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Summary 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises and sets the limits for two 
forms of legitimate regulatory interference with property, namely deprivation and 
expropriation. The focus of this dissertation is on the requirement in section 25(1) 
that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the 
Constitutional Court, deprivation is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it. 
The Court listed a number of factors to consider in determining whether there is a 
sufficient relationship between the purpose to be achieved by deprivation and the 
regulatory method chosen to achieve it. 
The outcome of the arbitrariness question depends on the level of scrutiny 
applied in a particular case. The level of scrutiny ranges from rationality review to 
proportionality review. Deprivation that results in an excessively harsh regulatory 
burden for one or a small group of property owners will probably be substantively 
arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Courts generally declare unconstitutional 
regulatory interferences with property rights invalid. However, invalidating legitimate 
regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose a harsh 
and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the 
regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose. Invalidating excessive 
regulatory measures may in some instances also be meaningless and may not 
constitute appropriate relief in vindicating the affected rights.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the appropriateness of 
alternative solutions to invalidating otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive 
regulatory deprivations of property. The goal is to identify remedies that allow courts 
to uphold the regulatory measure and simultaneously balance out the excessive 
regulatory burden it imposes on property owners.  
One alternative solution is to transform the excessive regulatory measure into 
expropriation and require the state to pay compensation to the affected owner. This 
approach is referred to as constructive expropriation. However, in view of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to and the wording of section 25 it seems unlikely 
that it will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution.  
Another alternative solution is for the legislature to include a statutory provision 
for compensation in the authorising statute. Examples from German, French, Dutch 
and Belgian law show that this approach balances out the excessive regulatory 
burden and allows courts to uphold the otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive 
regulatory statute without judicially transforming the deprivation into expropriation. An 
overview of South African law indicates that there is legislation that includes non-
expropriatory compensation provisions. In cases where the regulatory statute does 
not contain a compensation provision, the courts might consider reading such a duty 
to pay compensation into the legislation or awarding constitutional damages. 
In conclusion, it is possible for the state to deprive owners of property in a 
manner that may result in an excessive regulatory burden being suffered by one or a 
small group of property owners if the regulatory purpose is necessary in the public 
interest, provided that the legislature explicitly or implicitly provides for non-
expropriatory compensation in the regulatory statute. 
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Opsomming 
Artikel 25 van die Suid Afrikaanse Grondwet magtig en stel grense daar vir twee 
regmatige vorme van regulerende staatsinmenging met eiendom, naamlik ontneming 
en onteiening. Die fokus van hierdie proefskrif is op die vereiste in artikel 25(1) dat 
geen wet arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom mag toelaat nie. Volgens die 
Grondwetlike Hof is ŉ ontneming arbitrêr as daar nie ŉ voldoende rede daarvoor is 
nie. Die Hof het faktore gelys wat oorweeg moet word om te bepaal of daar ŉ 
voldoende verhouding bestaan tussen die doel wat die staat met ontneming van 
eiendom nastreef en die regulerende maatreël wat vir die doel gebruik word. 
 Die uitkoms van die toets vir arbitrêre ontneming hang af van die 
hersieningsstandaard wat die howe in ŉ spesifieke geval gebruik. Die standaard 
wissel van ŉ redelikheidstoets tot ŉ proporsionaliteitstoets. ŉ Ontneming wat ŉ 
oormatige swaar las op een of ŉ beperkte groep eienaars plaas sal waarskynlik 
arbitrêr en teenstrydig met artikel 25(1) wees. Die howe se benadering is om 
ongrondwetlike ontnemings van eiendom ongeldig te verklaar, maar dit is nie altyd 
geregverdig om toelaatbare en andersins regmatige ontnemings wat ŉ oormatige las 
op sommige eienaars plaas ongeldig te verklaar nie. Die ongeldigverklaring van 
wetgewing wat ŉ oormatige ontneming magtig mag soms ook nutteloos wees en nie 
ŉ gepaste remedie wees om die eienaar se regte te herstel nie. 
 Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die geskiktheid van alternatiewe 
oplossings tot die ongeldigverklaring van andersins regmatige maar oormatige 
ontnemings van eiendom te ondersoek Die doel is om remedies te identifiseer wat 
die howe toelaat om regulerende ontnemings in stand te hou en terselfdertyd die 
oormatige las op enkele eienaars uit te balanseer. 
 Een alternatiewe oplossing is om die oormatige ontneming te omskep in 
onteiening en die staat sodoende te verplig om aan die eienaar vergoeding te betaal. 
Hierdie benadering staan bekend as konstruktiewe onteiening. Gegewe die 
Grondwetlike Hof se benadering tot en die bewoording van artikel 25 is dit 
onwaarskynlik dat die howe konstruktiewe ontneming as ŉ oplossing sal aanvaar. 
 ŉ Ander alternatiewe oplossing is vir die wetgewer om ŉ statutêre bepaling vir 
vergoeding in die magtigende wetgewing in te voeg. Voorbeelde uit die Duitse, 
Franse, Nederlandse en Belgiese reg toon aan dat hierdie benadering ŉ oormatige 
las kan uitbalanseer en die howe toelaat om die andersins geldige en regmatige 
ontneming in stand te hou sonder om dit in onteiening te omskep. ŉ Oorsig van Suid 
Afrikaanse reg dui aan dat daar wetgewing bestaan wat wel voorsiening maak vir 
sodanige vergoeding. In gevalle waar die magtigende wetgewing nie vergoeding 
voorsien nie kan die howe oorweeg om ŉ vergoedingsplig in die wet in te lees of om 
grondwetlike vergoeding toe te ken.  
 Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit grondwetlik moontlik is vir 
die staat om eienaars van eiendom te ontneem op ŉ wyse wat soms daartoe kan lei 
dat enkele eienaars ŉ oormatige swaar las moet dra, mits die ontneming ŉ belangrike 
openbare doel dien en die wetgewer uitdruklik of implisiet voorsiening maak vir 
vergoeding.  
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1 Introduction: Arbitrary deprivation of property 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises two forms of state 
interference with property, namely deprivation and expropriation.1 Section 25(1) 
provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Section 25(2) 
and 25(3) set out the requirements for valid expropriation of property. Property may 
only be expropriated in terms of law of general application, for a public purpose or in 
the public interest and subject to just and equitable compensation. Compensation is 
generally not required for deprivation of property. However, the absence of a clear-
cut distinction between deprivation and expropriation creates uncertainty regarding 
the extent to which someone may legitimately be deprived of property without 
compensation. The question arises whether deprivation can shade into expropriation 
of property that would require compensation, specifically in instances where the 
regulatory burden that results from the exercise of the police power is so significant 
that it seems unfair not to compensate the affected property owner. To answer this 
question one must first understand what is meant by deprivation of property in terms 
of section 25(1) and what the implications and consequences are when a particular 
deprivation does not comply with the requirements in section 25(1).  
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance2 
(FNB) is the most comprehensive judicial authority to date on the interpretation, 
structure and application of section 25.3 The Constitutional Court introduced a 
                                                   
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
3
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 8, 193; H Mostert “Engaged citizenship and 
the enabling state as factors determining the interference parameter of property: A comparison of 
German and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273 at 242; H Mostert 
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methodology for the interpretation of section 25 to determine whether the relevant 
provision in that case constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property.  
 In terms of the FNB methodology the following questions need to be 
considered.4 Firstly, it must be established whether the affected interest qualifies as 
property for purposes of section 25.5 If the affected interest amounts to property, the 
second question is whether there has been a deprivation of such property. If there is 
                                                                                                                                                               
“Trends in the South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on property protection and 
regulation” 2007 Amicus Curiae 2-8 at 3; T Roux & D Davis “Property” in H Cheadle; D Davis & N 
Haysom (eds) South African constitutional law: The bill of rights (2
nd
 ed Issue 15 2013) chap 20 at 20-
6; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 10. The courts in Haffejee NO and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and 
Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) para 25 and Opperman v Boonzaaier and Others [2012] ZAWCHC 27 
(17 April 2012) para 19 stated that FNB is the starting point in the interpreting and application of 
section 25. It is important to note that the FNB decision only dealt with section 25(1)-(3) of the 
Constitution, which can be described as the protective function of the property clause. AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 12 explains that section 25 is a combination of two seemingly 
contradictory functions. Section 25(1)-(3) protects existing property interests against unconstitutional 
interference, and section 25(4)-(9) provides authority for state action aimed at the promotion of land 
and other related reforms.  
4
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
5
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 111 states that this is considered to be the 
“threshold question” for entry into the realm of constitutional property protection. In First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51 the Constitutional Court held that “it 
is practically impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive definition of 
property for purposes of section 25”. In Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister for 
Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) para 83 the Constitutional Court considered the meaning 
of property under section 25 to be a “vexed question”. Although section 25 does not contain a 
comprehensive definition of property, section 25(4)(b) provides that property is not limited to land. This 
indicates that both corporeal and incorporeal property enjoy protection. H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst 
“Property and the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights compendium (Issue 18 
2006) 3FB-20 state that the judiciary is generally responsible for defining the constitutional content 
and scope of property. According to T Allen “Commonwealth constitutions and the right not to be 
deprived of property” (1993) 42 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 523-552 at 527, most 
Commonwealth constitutions do not define “property” and leave it to the judiciary to decide what 
property means. Furthermore, where property is defined, it is done in an inclusive manner which 
entrusts the judiciary to determine the scope of its application. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property 
law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 84, 283-284 states that the “property” stage of the arbitrariness test is relatively 
unproblematic since the Constitutional Court tends to attach a generously wide interpretation to the 
property concept, whilst scrutinising the justification for the infringement more closely. According to 
Van der Walt, the courts’ generous approach to the property question is in line with other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, by focusing on one issue provides the easiest or least controversial solution to what may 
otherwise be a complicated or contested issue. See also I Currie & J De Waal The bill of rights 
handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 535-537; T Roux & D Davis “Property” in H Cheadle; D Davis & N Haysom 
(eds) South African constitutional law: The bill of rights (2
nd
 ed Issue 15 2013) chap 20 at 10-18(1); PJ 
Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
531; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 10; IM Rautenbach “Die reg op eiendom – Arbitrêre ontneming, 
proporsionaliteit en die algemene beperkingsbepaling in konteks” 2002 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse 
Reg 813-822 at 813. 
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proof of a deprivation, the third question is whether such deprivation is consistent 
with section 25(1). Section 25(1) requires deprivations to be authorised by law of 
general application and provides that no law may effect arbitrary deprivation. If the 
deprivation is inconsistent with section 25(1), and therefore arbitrary, the fourth 
question is whether such deprivation can be justified under section 36. If the 
deprivation is not authorised by law of general application or if the deprivation is 
arbitrary and cannot be justified under section 36 it will be the end of the matter.6 
However, if the deprivation is not arbitrary or if it is but can be justified under section 
36, the fifth question is whether the deprivation amounts to expropriation for 
purposes of section 25(2). If the deprivation amounts to expropriation, the sixth 
question is whether the expropriation complies with the requirements of section 
25(2)(a) and (b). However, if the expropriation does not comply with the said 
requirements, the last question is whether the expropriation can be justified under 
section 36.7 Moreover, if the deprivation amounts to expropriation, which is in conflict 
with section 25(2) or 25(3) but can be justified under section 36(1), it is valid. 
 This study is concerned with those regulatory deprivations that do not fall 
squarely within the category of constitutionally valid deprivation of property but do not 
constitute formal expropriation either. The cases in question are regulatory in form 
and purpose to the extent that they involve state interferences with private property 
that are authorised as and meant to function as regulatory deprivations and not as 
expropriations of property, but as regulatory deprivations they are excessive, even 
when they are properly authorised and otherwise valid and lawful, to the extent that 
                                                   
6
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 58. 
7
 F Michelman “Against regulatory taking: In defense of the two-stage inquiry: A reply to Theunis 
Roux” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 283-302 at 302 comments 
that this two-stage inquiry adopted by the Court is a “loud and clear token of the shift from a culture of 
authority to a culture of justification”.  
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their effects are excessively harmful (either in the extent to which they affect the 
property owner detrimentally or in that they single out one or a small number of 
owners). Therefore, the focus is specifically on excessive but otherwise valid and 
important regulatory deprivations of property. The aim of this study is, for cases of 
this nature, to identify the kind and level of scrutiny the courts apply to determine the 
extent of lawful regulatory deprivation of property and the consequences of 
regulatory infringements that meet the requirements of section 25(1) but nevertheless 
appear to have excessively harmful effects. The problem is that the courts might 
sometimes be hesitant to declare deprivations of this nature invalid simply because 
of their effects, both because they are otherwise lawful and because they might serve 
a valid and important regulatory purpose. One possibility is to treat excessive 
regulatory deprivations (hereafter excessive regulatory measures) as instances of 
expropriation, the idea being that payment of compensation might balance out the 
excessive harm they cause. This possibility is discussed in chapter 2. South African 
courts seem reluctant to follow this approach, also known as “constructive 
expropriation”. However, there are other alternative approaches that do not involve 
treating these excessive regulatory measures as expropriation. These alternative 
approaches are discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 4.  
 For purposes of this chapter the main focus is on the courts’ approach to 
determining whether the relevant infringement constitutes deprivation for purposes of 
section 25(1); whether the deprivation meets the requirements of section 25(1); and if 
not, whether it can be justified in terms of section 36(1). The courts’ analysis of 
expropriation will be discussed only in so far it relates to the analysis of regulatory 
deprivation of property. 
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2 Deprivation 
2 1 Defining what constitutes deprivation of property 
Section 25(1), which authorises deprivation of property, fulfils two functions.8 Firstly, it 
authorises the state to legitimately (for valid regulatory purposes) interfere with and 
limit the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property in accordance with the 
requirements in section 25(1). This is also known as the police power principle.9 
Secondly, the validity requirements contained in section 25(1) ensure that regulatory 
limitations on property rights are not arbitrary or unfair. 
 Van der Walt states that the decision in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC 
for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province Government and 
Another10 (Reflect All) explicitly confirms the police power principle in South African 
law.11 Sax states that the term “police power” has no exact definition.12 However, the 
term is used to describe those state actions that limit the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of property for the purpose of promoting and protecting public health and 
                                                   
8
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 17. 
9
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213; AJ van der Walt Property and 
constitution (2012) 29. 
10
 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 33. 
11
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 215. In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v 
MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province Government and Another 2009 (6) 
SA 391 (CC) para 33 Nkabinde J held that property rights “are far from absolute; they are determined 
and afforded by law and can be limited to facilitate the achievement of important social purposes. 
Whilst the exploitation of property remains an important incident of landownership, the state may 
regulate the use of private property in order to protect public welfare” (footnotes omitted). 
12
 JL Sax “Takings and the police power” (1964) 74 Yale Law Journal 36-76 at 36 fn 6. 
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safety.13 Moreover, the state may also exercise the police power to regulate and 
protect conflicting private property interests.14  
 Regulatory deprivations of property can take on various forms, including land-
use planning, building regulations, rent control, historic monument preservation, 
regulation of eviction procedures, mandatory licensing, various fiscal measures, 
environmental conservation, and forfeiture of property. Furthermore, deprivation is 
usually effected through or in terms of legislation or other law.15 State exercise of the 
regulatory police power almost always brings about a loss for the affected property 
holder, at least to the extent that her use of the property is restricted in some way, 
but compensation is as a rule not required for deprivation. The general scope of the 
impact of regulatory deprivations is one justification for the absence of compensation. 
Deprivation generally affects all property holders more or less equally and it often 
benefits them reciprocally.16 Furthermore, it would be impossible for the state to 
promote and protect the public interest by way of regulatory limitations on the use of 
property if it had to compensate every affected property holder.17 However, the state 
does not have unlimited power to limit property rights. The Constitution sets out the 
                                                   
13
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213-214; AJ van der Walt Property and 
constitution (2012) 29; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law 
of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 544. 
14
 JW Singer “Property as the law of democracy” (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287-1335 at 1296-
1297 states that property is a system and not just an individual entitlement. Property rights and 
externalities are inevitably bound and therefore, because property rights necessarily affect others, they 
must be regulated to ensure that they are compatible with the property rights and personal rights of 
others. JL Sax “Takings and the police power” (1964) 74 Yale Law Journal 36-76 at 62-63 states that 
the regulatory impact on the individual property owners is the same irrespective whether the state is 
acting in its core police power capacity or in its role as mediator between conflicting private interests. 
15
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 213. 
16
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 214. 
17
 Nkabinde J in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Province Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 67 held that “[f]orward 
planning and good governance … would become impossible if the State had to pay compensation 
every time it proposed a project in the public interest”. See also Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 
US 393 (1922) para 413 in which the US Supreme Court held that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if 
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law”. 
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perimeters within which the state may legitimately limit property rights. The 
constitutional protection of property by way of limiting the state’s police power differs 
in the various jurisdictions that are discussed in the following chapters. 
 With regard to South African law, section 25(1) provides that the state may only 
limit property rights in terms of law of general application. A regulatory measure that 
is not authorised by law of general application is invalid and cannot be salvaged. 
Deprivations of that kind are not considered here. Furthermore, no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Before one can consider whether a regulatory 
limitation is arbitrary, as set out in the FNB decision, it first has to be established 
whether the limitation is a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1). 
Although the definition of deprivation seems more or less settled the 
Constitutional Court has not always understood and applied the term “deprivation” 
uniformly. In the FNB decision the Court attached a wide interpretation to the term 
“deprivation”, stating that “any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of 
private property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or 
right to or in the property concerned”.18 However, in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality 
and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others19 (Mkontwana), the 
Court defined deprivation more narrowly than it did in FNB when it held that 
“[w]hether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference 
with or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation … at the very least, substantial 
interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use 
                                                   
18
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57.  
19
 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to 
deprivation”.20 
Subsequent to the Mkontwana decision, in Reflect-All the Constitutional Court 
referred to both the FNB and the Mkontwana interpretations of deprivation.21 The 
Court found that the relevant regulatory provision that places an embargo on the 
transfer of property deprived the property owners of some aspect of the use, 
enjoyment and exploitation of their properties.22 According to Van der Walt, the 
Court’s finding is an indication that it followed the wider FNB rather than the narrower 
Mkontwana approach in terms of the interpretation of deprivation.23 
 However, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others24 (Offit) the Constitutional Court created confusion 
when it referred to the FNB interpretation but then seemed to follow the definition in 
Mkontwana. It stated that “there must at least be ‘substantial interference’ in order to 
warrant consideration by this court in this matter of whether there has been an 
unconstitutional infringement of s[ection] 25(1).”25 However, Van der Walt points out 
that although the Court cited the Mkontwana definition of deprivation, it in fact applied 
the FNB definition.26 In Offit, the Court’s focus was on distinguishing between 
significant and insignificant deprivation, rather than between “normal” deprivation and 
                                                   
20
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
21
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
22
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 38. 
23
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 207, 258. See also J van Wyk Planning 
law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 217. 
24
 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC). 
25
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2011 (1) SA 293 (CC) para 39. 
26
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 207. 
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deprivation that exceeds what is normal in an open and democratic society, which 
formed the core of the Mkontwana definition. 
 Van der Walt criticises the additional qualification “normal in an open and 
democratic society” that the Court added to the definition of deprivation in the 
Mkontwana decision.27 According to Van der Walt, the addition of the phrase “normal 
in an open and open and democratic society” is an overstatement since all valid 
regulatory restrictions on the use and enjoyment of property are normal in such a 
society.28 It is not necessary to use section 25(1) to strike down undemocratic, 
illegitimate regulatory state action, since more suitable mechanisms are provided for 
that purpose in the Constitution.29 Furthermore, limiting the section 25(1) enquiry to 
“substantial or abnormal” restrictions serves no useful purpose and could unleash an 
unnecessary interpretative struggle to determine whether a restriction is substantial 
enough to qualify as deprivation.30 Moreover, in Mkontwana O’Regan J in a minority 
judgment held that it would defeat the purpose of section 25(1) if deprivation were to 
be read narrowly.31 The extent of the deprivation and the effect on the property 
                                                   
27
 AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 79. 
28
 AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 80 
questions whether the insertion of the particular phrase might have been an early indication that the 
Court was going to hand down a “government-friendly judgment” in this case. 
29
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 205 states that the rule of law principle, 
the equality provision (section 9) and the just administrative action guarantee (section 33) in the 
Constitution are more commonly used mechanisms to review and declare undemocratic, illegitimate 
state action unconstitutional. 
30
 AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 80. See 
also I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 541. 
31
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 89. 
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holder are two of the considerations to determine whether deprivation is arbitrary.32 
Section 25(1) is not only aimed at preventing excessive regulatory deprivation but 
also to control that normal regulatory deprivation is generally properly authorised.33 
Therefore, to restrict deprivation to extremely harsh or serious interferences with 
property would not make much sense.34 A wider interpretation of deprivation is 
justified when regarding the purpose of section 25(1), the legality requirement, and 
the fact that deprivation is normally not compensated.35 If section 25(1) was restricted 
to “interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions”, it would lead to 
undemocratic consequences because the majority of state actions would be 
excluded from judicial and constitutional review merely because they appear “normal” 
on face value.36 
 Furthermore, in Offit the Court may have interpreted the Mkontwana definition 
of deprivation simply to mean that the limitations placed on property rights must be 
significant, in the sense of something more than de minimis, for them to qualify as 
deprivation in terms of section 25(1).37 The Court indicated in both Reflect-All and 
Offit that regulatory state action must at least have a legally significant impact on the 
property holder in the sense of having made a legally relevant impact, before it would 
be eligible to be considered deprivation under section 25(1).38 According to Van der 
                                                   
32
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 90. 
33
 AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 80. 
34
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 205. 
35
 AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 80. 
36
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 206. 
37
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 264. 
38
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209. 
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Walt, the Offit decision would not have been decided differently if the FNB definition 
had been used, since FNB also indicated that only legally significant restrictions on 
property rights would be considered deprivation in terms of section 25(1).39 
Therefore, the simplest solution is to adhere to the FNB definition of deprivation, 
subject to the de minimis principle; and to accept that the scope of the deprivation is 
only relevant in so far it might affect the level of judicial scrutiny concerning whether 
the deprivation complies with the requirements of section 25(1).40 
 
2 2 Requirements for valid deprivation of property 
2 2 1 Introduction 
Once it is established that the interest claimed to be infringed is property for 
purposes of section 25 and that there is a deprivation of such property, the court 
needs to consider whether the deprivation complies with the requirements of section 
25(1).41 Section 25 confirms that property rights are not absolute and may be subject 
to limitation by the state for public purposes. However, the state’s power in this 
regard is not unlimited. Section 25(1) contains two explicit requirements for a valid 
deprivation of property, namely that the deprivation must be authorised by law of 
general application and that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Moreover, another implicit requirement is that the deprivation must be for a public 
purpose. If these requirements are not met, the deprivation will be unconstitutional 
and invalid unless it can be justified under section 36. 
                                                   
39
 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2010 (4) Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.2.1; AJ van der 
Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209, 264. 
40
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209. 
41
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. 
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2 2 2 Law of general application 
Section 25(1) provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
The first requirement in terms of section 25(1) is therefore that the state action must 
be authorised by law of general application. Courts interpret the term “law” 
generously.42 Both original and delegated legislation43 as well as the common law44 
and customary law45 are regarded as law of general application.  
Significantly, if the state action which results in deprivation of property is not 
authorised by law, such state action is invalid. That will be the end of the matter.46 
Van der Walt states that the “law of general application” requirement in section 25(1) 
ensures that the constitutionally recognised sources of law comply with specified 
constitutional requirements if they limit constitutional rights.47 This dissertation does 
not deal with deprivation of property that is invalid because it is not authorised by law 
of general application. 
                                                   
42
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 169. Section 2 of the Interpretation Act 
33 of 1957 defines law as “any law, proclamation, ordinance, Act of Parliament or other enactment 
having the force of law.” 
43
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 156, 540; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 545.  
44
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 156; MD Southwood The compulsory 
acquisition of rights by expropriation, way of necessity, prescription, labour tenancy and restitution 
(2000) 16; AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 25. AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 234 points out that neighbour law is an example of common law that could 
deprive a property holder of property for a regulatory purpose. See also Thebus and Another v S 2003 
(6) SA 505 (CC) para 65; Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) paras 
44, 136. 
45
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 156; AJ van der Walt Property and 
constitution (2012) 14, 25-26; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 545. 
46
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 4. 
47
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 28. 
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2 2 3 Public purpose 
Section 25(1) does not explicitly state that deprivation of property must be for a public 
purpose. However, Van der Walt argues that the state’s regulatory power to impose 
limitations on the use of property by way of deprivation is subject to an implicit public 
purpose requirement.48 The public purpose requirement can be inferred from either 
the law of general application or the non-arbitrariness requirement.49 According to 
Van der Walt, the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1), together with the 
arbitrariness test set out in FNB, enables the recognition of a public purpose 
requirement because the “proscription of arbitrary deprivation is intended to ensure 
that deprivation of property is imposed with due regard for proportionality between 
the public interest served by regulation and the private interests affected by it”.50 
Furthermore, the traditional function of regulatory deprivation, namely limiting the use 
and enjoyment of property to protect and promote health and safety and other 
legitimate public interests, also facilitates the recognition of a public purpose 
requirement because action that promotes public health and safety will no doubt 
serve a public purpose.51 It is unclear whether the implicit public purpose requirement 
for deprivation would require a different level of scrutiny than the explicit public 
purpose or public interest requirement for expropriation.52 In most instances the two 
                                                   
48
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 29. 
49
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 228. 
50
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 228. T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T 
Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 23 states 
that the courts in the application of the arbitrariness test “will seek to strike the required balance 
between the individual right to property and the public purpose sought to be pursued in, or the public 
interest underlying, the law in question”. 
51
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 227, 228. 
52
 See BV Slade “‛Public purpose or public interest’ and third party transfers” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 166-206 for a discussion on the distinction between public purpose and public 
interest in the context of expropriation (section 25(2)). 
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tests will coincide. This dissertation does not deal with deprivation of property that is 
unconstitutional because it does not serve a legitimate public purpose. 
 
2 2 4 No one may be deprived of property arbitrarily53 
Once the first requirement, namely law of general application that authorises 
deprivation of property is complied with, the second requirement provides that no law 
may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. In FNB the Court embarked on a 
comparative analysis of foreign law in an attempt to determine the meaning of the 
word “arbitrary” in section 25(1). The Court held that the word “arbitrary” should be 
interpreted in the context of section 25, the Constitution as a whole and the historical 
context of property in South Africa.54 The Court stated that the non-arbitrariness 
requirement in section 25 requires something more than mere rationality analysis but 
less strict than a full-scale proportionality evaluation under section 36.55 
The Court attached substantive content to the word “arbitrary” and concluded 
that “deprivation of property is ‘arbitrary’ as meant by section 25 when the ‘law’ 
                                                   
53
 The FNB methodology provides for two forms of arbitrary deprivation, namely substantive 
arbitrariness and procedural arbitrariness. However, for purposes of this dissertation only substantive 
arbitrariness is considered and discussed. Excessive regulatory measures will generally constitute 
substantive arbitrary deprivation of property. The various approaches evaluated in this study all 
concern the payment of compensation, albeit on different legal bases, to reduce the burden that 
results from the regulation and thereby prevent it from being arbitrary. However, procedurally arbitrary 
deprivation can never be rectified by the payment of compensation. See First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. See also AJ van der Walt 
“Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law Review 88-94; AJ van der 
Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 264-270; I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights 
handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 540-542; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 25-26 for a discussion on 
procedural fairness. 
54
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 63-66. 
55
 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 99 the 
Constitutional Court held that “[t]his is so because the standard set in section 36 is ‘reasonableness’ 
and ‘justifiability’, whilst the standard set in section 25 is ‘arbitrariness’”. 
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referred to in section 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the particular 
deprivation”.56 Sufficient reason is to be determined by evaluating the relationship 
between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved. This requires a 
complexity of relationships to be considered, namely the relationship between the 
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected; the 
relationship between the deprivation and the nature of the property; and the extent of 
the deprivation.57 The applicable level of scrutiny is dependent on the purpose sought 
to be achieved by the deprivation and the nature and extent of the property affected. 
When ownership of land is affected, a more compelling purpose is required to 
establish sufficient reason.58 Furthermore, when the deprivation embraces all the 
incidents of ownership the purpose of the deprivation will also have to be more 
compelling than in cases where only some incidents are affected or when certain 
incidents are only partially affected.59  
 
                                                   
56
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100; AJ van 
der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 75-89 at 78. 
57
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
58
 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 54, 56 the 
Constitutional Court held that factors such as the subjective interest of the owner in the object, the 
economic value of the right, or the fact that the owner makes no or limited use of the object in question 
play no role in the characterisation of the right. However, these factors may be relevant in deciding 
whether deprivation is arbitrary. 
59
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. According 
to T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 272-273, the factors listed in para 100 of 
FNB indicate that judicial review is determined according to the nature of the property right affected by 
the regulatory scheme. This approach is similar to that followed in the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s differentiated protection of property interests according to their social function. Roux contrasts 
this with the approach followed in the Commonwealth, where a uniform standard of review is generally 
applied once it is determined that the claimant’s interest amounts to constitutional property. In the 
Commonwealth, the nature of the property as well as the number of incidents of ownership affected by 
the regulatory scheme is only relevant to the threshold question. 
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2 2 5 Different levels of judicial scrutiny 
The arbitrariness test is in essence an exercise in balancing various interests, where 
the meaning of non-arbitrariness fluctuates according to the level of judicial 
scrutiny.60 According to Roux, the factors listed by the Court to determine “sufficient 
reason” is an indication that constitutional property cases will be decided on varying 
levels of judicial scrutiny, depending on the seriousness of the deprivation and the 
impact it has on the claimant. The state’s “justificatory burden” will be greater the 
more drastic the deprivation and the more extensive its impact.61 There may be 
circumstances when sufficient reason is established by no more than a rational 
relationship between means and ends. In others, sufficient reason may only be 
established by a proportionality evaluation that comes closer to (but never quite 
reaches) the level of scrutiny required by a full-scale limitation analysis in terms of 
section 36(1).62 This variable approach is beneficial because, on the one hand, it 
enables the courts to show the necessary deference when reviewing the impact on 
property rights of public health and safety regulations and important social 
programmes, such as land reform; while on the other hand, in cases where the state 
overzealously regulates property in pursuit of less compelling goals, it allows the 
courts to apply a higher level of scrutiny to provide adequate protection.63 
 Roux states that the scrutiny of deprivation may not always be as “thick” as it 
was in FNB due to the fact that the FNB approach “leaves much scope for judicial 
                                                   
60
 PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 529; H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) 
Bill of rights compendium (Issue 18 2006) 3FB-17. 
61
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 273. 
62
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
63
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 274. 
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discretion”, whereby courts may adjust the level of scrutiny of the enquiry according 
to the facts of the particular case and the factors to be taken in account.64 The 
outcome of a case will largely be determined by the level of scrutiny that the court 
decides to apply. Roux’s prediction was proven correct in the Mkontwana decision.65 
According to Roux, the grounds for the application of the one or the other level of 
judicial scrutiny should be clear and ascertainable in advance.66  
 Apart from the varying level of scrutiny, Roux criticises the Court’s approach in 
FNB for creating a “vortex” whereby issues that may have been addressed at other 
stages of the property inquiry are telescoped into the single, dominating question of 
whether there is sufficient reason for a law infringing on property.67 According to 
Roux, this approach will tend to resolve cases on an ad hoc facts-focused basis 
rather than a principled one.68 Another implication is that foreign law will play little or 
no role in future constitutional property law cases because the multi-factor balancing 
test set out in FNB is aimed at focusing the court’s attention on the facts of the 
                                                   
64
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 23-24 states that the Constitutional Court, in formulating the FNB 
methodology, deliberately retained an almost absolute discretion to decide future cases in the manner 
it deems fit. See also AJ van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action 
Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng” (2005) 122 South African Law 
Journal 75-89 at 79. 
65
 See the discussion of the Mkontwana decision below. 
66
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 274. 
67
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 3; T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law 
after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 270; H 
Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights 
compendium (Issue 18 2006) 3FB-18. 
68
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 275. 
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particular case, rather than on principles or rules that may have been developed in 
other jurisdictions.69 
 
2 2 6 Application of the arbitrariness test 
The FNB decision provides a framework for the meaning and interpretation of section 
25.70 The FNB decision is specifically important for the application of the arbitrariness 
test, which requires the court to establish whether there is sufficient reason for a 
deprivation. The meaning of “sufficient reason” is flexible. Deprivation is justified 
when there is a sufficient relationship between the means employed, namely the 
deprivation in question, and the ends sought to be achieved, namely the regulatory 
purpose of the law in question.71 This means-ends analysis requires an evaluation of 
the purpose for the deprivation, the person whose property is affected, the nature of 
the property and the extent of the deprivation in respect of such property.72 In some 
circumstances the legislative purpose of the deprivation may be so important that no 
more than a rational connection between means and ends would be required, while 
in other instances the ends would have to be more compelling to prevent the 
deprivation from being arbitrary.73 According to the Court, where the property in 
question is ownership of land or a corporeal movable, a more compelling purpose will 
                                                   
69
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 281. 
70
 See the discussion above. 
71
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
72
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
73
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 66; Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province Government 
and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 
ed 2011) 245-246. 
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have to be established for the deprivation to be justified. Similarly, when the 
deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of ownership, the purpose for the 
deprivation will also have to be more compelling.74 Furthermore, with regard to the 
extent of the deprivation the Court has indicated that a lower level of scrutiny is 
required when the deprivation in question is slight and a higher level of scrutiny when 
it is substantial or significant.75 Where on the continuum the applicable standard of 
review will fall will depend on the legislative purpose and the factual circumstances of 
the case. The application of the arbitrariness test by the courts is discussed below 
with regard to three Constitutional Court decisions, namely First National Bank of SA 
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance76 (FNB); Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for 
Local Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others77 
(Mkontwana) and Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Province Government and Another78 (Reflect All). 
The first consideration in terms of the FNB arbitrariness test is the purpose for 
the deprivation. Van der Walt points out that very little has been said about how the 
level of scrutiny is related to the purpose for the deprivation.79 According to Van der 
Walt, the purpose for the deprivation is subjected to judicial scrutiny, but only in 
relation to the nexus between the purpose for the deprivation, the nature of the 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
75
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 229. 
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 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
79
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
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 ed 2011) 229. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
property, the person affected and the extent of the deprivation.80 Foreign law 
provides a good example of how the purpose for the deprivation determines the level 
of judicial scrutiny. In terms of foreign law, deprivation of property falling within the 
core function of the police power, namely limiting property rights for the protection of 
public health and safety, is usually subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny; 
whereas deprivations that fall outside the core function of the police power, moving 
into borderline or less compelling public interest areas may require a higher level of 
scrutiny.81  
According to Van der Walt, FNB provides some indication, albeit vaguely, that 
the purpose of the deprivation can play a role in deciding the applicable level of 
scrutiny.82 In terms of the FNB decision, a higher level of judicial scrutiny could apply 
when the purpose of the regulation is to make it easier for the state to carry out its 
day-to-day business, such as collecting debts or taxes.83 The FNB case dealt with 
the constitutionality of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
Section 114 was a fiscal measure that authorised a dispossession of all rights, use 
and benefit an owner had in corporeal movable goods. The deprivation was intended 
to secure payment of outstanding customs debts and assumed the form of granting 
the state a statutory lien over certain goods. Section 114 was widely formulated and 
applied irrespective of any significant nexus between the Commissioner of South 
African Revenue and the non-debtor third party over whose property a lien was 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
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 ed 2011) 229. 
81
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
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borderline public purpose. 
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created.84 The detention of the goods could continue indefinitely and the goods could 
be sold in execution to satisfy the outstanding customs debt. In the latter event, the 
Commissioner would by virtue of section 114 enjoy preference on the proceeds of 
the sale. The Court held that statutory fiscal provisions were not immune from 
constitutional scrutiny, no matter how indispensable they may be for the economic 
well-being of the country.85 The purpose of section 114 was to create a powerful 
mechanism for exacting customs debts. According to the Court, this is a legitimate 
and important legislative purpose.86 However, Van der Walt points out that the 
purpose of section 114 does not fall within the core function of the police power, 
namely protecting and promoting public health and safety, but rather in the less 
compelling public interest area of assisting the state in its day-to-day functioning such 
as collecting taxes and debts; thus indicating a level of scrutiny that is higher than 
mere rationality review.87 Furthermore, the nature of the property was ownership of 
corporeal movables (motor vehicles) and the deprivation embraced all the incidents 
of ownership (use and enjoyment of the property),88 both indicating that more 
compelling reasons are required for the deprivation to be justified. The Court found 
that the property had no connection to the customs debt and that FNB had no 
connection to the transaction that gave rise to the customs debt and had not placed 
the customs debtor in possession of the property under circumstances that induced 
                                                   
84
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 36. The effect 
of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act was that property, unrelated to the customs debt and 
belonging to an innocent third party (in this case FNB) who is not a customs debtor was also subject to 
the statutory lien. 
85
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 31. 
86
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
87
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 228. 
88
 Although the Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) para 24 stated that the detention of goods does not constitute an actual infringement 
of a right in the sense of losing ownership it does constitute a continuing and real threat of sale. 
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the Commissioner to act to his detriment in relation to the incurring of customs debt.89 
In this regard, the Court held that section 114 “cast the net far too wide”.90 The 
absence of a sufficient relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the 
nature of the property and the person affected by deprivation rendered section 114 
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1). The Court accordingly declared section 114 
constitutionally invalid to the extent that it subjected goods owned by a person who 
was not the customs debtor to a lien that might result in the detention and sale of the 
goods for the purpose of exacting customs debts.91 
 Subsequent to FNB, the Mkontwana case also dealt with a statutory fiscal 
provision that effected a regulatory deprivation aimed at assisting the state in 
carrying out its day-to-day business of collecting taxes and debts. The case 
concerned the constitutional validity of section 118(1) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 that in effect placed an embargo on the transfer of 
immovable property in certain circumstances. Section 118(1) provides that the 
Registrar of Deeds may only register a transfer upon production of a certificate 
issued by the Municipality stating that the consumption charges that became due 
during the two years preceding the date of application for the certificate has been 
fully paid. No distinction was made between consumption charges accumulated by 
owners who occupied their own property and persons who occupied property owned 
by someone else. Many owners who did not occupy their own property were unaware 
of the substantial outstanding consumption charges incurred by the occupiers (both 
lawful and unlawful) of the relevant property. The provision was challenged on the 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
90
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 133. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
basis that it constituted arbitrary deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) 
of the Constitution.  
 A deprivation is arbitrary if the relation between the means employed and ends 
sought to be achieved is insufficient, having regard to the purpose for the deprivation, 
the nature of the property and the person affected and the extent of the deprivation. 
Similar to the FNB decision, the purpose of section 118(1) is a non-core police power 
purpose aimed at fiscal efficiency or state governance considerations and as such it 
should be subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.92 The nature of the property 
affected in this case was immovable property, which requires more compelling 
reasons for the deprivation to be justified. The deprivation only applies to property 
that cannot be transferred due to outstanding consumption charges owed to the 
relevant Municipality in which the property was situated. The Court nevertheless held 
that the services the Municipality rendered to the properties in question were 
essential for the occupiers’ use and enjoyment of the property and these services 
also increased the value of the property.93 Section 118(1) accordingly established a 
sufficient relationship between the consumption charges and the property. 
Furthermore, the deprivation only limited the owner’s right to alienate his property, 
which is just one of the incidents of ownership, and even then only temporarily, until 
such time as the outstanding consumption charges have been paid.94  
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 230-231. Section 118(1) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act states that no transfer of immovable property may be registered 
without a certificate issued by the Municipality in which the relevant property is situated, stating that all 
consumption charges that became due “in connection with that property” have been fully paid (own 
emphasis). 
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 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 40, 
110. 
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 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 33, 91 
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 The Court’s argument is not above criticism. In terms of the FNB arbitrariness 
test, a more compelling purpose will have to be established when the deprivation 
embraces all the incidents of ownership compared to when the deprivation only 
affects some incidents of ownership and those incidents only partially.95 The extent of 
deprivation depends on the extent of the owners’ indebtedness to the Municipality. It 
is possible that the consumption charges accumulated over the two year period may 
be so high as to exceed the market value of the relevant property and thereby render 
a sale uneconomical. Therefore, the extent of deprivation will have to be determined 
on an ad hoc basis. With regard to the person affected by the deprivation, a 
distinction was drawn between owners who occupy their own property and non-
owner occupiers. The constitutionality of the deprivation with regard to the first 
category of owners was not in dispute. There was no doubt that there was a sufficient 
reason for the deprivation of the property in those cases.96 However the relation 
between the deprivation and the category of non-owner occupiers is more 
problematic. The court a quo concluded that there was no connection between 
section 118(1) and the affected persons on the basis that the provision applied in the 
case of a vast array of non-owners, in particular to unlawful occupiers who never had 
the owner’s consent to occupy.97 However, the Constitutional Court held that there is 
always a level at which the owner and the debt are connected regardless of the 
nature of the relationship between the owner and the occupier and whether the 
                                                                                                                                                               
the Constitutional Court held that the right to alienate property is an important incident of property 
rights. 
95
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
96
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 112. 
97
 Nkuthula Phyllis Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Municipality and Others (SECLD) Case No 1238/02; 
Peter William Bisset and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others (SECLD) Case No 903/2002, 
13 September 2003 (unreported decisions). 
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property is lawfully occupied.98 The Court stated that the owner was bound to the 
property by reason of his ownership, which entails certain rights and 
responsibilities.99 Section 118(1) was concerned, amongst other things, with the 
question whether the Municipality or the property owners should bear the risk when 
non-owner occupiers who were obliged to make these payments in the first instance 
failed to do so.100 The purpose of section 118(1) was to place the risk on property 
owners.101 The Court concluded that there may be instances, notably in the case of 
unlawful occupiers, where it is arguable that the supply of municipal services to the 
property for consumption by the occupier is of no benefit to that owner, but it was 
nevertheless fallacious to require that the owner must benefit from the consumption 
charge before it can be said that there is a relationship between the consumption 
charge and the property owner.102 According to the Court the strong relationship 
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 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 41. 
99
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 41, 
109. According to the Constitutional Court, owners have a responsibility to take steps to limit the 
potential municipal debt in respect of their properties and thereby have some power to limit the 
potential deprivation of their right to alienate their property. These steps include careful selection of 
tenants with an eye to ensuring that they will be able to meet financial responsibilities; owners can 
include provisions in lease agreements which will promote payment of municipal charges; owners can 
install pre-paid meters on their premises and require occupiers to pay for the use of electricity in 
advance (thereby eliminating municipal debt); or owners can take steps to evict unlawful occupiers 
who are consuming municipal services. 
100
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 38. 
101
 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 38 the 
Constitutional Court held that the “purpose is important, laudable and has the potential to encourage 
regular payments of consumption charges and thereby to contribute to the effective discharge by 
municipalities of their constitutionally mandated functions. It also has the potential to encourage 
owners of property to discharge their civic responsibility by doing what they can to ensure that money 
payable to a government organ for the delivery of service is timeously paid”. 
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 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 42, 
115-116. In the minority judgment O’Regan J held that despite being practically cumbersome, the 
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between the consumption charges and the property compensated for the attenuated 
relationship between the consumption charge and the owner.103 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that section 118(1) did not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property for 
purposes of section 25(1). 
 The purpose for the deprivation is one of the considerations that need to be 
taken into account when courts determine the applicable level of scrutiny to the 
property dispute before it. Van der Walt explains the foreign law approach to using 
the purpose of the deprivation as an indication of the level of judicial scrutiny.104 In 
terms of the foreign law approach, a low level of scrutiny is required for regulatory 
deprivations that fall within the core function of the police power, namely protecting 
and promoting public health and safety, whereas a higher level of scrutiny is required 
for regulatory deprivations that fall outside this core function of the police power. 
Although it seems that the Court in FNB followed a similar approach, in the sense of 
applying a higher level of scrutiny (something closer to proportionality) to regulatory 
deprivations aimed at promoting the state’s fiscal efficiency, which fall outside the 
core function of the police power, it did not adhere to this approach in the Mkontwana 
decision. In Mkontwana the Court regarded the purpose of section 118(1) as 
important enough to indicate a lower level of scrutiny (something closer to rationality 
than proportionality), although it in fact fulfilled a similar function as section 114 did in 
FNB, namely enabling the state to collect debts and taxes. It may not always be easy 
to determine whether the purpose for a deprivation falls within the core function of the 
police power. In some cases the purpose of the deprivation can easily be classified 
                                                                                                                                                               
payment-inducing effect of section 118(1) would lose its vigour if the scope of the provision was 
narrowed to a particular class of occupiers. 
103
 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local 
Government and Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 60. 
104
 See the discussion of the different levels of scrutiny above. 
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as falling within the core function of the police power, for example legislation 
regulating the use and enjoyment of firearms to protect public safety.105 In other 
cases it is more difficult to classify the public importance of the regulatory deprivation, 
for example road planning regulations.106  
 Roux’s prediction seems to be accurate that the outcome of a case will largely 
be determined by the level of scrutiny the court decides to apply.107 The cases 
discussed above indicate that the level of scrutiny is determined on a case by case 
basis. Furthermore, the FNB arbitrariness test leaves much scope for judicial 
discretion. This is evident in the Court’s inconsistent approach to the purpose for the 
deprivation, one of the factors to consider in determining the level of scrutiny, in the 
FNB and Mkontwana decisions. The wide scope of judicial discretion in determining 
the level of scrutiny is also evident in the different conclusions reached by the 
majority and minority in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Province Government and Another108 (Reflect All). In 
Reflect All the constitutionality of section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport 
Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 (hereafter the Act) was challenged. The Act came into 
operation in 2003 and replaced the Transvaal Roads Ordinance 22 of 1957 
                                                   
105
 The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 prohibits the possession of firearms without a licence and 
restricts the number of licences a person may hold in respect certain types of firearms. In Justice 
Alliance of South African and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others [2012] 
ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012) (Justice Alliance) the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider the 
constitutionality of the provisions of the Act that rendered firearms once held legally in terms of the 
Arms and Ammunitions Act 75 of 1969 (repealed and replaced by the Firearms Control Act) unlawful 
and subject to forfeiture to the state to be destroyed without compensation. The extent of the 
deprivation was severe, namely total loss of the property. However, the purpose for the deprivation 
was regarded as crucial and therefore the level of scrutiny was low in the sense that the means 
chosen, namely total deprivation of all incidents of ownership of the firearms was rationally connected 
to the ends sought to be achieved, namely protecting the public safety. See chapter 4 for a discussion 
of the Firearms Control Act and the Justice Alliance decision. 
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 In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Province Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 50, 64 the Constitutional Court held 
that road planning is an important mechanism for promoting economic growth and welfare. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the planning process has economic value and is in the long run in the 
public interest.  
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(hereafter the Ordinance) in terms of which route determinations and preliminary 
designs for future provincial roads were published in the Provincial Gazette. There 
were no legal restrictions on the use of land within the route determinations or the 
preliminary designs under the Ordinance. However, the Act changed the procedures 
for the establishment of route determinations and preliminary designs as well as the 
legal restrictions imposed on land affected by such routes and designs. Both 
subsections 10(1) and 10(3) imposed a number of legal restrictions upon land 
affected by route determinations and preliminary designs accepted under the 
Ordinance. Section 10(1) concerned route determinations and section 10(3) 
concerned preliminary designs. The Constitutional Court was asked to determine 
whether subsections 10(1) and 10(3), which in effect froze the land within the road or 
rail reserve, constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Section 10(1) invoked legal restrictions under section 7, which 
provided that no services may be laid over or below the land falling within the route 
determinations without the written permission of the Member of the Executive Council 
for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government (hereafter 
the MEC) or in terms of a registered servitude. Property owners could apply for 
certain changes to the affected land provided that such application was accompanied 
by a report by a civil engineer. Section 10(3) invoked legal restrictions under section 
9, which inter alia prohibited the granting of applications for the establishment of 
townships and or any change of land use in terms of any law or town planning. 
Section 8(9) empowered the MEC to amend preliminary road designs upon written 
application by anyone who desired such preliminary design to be amended, 
accompanied by the payment of the prescribed fee.  
The Constitutional Court concluded that section 10(1) and 10(3) did deprive the 
property owners affected by these provisions in some respect of the use, enjoyment 
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and exploitation of their properties.109 The Court proceeded to consider whether the 
deprivation was arbitrary. The Court followed the FNB arbitrariness test and 
considered the purpose for the deprivation. Although the Court accepted that road 
planning is an important mechanism for promoting economic growth and welfare it 
stated that it cannot be gainsaid that regulation of the use of property in this case 
was for the public good.110 This statement seems to adopt something similar to the 
foreign law approach discussed above in the sense that road planning regulations 
are not considered to fall within the core function of the police power and might 
therefore require a higher level of judicial scrutiny than mere rationality. The property 
affected by the deprivation was immovable, which would in terms of the FNB 
arbitrariness test require more compelling reasons for the deprivation. Furthermore, 
the Act only applied to owners of properties falling within the route determinations 
and preliminary designs accepted under the Ordinance and subsequently the Act. It 
is interesting to note that the minority and the majority judgment differed on whether 
there was a sufficient relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the 
extent and impact of the deprivation on affected property owners. Although the 
deprivation affected immovable property, the property owners were not deprived of 
their property in entirety.111 Furthermore, the limiting provision of the Act deprived the 
land owner only of the right to exploit the affected part of the land within the road 
reserve.112 The Court also considered the indefinite-time aspect of the deprivation.113 
Some of the road schemes under the Ordinance are over three decades old. Most of 
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Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 38. 
110
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Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 64. 
113
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 69-70. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
these road determinations and designs have not been implemented and it was 
unclear when, if ever, such roads will be built.114 However, the Court also considered 
the expenses the state incurred in the development of these route determinations 
and preliminary designs.115 The majority held that the obstacles created by sections 
10(1) and 10(3) were not insurmountable. The affected property owners could 
approach the MEC in terms of section 8(9) and request that the preliminary road 
designs be amended. Furthermore, section 9 authorised the MEC to relax the 
prohibition in relation to access roads. The amendment and relaxation procedure, 
according to the majority of the Constitutional Court, significantly reduced the impact 
of the deprivation and struck a balance between the protection of individual property 
rights on the one hand, and the protection of the Province’s legitimate interest in the 
hypothetical road network, on the other.116 Therefore, the majority concluded that 
sections 10(1) and 10(3) did not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property as meant 
in section 25(1) of the Constitution.117  
Although both the majority and the minority applied a higher level of scrutiny, 
the minority disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the deprivation was 
proportionate to the extent of the deprivation.118 In the minority judgment O’Regan J 
disagreed with the majority’s finding that section 10(3) did not constitute arbitrary 
                                                   
114
 In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Province Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 18, 67 the Constitutional Court stated 
that there was no principle in law that obliged the state to implement a road scheme merely because 
its planning has been approved. 
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 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
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deprivation of property.119 According to O’Regan J, the limitation of the landowners’ 
rights occasioned by section 10(3) was quite weighty.120 Moreover, O’Regan J did 
not view the amendment and relaxation measures provided for in section 8 and 9 of 
the Act as sufficient to reduce the impact of the deprivation. O’Regan J stated that 
the MEC would surely be reluctant to amend a preliminary design on the application 
of one landowner. Road design required comprehensive determination in one 
process at one time. The amendment of a preliminary design may have the 
consequence of threatening the viability of the road design in its entirety or of 
imposing burdens on other landowners.121 Therefore, piecemeal amendment of a 
preliminary road design in a manner that could significantly reduce the burdens on 
landowners affected by the proposed road was likely to be rare. The minority 
therefore argued that section 10(3) deprived a landowner of the right to seek 
permission to develop the land, to subdivide it or to change its land use. Furthermore, 
the absence of a provision for future review of preliminary designs in the Act allowed 
for the deprivation to endure indefinitely. The minority also considered the fact that 
the Act affected hundreds of landowners.122 Although the minority decision agreed 
that the purpose the Act sought to achieve was important and in the public interest, 
the minority concluded that the Act was not adequately formulated to achieve the 
legislative purpose.123 According to the minority decision, the absence of a review 
procedure in the legislation of the preliminary designs placed a disproportionate 
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burden on landowners and consequently constituted an arbitrary deprivation.124 
O’Regan J argued that the disproportionate effect of the deprivation could be 
ameliorated by a periodic review of the proposed infrastructure network.125 
 Roux is correct in his criticism that the FNB arbitrariness test leads to 
uncertainty for both the state and aggrieved property holders. The wide margin of 
judicial discretion when determining the level of scrutiny leads to uncertain and 
inconsistent judgments. This is evident in the inconsistent treatment of regulatory 
deprivations for the purpose of promoting the state’s fiscal efficiency in the FNB and 
the Mkontwana decision and also in the conflicting outcomes of the majority and the 
minority judgment in Reflect All. Although the Court in FNB set out factors that should 
be considered in establishing the level of scrutiny required, the Court did not indicate 
how these factors relate to each other.126 For example, if two or more of the factors 
indicate a higher level of scrutiny and only one a lower level of scrutiny, should it be 
accepted that the level of scrutiny should be something higher than rationality or can 
one factor overrule the other factors? In this regard, Roux correctly asserts that the 
grounds for the application of the one or the other level of judicial scrutiny should be 
clear and ascertainable in advance.127 
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3 The effect of finding that a deprivation does not comply with 
the requirements 
Section 25(1) both empowers and at the same time restricts the state’s power to 
regulate the use and enjoyment of property. Roux states that the primary function of 
a constitutional property clause is to strike an appropriate balance between the public 
interest and individual property rights.128 Section 25 was considered for the first time 
by the Constitutional Court in FNB and this decision is significant in the sense that it 
purported to decide how this balance should be struck. The Court set out a 
methodology in terms of which section 25 disputes should be considered.  
Section 25(1) limits the state’s police power by requiring that any regulatory 
deprivation be authorised in terms of law of general application and that no law may 
effect arbitrary deprivation of property. Any regulatory deprivation that is not 
authorised by law of general application is unconstitutional and consequently invalid. 
Constitutionally speaking, such a regulatory deprivation measure cannot be salvaged 
in any way. Moreover, although section 25(1) does not explicitly state that deprivation 
should be for a public purpose, such a requirement is arguably implicit in section 
25(1).129 Any deprivation that is not for a valid public purpose is also likely to be in 
conflict with section 25(1) and unconstitutional and invalid. In both these instances it 
will be the end of the section 25(1) inquiry. Instances of this kind are therefore not 
interesting for this study. 
Furthermore, if the interest affected does not qualify as property for purposes of 
section 25 the protection afforded by section 25 is not triggered, no matter how 
                                                   
128
 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 266. 
129
 See the discussion on the public purpose requirement above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
oppressive or unfair the law in question is. Section 25(1) prohibits arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Similarly, if there has not been a deprivation of the alleged 
property interest section 25(1) is not triggered either. Before the court can consider 
whether deprivation was arbitrary it first has to establish that there was a deprivation 
of property in the first place. Although there are inconsistencies in the Constitutional 
Court’s definition of deprivation, it seems clear enough that any interference with the 
use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property, subject to the de minimis principle, 
will be classified as a deprivation for purposes of section 25. Instances where it 
cannot be proven that there is a property interest or that there has been a deprivation 
of a property interest in this sense are not interesting for this study either. 
The focus of this study is the requirement in section 25(1) that no law may allow 
arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the established case law of the 
Constitutional Court, a regulatory interference with property rights is arbitrary if there 
is insufficient reason for the deprivation. The arbitrariness test requires a contextual 
balance between means and ends. The determination of non-arbitrariness depends 
on the level of judicial scrutiny, which may fluctuate from rationality to proportionality 
review, depending on the purpose for the deprivation and the facts of the case. The 
level of judicial scrutiny is determined by considering a complexity of relationships, 
namely the relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the nature of the 
property, the extent of the deprivation and the person whose property is affected. The 
application of the arbitrariness test in the case law discussed above indicates that the 
FNB arbitrariness test leaves much scope for judicial discretion and the level of 
scrutiny that courts will apply cannot be determined abstractly beforehand. This has 
important implications for legal certainty as the outcome of cases will depend on the 
level of scrutiny the court decides to apply.  
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Having said all that, the focus of this study is on the effects of a court deciding 
that a seemingly excessive deprivation is arbitrary in a specific set of instances, 
where invalidation of the deprivation is not an option because of the importance of 
the reason for it. If there is insufficient reason for the deprivation the state action is 
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1), even when the reason for the deprivation is 
very important. As appears below, this will usually be the case where the purpose for 
a deprivation is extremely important, but the deprivation is nevertheless arbitrary 
because its effects in an individual case are excessive.  
According to the methodology in FNB, if the deprivation does not comply with 
section 25(1) it should be considered whether it can be justified under section 36 of 
the Constitution,130 but Roux131 and Van der Walt132 argue convincingly that it is 
unlikely that deprivation or expropriation that does not comply with the requirements 
of section 25(1) and (2) can be justified in terms of section 36.133 An example of an 
                                                   
130
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
131
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 26. 
132
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 76. 
133
 IM Rautenbach “Means-end rationality in Constitutional Court judgments” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse Reg 768-779 at 770 criticises the courts’ approach of limiting the means-end rationality 
analysis to the limitation clause that forms part of a specific fundamental right in the Bill of Rights 
without a further full blown section 36 analysis. Section 25(1) is an example of a fundamental right with 
a limitation clause. Rautenbach advocates for a more prominent role of section 36 of the Constitution 
in section 25(1) cases. See also IM Rautenbach “The limitation of rights in terms of provisions of the 
Bill of Rights other than the general limitation clause: A few examples” 2001 Tydskrif vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse Reg 617-641; IM Rautenbach “Vonnisbespreking: Rasionaliteit – Die president se eie 
administratiefreg? Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2012 12 BCLR 1261 (KH)” (2013) 2 
LitNet Akademies 27-44. T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 27 points out that a rationality based review in 
terms of the arbitrariness test proves the strongest conceptual non-application of section 36 since a 
law that infringes upon section 25(1) for lack of means-end rationality will never be capable of 
justification under section 36. On the other hand, a section 36 analysis where proportionality based 
review in terms of the arbitrariness test was applied, will at best only confirm the conclusion already 
reached under section 25(1). Furthermore, Roux argues that although the Constitutional Court in FNB 
acknowledged the difficulties in applying section 36 to infringements of section 25(1), it nonetheless 
did a cursory limitation enquiry, which tends to confirm the view that section 36 has no meaningful 
application to infringements of section 25(1). See also T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: 
Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations 
(2008) 265-281 at 278, 280; I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 557-558; AJ 
van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 219, 288; J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 
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exception to this argument may exist in case law dealing with section 25(2), although 
it is probably of limited value for section 25(1). In Nhlabathi and Others v Fick134 
(Nhlabathi) the Land Claims Court accepted without deciding the point that, if the 
legislation at stake in that case indeed effected an uncompensated expropriation of 
property, in conflict with section 25(2), it would nevertheless be justified under section 
36 of the Constitution. However, the Nhlabathi example serves as limited authority for 
the proposition that an infringement that is inconsistent with section 25(2) can be 
justified in terms of section 36 because the court only assumed for the sake of the 
argument that there was expropriation, without actually deciding that there was in fact 
an expropriation (and accordingly that the expropriation without compensation could 
be justified).135 Even assuming that there was an uncompensated expropriation in 
this case and that it was justifiable in terms of section 36(1) does not necessarily 
imply that it would also be possible to justify an arbitrary deprivation that conflicts with 
section 25(1) in the same way.136 The unconstitutionality of a deprivation that does 
                                                                                                                                                               
228; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 530. 
134
 2003 (7) BCLR 806 (LCC) para 35. 
135
 See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 79 for a discussion of the Nhlabathi 
decision. See also H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P 
Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights compendium (Issue 18 2006) 3FB-15; I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights 
handbook (6
th
 ed 2013) 558-559. 
136
 A troublesome question in this regard is whether all expropriations should literally be treated as 
deprivations of property first and only as expropriation afterwards, as the FNB methodology indicates. 
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57 the 
Constitutional Court held that expropriation is a subset of deprivation, therefore all expropriations are 
deprivations but not every deprivation is an expropriation. In principle, every expropriation must 
therefore comply with the requirements of section 25(1) in addition to the requirements of section 
25(2) and (3). However, AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 225 states that it 
cannot be assumed that the courts will always follow the FNB methodology strictly, in the sense of 
starting out with a non-arbitrariness analysis. Subsequent to the FNB decision, courts have indicated 
that there are two instances when they would be willing to depart from the FNB methodology and 
proceed directly to the expropriation analysis without first considering whether the deprivation was 
arbitrary. In Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 53 the 
Constitutional Court held that the court may directly consider whether expropriation occurred if the 
claimants are content not to allege that the deprivation of property was arbitrary or when the only 
matter in dispute is the compensation payable on expropriation. See also Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA) para 14. With regard to direct questions about the 
amount of compensation, see Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). See also AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 509-520; AJ van der Walt “The state’s duty to pay 
‘just and equitable’ compensation for expropriation: Reflections on the Du Toit case” (2005) 122 South 
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not comply with section 25(1) because it is deemed arbitrary can probably not be 
overcome by a section 36 justification. 
If a regulatory deprivation does not comply with section 25(1) because it is 
arbitrary and cannot be justified under section 36 the default remedy is to declare 
such state action unconstitutional and therefore invalid.137 Section 172(1)(a) of the 
Constitution provides that, when deciding a constitutional matter, a court must 
declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of its inconsistency. Currie and De Waal explain that a declaration of 
invalidity is a remedy that the courts grant whenever a particular state action or 
legislation is inconsistent with the Constitution.138 On the face of it, any deprivation of 
property that is deemed arbitrary because its effects are excessive therefore seems 
to face the inevitable result of being declared invalid. 
                                                                                                                                                               
African Law Journal 765-778; AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform 
and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation for expropriation” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 
23-40. With regard to the time and manner of payment of compensation, see Haffejee NO and Others 
v Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC). See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 508-509. Whether it is possible for a claimant to challenge the validity of an 
expropriation on the basis of the public purpose or public interest requirement in section 25(2)(a) 
without first arguing that the deprivation was arbitrary remains unclear. T Roux “Property” in S 
Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 
46 at 33 argues that it is doubtful whether a law will ever be tested against section 25(2)(a) because 
expropriation that is not for a public purpose or in the public interest is unlikely to pass the 
arbitrariness test. However, in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11 (4 February 2010) paras 1, 4, 5 the applicant directly challenged the 
expropriation on the basis that it was not for a public purpose, without challenging the validity of the 
infringement against section 25(1). In this case the applicant challenged the Municipality’s decision to 
transfer his expropriated property to a private land developer to develop a shopping complex on the 
basis that it did not constitute a public purpose as meant by section 2 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975. The court merely stated that the Expropriation Act constituted law of general application as 
meant by section 25(1) and proceeded to determine the meaning of “public purpose” in terms of the 
Expropriation Act, the scope of which is extended by the insertion of the phrase “public interest” in 
section 25(2) of the Constitution, without first considering whether the Municipality’s action constituted 
arbitrary deprivation of the applicant’s property. See also Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Coega Development Corporation and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA) paras 13-18.  
137
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 270. 
138
 According to I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 193, the wording of 
section 172(1)(a) indicates that the declaration of invalidity is not a discretionary remedy, which 
explains why such a remedy attained such a prominent position in constitutional law. See chapter 4 for 
a discussion on section 172 of the Constitution. 
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However, although a declaration of invalidity is the default remedy, section 
172(1)(b) also provides that, in addition to the declaration of invalidity, a court “may 
make any order that is just and equitable”.139 Section 38 of the Constitution also 
provides that the court may grant “appropriate relief” where fundamental rights have 
been violated.140 The relationship between just and equitable relief in section 
172(1)(b) and section 38 is not clear. However, the courts state that section 172(1)(b) 
and section 38 should be read together.141  
Courts recognise that the declaration of invalidity may not always be enough to 
eradicate inconsistencies between law and conduct.142 The declaration of invalidity 
may often be meaningless, which will not constitute appropriate relief for purposes of 
section 38.143 In President of the Republic of South African and Another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae)144 (Modderklip) for example, 
the landowner’s property was occupied by a sheer number of unlawful occupiers, 
which rendered the land useless for the duration of the unlawful occupation. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the state failed to fulfil its constitutional duty to 
the affected landowner when it refused to assist the landowner in evicting the 
                                                   
139
 See chapter 4 for a discussion on the interplay between section 172(1)(a) and section 172(1)(b) of 
the Constitution. 
140
 In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) paras 19, 69 the Constitutional 
Court held that  
“[a]ppropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the 
Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a 
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to 
ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is 
necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the 
protection and enforcement of these all important rights.” 
Furthermore, the Court stated that “an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without 
effective remedies for breach, the values underlying the right entrenched in the Constitution cannot 
properly be upheld or enhanced”. See chapter 4 for a discussion on what constitutes “appropriate 
relief” as meant by section 38. 
141
 See chapter 4 for a discussion of the relationship between section 172(1)(b) and section 38. 
142
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 194. 
143
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 194. 
144
 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). See chapter 4 for a discussion of the Modderklip decision. 
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unlawful occupiers. However, the Court recognised that declaring the state’s action 
invalid in that instance would not have vindicated the affected landowner’s property 
rights in a just and equitable manner. 
Another instance where invalidity may not be an appropriate remedy is for 
example a rental housing scheme that statutorily limits certain lessors’ right to raise 
the annual rent or to evict tenants from their property for the purpose of protecting 
tenants of rental property in a period of a dire housing shortage. If the court found 
that the relevant Act effects an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 
25(1), for example because the court finds that the purpose for the deprivation is 
disproportionate to the impact of the deprivation, the default remedy will be to declare 
the regulatory provision of the Act invalid. However, an important and necessary 
public purpose, namely the protection and promotion of access to adequate housing, 
will be negated if the relevant provision were to be declared invalid.145  
It is imperative that regulatory measures that serve a legitimate, necessary and 
important public purpose and that are otherwise lawful, but for the excessive and 
disproportionate burden they impose on an individual or select group of property 
owners (therefore constituting a substantially arbitrary deprivation of property in 
terms of section 25(1)) should be saved from invalidity whenever it is possible to do 
so in terms of the Constitution.146 The possibilities of doing so and the deprivations of 
property that are implicated form the main focus of this dissertation. The question is 
therefore: If a regulatory action that serves a legitimate, necessary and important 
                                                   
145
 See also chapter 4 for a discussion of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). 
146
 Otherwise legitimate and lawful regulatory measures mean that the regulatory deprivation is 
authorised by law of general application and serve a public purpose but may be arbitrary because the 
burden it imposes on an individual owner or a small group of property owners may sometimes be 
harsh and excessive. If the regulatory measure is not authorised by law of general application or does 
not serve a public purpose or imposes a procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property, the regulatory 
measure is unconstitutional and cannot be saved from invalidity. 
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purpose and that is otherwise valid runs the risk of being declared invalid simply 
because it is substantively arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) for imposing an 
excessive and disproportionate burden on an individual or select group of property 
owners, what are the constitutional options in terms of which the authorising statute 
and the regulatory action can be upheld? 
Various approaches in foreign law serve as examples of alternatives to 
invalidating important and otherwise lawful but excessive regulatory measures. The 
purpose of the comparative overview is to describe a number of alternative 
approaches to invalidating excessive regulatory measures that exist in foreign law 
and to analyse whether these approaches may serve as appropriate examples for 
developing a solution for South African law. The foreign jurisdictions considered in 
this dissertation are selected on the basis of the different ways in which courts and 
academic literature’s describe the problem of excessive regulatory measures and the 
unique approaches that developed in these jurisdictions to develop different 
solutions. Some jurisdictions (Ireland) are discussed especially because they 
illustrate the dilemma of courts’ not having an alternative to invalidating excessive 
regulatory interferences. A central question that runs throughout the comparative 
overview is whether courts recognise possibilities to uphold regulatory measures that 
serve a necessary and important public purpose, even when they impose an 
unforeseen, excessive and perhaps disproportionate and unconstitutional burden on 
one or a small group of property owners.147 The approach in the comparative 
chapters is largely descriptive because the goal is not to analyse any particular 
jurisdiction in detail, but simply to show how different perceptions of the problem and 
different solutions have developed in different contexts. For that purpose, the 
description of the legal position in the jurisdictions that are discussed in the 
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 See the discussion below on the various foreign jurisdictions considered in this dissertation. 
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comparative chapters relies largely on the majority view in that jurisdiction, without 
entering into debates and differences of opinion about the suitability and the technical 
detail of the particular approach. 
One alternative to invalidity that is relied on, in different ways, in a number of 
jurisdictions is to treat the excessive regulatory measure as some form of 
expropriation, which requires compensation (Switzerland, US).148 In terms of what is 
here broadly described as the constructive expropriation strategy, courts treat 
excessive regulatory interferences with property rights as expropriation and require 
the state to pay compensation even though there was no formal expropriation of 
property. The comparative overview shows that this strategy can adopt different 
formats in different jurisdictions, depending on the constitutional text, the social and 
political context and the underlying legal tradition. Whether the notion of constructive 
expropriation can be recognised in South African law is not clear since the 
Constitutional Court has not explicitly accepted nor rejected this doctrine.  
Another alternative is to rely on legislation to provide for expropriation-like 
compensation, without transforming the deprivation into expropriation (Germany, 
France, Belgium, The Netherlands). This type of compensation is aimed at equalising 
the impact of the burden, thereby preventing it from constituting arbitrary deprivation 
of property.149 Once again, the comparative overview shows that this approach can 
assume different formats in different juridictions, depending on different constitutional 
texts, the social and political context and the underlying legal tradition. Some South 
African statutes already provide for compensation of this nature. It is not clear 
whether South African courts can read-in a compensation provision, without 
transforming the regulatory deprivation into expropriation (as with the notion of 
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 See chapter 2 for a discussion of constructive expropriation. 
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 See chapters 3 and 4 for a discussion of expropriation-like compensation provisions in legislation. 
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constructive expropriation), into an otherwise lawful regulatory statute that imposes 
an excessive burden on one or a small group of property owners. Another alternative 
remedy to invalidation is a constitutional remedy in the form of constitutional 
damages in terms of section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.150  
The conclusion in this chapter is that (a) properly authorised and otherwise 
lawful measures that serve a legitimate and important regulatory purpose and that (b) 
are clearly both authorised and intended to regulate the use of property and not to 
expropriate property (c) can sometimes have such an excessively detrimental effect 
on property holders, either in the extent to which they interfere with the use of the 
property or because they single out one or a small number of people the 
extraordinary regulatory burden that they impose, that (d) a court might find that the 
deprivation of property caused by those measures is substantively arbitrary and 
therefore unconstitutional and invalid. This outcome is particularly troublesome if the 
public purpose served by the regulatory measure falls outside of the narrow sphere 
of protecting public health and safety, with the result that the courts would assess the 
effect of the deprivation in terms of a strict proportionality-type scrutiny rather than 
pure rationality. (e) However, if the public purpose served by the regulatory measure 
is important enough it might be undesirable to declare the measure invalid. (f) The 
purpose of the following chapters is to investigate the feasibility, applicability and 
scope of several strategies that are intended or that can be used to uphold the 
validity of the regulatory measure while simultaneously overcoming or balancing out 
the excessive harm that it causes for one or a small number of affected property 
owners.  
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 See chapter 4 for a discussion of constitutional damages as a constitutional remedy. 
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4 Outline of chapters 
The first alternative solution, namely the notion of constructive expropriation, is 
considered in chapter 2. In chapter 2 the US, Irish and Swiss law approach to 
constructive expropriation or regulatory takings is considered.151 The notion of 
regulatory takings developed in US case law. US law sets out the most 
comprehensive and authoritative arguments in favour of regulatory taking for the US 
constitutional context. Furthermore, the US approach to regulatory takings has 
played an influential role in other jurisdictions that also recognise regulatory takings 
or constructive expropriation. The structure of the Irish Constitution is unique and 
allows for the application of something similar to the US notion of regulatory takings. 
Unlike US and Irish law, the Swiss Constitution explicitly provides for something like 
constructive expropriation, called “material expropriation”. Chapter 2 evaluates the 
appropriateness of the constructive expropriation strategy and considers whether this 
is a possible and viable solution for South African law, especially with regard the 
structure of the South African property clause and the South African courts’ attitude 
toward recognising the notion of constructive expropriation. 
 Chapter 3 considers the German, French, Dutch and Belgian solution of 
upholding excessive regulatory measures against compensation, but without 
transforming the regulatory deprivation into expropriation. The possibility of 
something similar to constructive expropriation was considered in German law but 
explicitly rejected by the German Federal Constitutional Court. German law 
recognises that equalisation measures, which need not always be monetary, may in 
exceptional situations be included in the regulatory statute that would reduce the 
burden on the property holder and thereby prevent the statute from authorising a 
                                                   
151
 See chapter 2 for a discussion on the difference in terminology between constructive expropriation 
and regulatory taking. 
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disproportionate regulatory limitation of property rights that would consequently be 
unconstitutional and subject to invalidity. French, Dutch and Belgian law also 
recognise that the explicit statutory provision of compensation for excessive 
regulatory burdens in regulatory legislation may reduce the otherwise 
disproportionate burden and thereby prevent the regulatory measure from being 
unconstitutional. However, unlike German law, this type of ameliatory compensation 
in French, Dutch and Belgian law is generally always monetary. Furthermore, the 
courts in French, Dutch and Belgian law may sometimes award compensation for 
excessive regulatory deprivations of property in terms of the égalité principle even 
though there is no statutory authority for such compensation and no formal 
expropriation has occurred.  
 In chapter 4 an overview of South African legislation indicates that there are 
some statutes that, similar to the German, French, Dutch and Belgian law approach, 
include a non-expropriatory compensation provision that is aimed at reducing the 
excessive and possible arbitrary burden that may result from the application of the 
legislation. Chapter 4 also considers the possibility whether South African courts can, 
like the courts in French, Dutch and Belgian law, award non-expropriatory 
compensation in instances where the otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive 
regulatory statute does not provide for compensation or where the possibility of 
compensation is explicitly excluded.  
As a last alternative solution, chapter 4 considers whether a constitutional 
remedy in the form of constitutional damages can serve as a viable alternative to 
invalidating excessive regulatory legislation that serves a necessary and important 
public purpose that will be defeated if the legislation were to be declared invalid. 
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1 Introduction 
Recognition of something like the notion of constructive expropriation is one possible 
reaction to instances of excessive or unfair regulatory actions, as an alternative to 
declaring the regulatory infringement invalid. However, it remains unclear whether it 
will be possible to recognise something like constructive expropriation in South 
African law. Much will depend on the distinction that the courts draw between 
deprivation and expropriation of property, since constructive expropriation effectively 
occupies a grey area between these two categories. Usually, recognition of such a 
grey area depends on judicial interpretation, although there are examples of 
constitutional texts that recognise such a middle category explicitly. 
Section 25 of the 1996 South African Constitution distinguishes between 
deprivation and expropriation as two forms of legitimate state interference with 
property, in each case provided that certain requirements are met. The constitutional 
text does not provide a clear-cut definition to facilitate a distinction between these two 
categories of state interference, but on the basis of the constitutional distinction 
expropriation is usually defined in contrast to deprivation.1 A few essential 
characteristics of expropriation that may help to differentiate expropriation from 
deprivation include the fact that expropriation is an original form of acquisition; that it 
is exercised in terms of the state’s power of eminent domain; that it involves a 
complete or partial loss of property of the former holder and acquisition of the 
property by the state; that it fulfils a public purpose or public interest; and that it is 
accompanied by compensation.2 
                                                   
1
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 335. 
2
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 345.  
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Categorising the type of state action as either deprivation or expropriation 
becomes more problematic in situations where limitations of private property seem to 
fall within a grey area that cannot be described clearly as either purely regulatory 
deprivation or expropriation of property.3 Murphy argues that this will usually be the 
case where there has not been an outright transfer or extinction of title but only a 
substantial diminution in the incidents of ownership.4 In some jurisdictions these state 
interferences with property are classified as constructive expropriation because they 
neither regulate the use of property nor formally expropriate the owner, but in fact 
extinguish either the property object or the property right in it. State interferences of 
this kind are said to occupy a grey area in between deprivation and expropriation 
because they have the formal appearance of regulatory deprivations but have the 
effect of expropriation, in the sense that the property owner either loses the property 
right entirely or suffers a loss that is so significant that it resembles expropriation 
more than it does regulatory deprivation. The issue of compensation plays an 
important role in this grey area because compensation is a requirement for 
expropriation whereas deprivation is usually not compensated.5 Classifying what 
might otherwise appear to be a regulatory deprivation of property as constructive 
expropriation is therefore significant in that compensation is consequently required 
for it. In terms of the doctrine of constructive expropriation or regulatory takings, the 
                                                   
3
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 335. 
4
 J Murphy “Interpreting the property clause in the Constitution Act of 1993” (1995) 10 South African 
Public Law 107-130 at 118. In Conforth Investments (Pty) Ltd v Ethekwini Municipality [2013] 
ZAKZDHC 68 (28 November 2013) paras 23, 26 the High Court held that “[c]onstructive expropriation 
deals with a situation where by virtue of a statutory provision, a property owner suffers loss which 
could justify the conclusion that compensation is necessary even though the state did not, and did not 
intend to, acquire ownership of the property”. Furthermore, the court held that the interference with the 
property must be significant, in the sense that “it deprives the owner of the property of all his rights of 
ownership or enjoyment in and to the property, or so interferes with the proprietary value of the 
property that it is rendered useless”. 
5
 In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 63 the Constitutional Court held that “[t]he 
purpose of the distinction between expropriation and deprivation by regulatory measures is to enable 
the state to regulate the use of property for public good without the fear of incurring liability to owners 
of property affected in the course of such regulation”. 
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excessive regulatory measure is judicially transformed into expropriation. Therefore, 
a duty to pay compensation arises since compensation is a requirement for a valid 
expropriation of property. 
In some jurisdictions limitations of property that fall within the grey area between 
deprivation and expropriation are treated as cases of constructive expropriation or 
regulatory taking of property.6 Constructive expropriation or regulatory taking occurs 
when a regulatory deprivation causes an excessive or unfair loss for a property 
holder, usually in the sense that the affected property is destroyed or becomes 
worthless, an effect that cannot be justified without compensation, even though the 
state did not formally expropriate or intend to expropriate the property.7  
Recognition of constructive expropriation is only possible in jurisdictions that do 
not place a strong emphasis on the formal authority to expropriate or on actual state 
acquisition of the property, because focusing on either of these aspects would negate 
the possibility to judicially transform an excessive regulatory deprivation into a 
constructive expropriation. The notion of constructive expropriation is premised on 
the judicial power, based on a proportionality test of some kind, to determine that a 
particular regulatory burden is so excessive and unfair that it cannot be justified 
without compensation.8 Germany is one example of a jurisdiction that places strong 
emphasis on the formal authority to expropriate and therefore explicitly rejects the 
                                                   
6
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 350. See the discussion below on the 
difference in the terminology. 
7
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 351. See also the distinction between 
constructive expropriation and formal expropriation in Conforth Investments (Pty) Ltd v Ethekwini 
Municipality [2013] ZAKZDHC 68 (28 November 2013) para 24. With regard to formal expropriation, 
the court held that “the statute or administrative decision which declares the intention to expropriate 
property is the key factor, where as in constructive expropriation the intention is to regulate control of 
the property rather than to expropriate it. With constructive expropriation the property is not acquired 
by the state, and the state may not even acquire any benefit from it”. 
8
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 354, 376 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
58 
 
notion of constructive expropriation.9 The German approach to excessive regulatory 
limitations is discussed in chapter 3. Furthermore, in jurisdictions that uphold a clear 
and categorical distinction between compensable expropriatory acquisition of 
property and non-compensable regulatory limitation on the use of property or that 
require state acquisition of property as a requirement for expropriation it is equally 
impossible to recognise a notion such as constructive expropriation or regulatory 
taking.10 
Different terminology is used to describe this phenomenon, namely constructive 
expropriation, inverse condemnation and regulatory taking. Van der Walt explains 
that the normal, run-of-the-mill state acquisition of property in terms of the power of 
compulsory acquisition or eminent domain is usually described in the Anglo or 
common law tradition as “compulsory acquisition”, whereas most constitutions in the 
Germanic or civil law tradition refer to “expropriation”.11 These two terms have 
roughly the same meaning and it is generally accepted that these terms require the 
state to acquire property or derive a benefit from the compulsory acquisition or 
expropriation.12 In this sense, state actions that destroy property or take property 
without any benefit for the state will generally not be regarded as compulsory 
acquisition or expropriation of property that would require compensation.13 
However, the US Constitution refers to “taking” of property. This term is wider 
than either compulsory acquisition or expropriation, and it is generally accepted that it 
includes both expropriation, understood as a narrower category of acquisition of 
                                                   
9
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung); confirmed in BVerfGE 100, 226 (1999) (Denkmalschutz). 
See chapter 3 for a discussion of the Naβauskiesung and Denkmalschutz decisions. 
10
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 169. 
11
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 18. 
12
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 18. 
13
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 18. 
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property by the state, and regulatory taking of property, which does not involve state 
acquisition.14 Similarly, the Irish Constitution does not explicitly provide for 
expropriation of property. It authorises the legislature to limit property in terms of 
legislation but adds that no law may constitute an unjust attack on property.15 The 
term “unjust attack” is understood as a wider category than compulsory acquisition or 
expropriation of property. Therefore, the terminology of the US and Irish constitutions 
allows for a wider approach to state action that infringes on property rights than 
compulsory acquisition and expropriation and consequently lends itself to the 
recognition of a grey area of “regulatory taking” of property that requires 
compensation.16 In both cases, the idea of a regulatory taking is employed in case 
law to refer to a grey area in between uncompensated regulatory deprivation of 
property and compensated expropriation of property, usually on the basis described 
earlier, namely that the effect of a particular regulatory action is so extreme or severe 
on one particular property owner that it cannot be justified in the absence of 
compensation. Formally the action does not constitute expropriation, but because of 
its impact it is treated as a special kind of taking that is justified only when 
accompanied by compensation. 
The term “regulatory taking”, sometimes also referred to as “inverse 
condemnation”, is unique to US law because it was judicially derived from the 
constitutional term “taking of property”, whereas the term “constructive expropriation” 
fits the civilian jurisdictions more easily. The Swiss Constitution is unique in the 
sense that it explicitly provides for “material expropriation”, which resembles the 
                                                   
14
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 18. 
15
 See the discussion on Irish law below. 
16
 AJ Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 19. See also AJ 
van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 420. 
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same grey area previously referred to as regulatory taking or constructive 
expropriation.17 
 Even in jurisdictions that do recognise some form of constructive expropriation, 
a claim for compensation will not necessarily be successful simply because a 
regulatory infringement imposes an excessive or unfair deprivation on a property 
owner. Courts will only award compensation if a balancing of the interests of the 
affected owner and the public interest in the regulatory limitation indicates that 
compensation is required, considering all the relevant circumstances.18 Van der Walt 
mentions three considerations that may diminish the likelihood of a compensation 
award, namely when the regulatory deprivation falls within the core police power 
function of protecting public health, safety and welfare; when the deprivation is 
exercised in terms of a power that is clearly and rationally distinct from the power of 
eminent domain; and when the regulation is not only substantively unfair but also 
procedurally unfair and flawed, in which case the correct remedy should be a 
declaration of invalidity and not a compensation award.19 Moreover, Van der Walt 
highlights two factors that would increase the likelihood of compensation, namely 
when the state in fact acquires the affected property or some benefit from the 
process; and when the affected owner alone or a small group of property owners is 
unfairly singled out by the regulatory measure.20 
 The notion of regulatory takings was developed in the case law of the US 
Supreme Court. Although US law on this topic is complex and the age, structure and 
phraseology of the US Constitution do not compare easily with more recent 
                                                   
17
 See the discussion on Swiss law below. 
18
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 353. 
19
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 353. 
20
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 353-354. 
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constitutions, US law sets out the most comprehensive and authoritative arguments 
in favour of regulatory taking for that particular constitutional context.21 In the context 
of the Irish Constitution the construction also works because of the terminology of the 
Irish text. Because of its explicit provision for material expropriation, the notion of 
something like constructive expropriation also fits in the context of the Swiss 
Constitution. However, outside of these contexts the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation is generally fraught with conceptual difficulties. Constructive 
expropriation is a controversial issue in the context of South African law and has not 
been authoritatively accepted or rejected by the courts. If constructive expropriation 
could be developed in South African law it might constitute a viable alternative to 
invalidating excessive regulatory measures that serve a necessary and important 
public purpose for constituting arbitrary deprivation of property as meant in section 
25(1) of the Constitution. Regulatory deprivations that are categorised as 
constructive expropriation would require the payment of compensation even though 
they do not constitute formal expropriation.  
 
2 Treating regulatory deprivation of property as constructive 
expropriation 
2 1 Comparative overview  
2 1 1 Introduction 
All the jurisdictions that recognise some form of constructive expropriation share the 
same problem of identifying precisely when a regulation of property should be treated 
                                                   
21
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 359. 
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as a constructive expropriation that requires compensation. The reason for the 
ambiguity is that the decision of whether to expropriate is taken from the legislature 
or the administration and given to the judges. Courts are called upon to decide which 
regulations should be viewed as uncompensated regulatory state interferences with 
property, even though they may render the affected property less useful or valuable 
to the owner, and which regulations should be viewed as effectively expropriating the 
property for public use that requires compensation.22 The discussion below analyses 
the different approaches to constructive expropriation in US, Irish and Swiss law. The 
purpose of the comparative overview is to show how courts can sometimes salvage 
excessive regulatory interferences with property by treating them as a kind of 
expropriation that requires compensation (US and Switzerland), while that solution is 
not available in other jurisdictions (Ireland), with the result that invalidation is the only 
option. The overview also shows that the way in which courts can rely on some form 
of constructive expropriation depends largely on the constitutional text, the social and 
political context and the underlying legal tradition. 
 
2 1 2 US law 
The notion of regulatory taking was developed in the case law of the US Supreme 
Court.23 The Court adopted a complex doctrinal structure consisting of a series of 
tests to differentiate between a legitimate regulation and an unconstitutional taking of 
property.24 According to the US case law, overarching principles of justice and 
fairness indicate when the burden imposed by regulatory measures exceed what 
                                                   
22
 JL Sax “Land use regulation: Time to think about fairness” (2010) 50 Natural Resources Journal 
455-470 at 456. 
23
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 359. 
24
 JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 677. 
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could legitimately be expected of property holders to bear without compensation. 
Factors that courts generally consider to determine whether compensation is payable 
for constructive expropriation include the extent of the economic impact on the 
property holder in relation to the public interest served by the regulatory measure; the 
extent to which the regulatory measure interfered with the property owner’s 
investment-backed expectations; and the character of the state action. Although 
these factors overlap in the various jurisdictions that recognise constructive 
expropriation, the weight that is attached to each factor differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. This may be partially attributed to different degrees of constitutional 
protection of property.25  
The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution is also known as the takings 
clause.26 One of the purposes of the takings clause is to prevent the state from 
forcing some people to bear a burden that ought to be shared by the public as a 
whole.27 The term “taking” is not confined to formal expropriations, although such 
actions do constitute takings. Some regulatory state actions, known as “regulatory 
takings”, that are substantively tantamount to expropriation are also included under 
the term “taking”.28 In addition to the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
also known as the due process clause, protects owners from being deprived of 
                                                   
25
 R Alterman “Comparative analysis: A platform in cross-national learning” in R Alterman (ed) Takings 
international: A comparative perspective on land use regulations and compensation rights (2010) chap 
2 at 25. 
26
 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without compensation”. 
27
 Armstrong v United States 364 US 40 (1960) para 49. See also Agins v City of Tiburon 447 US 255 
(1980) para 260. 
28
 GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 71. See also JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 676; K Gray “Can 
environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 168-169. 
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property without due process.29 The due process clause functions as a formal check 
on the procedure followed in imposing a restriction on the use of property and not as 
a substantive review of the reasons for the regulation.30 A major difference between 
the due process clause and the takings clause is that takings are permissible as long 
as they are undertaken for a public purpose and with just compensation. On the other 
hand, state action may not infringe the due process clause, even if compensation is 
paid.31 
The regulatory taking doctrine was first developed in Pennsylvania Coal Co v 
Mahon32 (Mahon).33 Prior to Mahon, the takings clause was narrowly interpreted to 
apply only to physical appropriations of property by the state in the exercise of its 
power of eminent domain.34 However, in Mahon the Court extended the protection of 
the takings clause to exercises of regulatory power because it held that “[i]f … the 
uses of private power were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under 
the police power, ‘the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the 
                                                   
29
 JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 678. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “… 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …”. 
30
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 355. A O’Neil “Property rights and the 
power of eminent domain” in O Doyle & E Carolan (eds) The Irish Constitution: Governance and 
values (2008) chap 24 at 432 states that the just compensation requirement entrenched in the Fifth 
Amendment constitutes an essential element of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the US Constitution. 
31
 JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 686. See also R Meltz; DH Merriam & RM Frank 
The takings issue: Constitutional limits on land use control and environmental regulation (1999) 18. 
32
 260 US 393 (1922) para 413. 
33
 GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 71. See also R Lubens “The social obligation of property ownership: A 
comparison of German and US law” (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
389-449 at 394; WA Fischel Regulatory takings: Law, economics, and politics (1995) 1. 
34
 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992) para 1014. See also JW Singer 
Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 678-679, citing Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623 (1887) paras 668-
670, arguing that laws enacted in good faith to protect the public safety cannot constitute 
unconstitutional takings of property, as long as they do not amount to an actual taking of private title or 
deprive the owner of possessory rights. LS Underkuffler-Freund “Takings and the nature of property” 
(1996) 9 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 161-205 at 164 fn 14 states that the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623 (1887) is generally considered to mark the beginning 
of modern takings law in the United States. 
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qualification more and more until at last private property disappears’”.35 The Court 
held that property rights are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the 
police power, but such implied limitation must have its limits.36 
US takings law draws a distinction between the state’s police power to regulate 
the use of property for purposes of public health, welfare and safety on the one hand 
and its eminent domain power on the other.37 With regard to the state’s police power, 
a distinction is drawn between public purposes which fall in the narrow sphere of 
police power regulation and those that do not. Public purposes that fall within the 
narrow sphere of police power regulation include the promotion of public health and 
safety, whilst public purposes such as planning, zoning and conservation laws fall 
outside the narrow sphere of police power regulation.38 Police power regulation in the 
narrow sphere is not compensated regardless of the negative effect or impact it might 
have on a property holder and a lower level of judicial scrutiny is applied.39 Outside 
the narrow sphere of regulatory action the impact or effect of the regulation becomes 
relevant, even when the purpose is legitimate and the due process requirements are 
complied with.40 In the wider sphere of regulatory action the state’s police power and 
its power of eminent domain are seen as two opposites on a continuum and 
                                                   
35
 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) para 415. 
36
 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) para 413. 
37
 B Ziff; J de Beer; DC Harris & ME McCallum A property law reader: Cases, questions, & 
commentary (3
rd
 ed 2012) 146. 
38
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 355; AJ van der Walt “Compensation for 
excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory 
takings” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 273-331 at 282-283. 
39
 JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 681. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 355-356; AJ van der Walt “Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: 
A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 South 
African Public Law 273-331 at 282. 
40
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 356; AJ van der Walt “Compensation for 
excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory 
takings” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 273-331 at 283. 
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compensation is required as soon as a weighing of private and public interest 
indicates that the regulation went too far.41 
Although property rights are affected to some extent by regulatory measures in 
terms of the state’s police power, not every such measure gives rise to 
compensation. The oft quoted statement by Justice Holmes in Mahon holds that  
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. 
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and 
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its 
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for 
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of 
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So then the question 
depends upon the particular facts”.42 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Mahon stated as a general rule that “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognised as a taking”.43 Unfortunately the Court did not precisely define when a 
given regulation would be seen as going “too far” for purposes of the takings clause. 
The main purpose of the statement in the Mahon decision was to show that there is 
some limit to the police power.44 Heller and Krier interpret the Court’s reference to the 
“extent of the diminution” as an implicit corollary that in most cases, where the loss is 
small there is no taking and therefore no compensation due.45 Subsequently, in 
Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co46 (Euclid) the Court qualified this statement 
when it decided that even very serious and substantial loss of property value can be 
                                                   
41
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 356.  
42
 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) para 413. 
43
 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) para 415. 
44
 WA Fischel Regulatory takings: Law, economics, and politics (1995) 21. 
45
 MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law 
Review 997-1025 at 1005. 
46
 272 US 365 (1926). 
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insufficient to trigger the just compensation requirement.47 It is not an easy task to 
define what would constitute an unconstitutional taking unless compensation is 
required for it.48 
An overview of takings jurisprudence highlights the courts’ unwillingness to 
develop and apply a set formula for determining whether a regulation goes too far. In 
Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City49 (Penn Central) the Supreme Court 
adopted a complex doctrinal structure that involves an ad hoc inquiry, having regard 
to a number of factors to differentiate between a legitimate regulation and an 
unconstitutional taking of property.50 This preference for an ad hoc test rather than a 
set formula was influenced by the utilitarian argument of Michelman that the decision 
to recognise a duty to compensate should be based on efficiency considerations, 
namely that compensation should be required whenever it would promote efficient 
regulation.51 The ad hoc inquiry, also known as the Penn Central balancing test, 
                                                   
47
 MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law 
Review 997-1025 at 1005. 
48
 In Armstrong v United States 364 US 40 (1960) para 10 the Supreme Court held that it is difficult to 
“draw the line between what destructions of property by lawful governmental actions are compensable 
‘takings’ and what destructions are ‘consequential’ and therefore not compensable”. See also Penn 
Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 (1978) para 123. RA Epstein “An outline of 
takings” (1986) 41 University of Miami Law Review 3-19 at 10 states that the line between regulation 
and taking of property is not principled but incoherent. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 
ed 2011) 359 states that the takings jurisprudence is often referred to as an incomprehensible muddle. 
49
 438 US 104 (1978) paras 124, 130-131. 
50
 JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 677. 
51
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 357, citing FI Michelman “Property, utility, 
and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations of ‘just compensation’ law” (1967) 80 Harvard Law 
Review 1165-1258. MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 
Harvard Law Review 997-1025 at 997-1013 make a similar argument that “efficiency” and “justice” are 
two considerations that underlie the takings clause. According to the authors, efficiency relates to the 
allocation of resources among various alternatives in ways that maximise value, whereas justice 
relates to the distribution of costs and benefits that result from particular allocations in ways that 
satisfy some equitable principle of fairness. In this regard, the just compensation requirement plays an 
important role in deterring the state from overusing its taking power. The authors distinguish between 
general and specific deterrence. General deterrence aims to prevent the state from taking resources 
without paying for them; whereas specific deterrence is aimed at constraining state inclinations to 
exploit politically vulnerable groups and individuals. However, deterrence and distribution are not 
always independent from each other. The interrelatedness is evident by the fact that the denial of 
compensation when justice would insist upon it would not only be unfair but inefficient as well. 
Furthermore, justice will sometimes require specific distribution to aggrieved individuals, even though 
no formal taking had occurred.  
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consists of consideration of three factors to determine whether a regulatory action 
constitutes a taking for purposes of the takings clause. These ad hoc factors are 
firstly, the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; secondly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations; and thirdly, the character or extent of the state action.52  
No uniform formula exists with regard to the application of these considerations. 
Therefore, the ad hoc determination results in uncertainty for both landowners and 
the state whenever regulatory takings are challenged in courts.53 Fischel argues that 
the open ended balancing test runs the risk of balancing the just compensation 
clause out of the Constitution entirely.54 Michelman points out that the Court had 
found the undefined, open-ended ad hoc balancing test hard to maintain and had 
therefore shifted towards a reformalisation of the takings doctrine in the sense of 
adopting a series of categorical takings.55 
 The Supreme Court identified a number of situations that are not governed by 
the Penn Central balancing test but by per se tests, known as “categorical takings”. 
Categorical takings are regulations of property that are invalid in the absence of 
compensation, regardless of the public purpose served by the regulation and without 
                                                   
52
 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 (1978) paras 124, 130-131. See 
similar statements in Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979) para 175; Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association v DeBenedictis 480 US 470 (1987) paras 458, 488. See the discussion of the ad hoc 
factors in JW Singer Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 687-688. See also R Lubens “The social 
obligation of property ownership: A comparison of German and US law” (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 389-449 at 395; WA Fischel Regulatory takings: Law, economics, 
and politics (1995) 50-51. 
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 R Alterman “Conclusions: The US property rights debate viewed through cross-national lense” in R 
Alterman (ed) Takings international: A comparative perspective on land use regulation and 
compensation rights (2010) chap 3 at 76. 
54
 WA Fischel Regulatory takings: Law, economics, and politics (1995) 52. 
55
 F Michelman “Takings, 1987” (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1601-1629 at 1621-1622. 
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resort to the Penn Central ad hoc test.56 If a court determines that the case before it 
does not meet the criteria for one of the categorical takings, the three-factor ad hoc 
test is applicable.57 So far three special rules have been identified that constitute 
categorical takings, namely permanent physical invasions of property (regardless 
how trivial the impact of the infringement); deprivation of certain core property rights; 
and the deprivation of all economically viable use of the property.58 Singer points out 
that each of these special rules has very strict and limited application and that policy 
considerations are relevant to determining when they are applicable.59 In addition, 
the categorical rules themselves contain exceptions that limit the scope of their 
application.60  
 The first categorical rule holds that permanent physical invasions of property by 
the state will often, but not always, constitute a taking.61 This test was first firmly 
articulated in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp62 (Loretto). In Loretto, 
the Court held that the City of New York effected a taking by requiring lessors of 
residential property to permit the installation of cable television facilities on their 
buildings. In this case both the strength of the public interest and the overall impact 
on the property’s value were considered irrelevant.63 The Court held that the 
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recognised property rights in a physical thing are the rights “to possess, use and 
dispose of it … [and when] the government permanently occupies physical property, 
it effectively destroys each of these rights”.64 Heller and Krier argue that the physical 
occupation rule cannot always be explained and reconciled with the efficiency and 
justice concerns underlying the takings clause, especially where courts extend the 
rule to cases in which both the burden and the number of individuals affected are 
minimal.65 In these cases the affected property interests are small in aggregate and 
therefore efficiency considerations do not play a role; and the losses suffered are 
also so small that justice considerations do not come into play either.66 Therefore 
compensation should not be payable. 
 However, not every permanent physical invasion of property will constitute a 
taking. In Nollan v California Coastal Commission67 (Nollan), the Court indicated an 
exception to this rule.68 A permanent physical invasion of property will not be treated 
as a taking if the state can show that a nexus exists between the foreseeable impact 
of the landowner’s proposed property development and the land exacted for public 
use.69 In addition, the nexus must be proportionate to the foreseen impact of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 997-1025 at 1008 point out that 
the de minimis nature of the taking did not play a role in the Supreme Court’s view. 
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 MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law 
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if the courts decide to characterise the state action as a physical occupation, a taking will be 
established even if the loss or inconvenience to the owner is miniscule. 
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 483 US 825 (1987). 
68
 TE Roberts “United States” in R Alterman (ed) Takings international: A comparative perspective on 
land use regulation and compensation rights (2010) chap 11 at 222-223. See also JW Singer 
Introduction to property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 694-702 for a discussion of other exceptions to the Loretto rule 
that developed in case law. 
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development.70 The courts will in these instances not defer to the state’s assertion of 
a nexus. The Courts approach is commendable since close scrutiny of the 
connection between ends and means of land use regulations will prevent regulations 
in terms of the state’s police power, which are usually uncompensated, from 
becoming a substitute for eminent domain. 
 With regard to the second categorical rule, only two core property rights that 
would result in a taking if the property owner is deprived of them have been identified 
by courts, namely the right to exclude (which is effectively taken by permanent 
physical invasions of property) and the right to pass on property at death. In Kaiser 
Aetna v United States71 the Court held that the right to exclude is “universally held to 
be a fundamental element of the property right” and that the state cannot take it 
without compensation.72 Moreover, in Hodel, Secretary of the Interior v Irvin73 (Hodel) 
the Court held that the relevant regulation in effect abrogated the right to pass on a 
certain type of property to one’s heirs and this right has been part of the Anglo-
American legal system since feudal times.74 According to the Court, a total 
abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld.75 Singer states that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                               
1987” (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1601-1629 at 1606-1607; MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence 
and distribution in the law of takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 997-1025 at 1024. R Lubens 
“The social obligation of property ownership: A comparison of German and US law” (2007) 24 Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 389-449 at 397 states that the increased judicial 
scrutiny approach to the means-end analysis of land-use regulation adopted in the Nollan decision is 
greater than that applicable in the due process analysis. 
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land use regulation and compensation rights (2010) chap 11 at 223. 
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73
 481 US 704 (1987). 
74
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has rejected arguments to the effect that other entitlements are “core” rights whose 
infringement is per se unconstitutional without compensation.76 
 The third categorical rule was developed in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal 
Council77 (Lucas), which dealt with a regulation that prevented the owner of 
beachfront property to build on his land and consequently rendered the landowner’s 
property valueless. The Supreme Court held that a taking occurs where a regulation 
deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of his property.78 According to 
the Court, one justification for this rule is that depriving an owner of all economic use 
of the property has the same effect as a permanent physical invasion.79 However, the 
Court qualified the categorical nature of the rule, holding that the state will be exempt 
from paying compensation if it can show that the particular property use was never 
part of the owner’s right in the first place.80 The rationale behind this qualification is 
that no owner has the right to use his property in an unlawful manner. It is very 
difficult to succeed with a regulatory takings claim on this ground. In Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency81 (Tahoe), the Court 
held that anything less than a “complete elimination of value” or “total loss” is 
insufficient to invoke this per se rule.82 
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 Regulatory interferences that do not qualify as categorical takings will be 
assessed in terms of the ad hoc test set out in Penn Central. With regard to the third 
ad hoc consideration, namely the nature of the state action, Singer succinctly 
identified a few regulatory interferences that result from legitimate exercises of the 
police power that need not be compensated.83 These instances include a regulation 
of property use rather than a forced physical invasion; a restriction designed to 
protect the community from harm, or to respond to externalities caused by the 
property owner’s use of the property rather than extraction of a benefit for the 
community for which the owner should receive compensation;84 regulations that 
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challenged on the basis that it authorised an uncompensated taking of property but the Supreme 
Court upheld the legislation, holding that it was a valid exercise of police power and therefore no 
compensation was due. Furthermore, the Court held that no one could have a vested right to commit a 
nuisance (despite the fact that the neighbours had come to the nuisance). Another example of the 
unfairness that may result from the noxious use exception is Miller v Schoene 276 US 272 (1928). 
This case dealt with a statute that mandated the felling and destruction of a large number of 
ornamental red cedar trees without compensation because they produced cedar rust fatal to apple 
trees cultivated nearby. The Supreme Court pointed out that apple growing was one of the principal 
agricultural pursuits in that particular state. Moreover, the Court concluded that the state had not 
exceeded its constitutional powers by deciding to destroy one class of property without compensation 
in order to save another, which it regarded of greater value to the public. Heller and Krier argue that 
both cases are no doubt efficient but it was hardly fair in the absence of compensation. For a 
discussion of the two decisions see MA Heller & JE Krier “Deterrence and distribution in the law of 
takings” (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 997-1025 at 1009-1011; JW Singer Introduction to property 
(2
nd
 ed 2005) 679-680, 686-687. WA Fischel Regulatory takings: Law, economics, and politics (1995) 
61 argues that the nuisance exception may be a sensible rule but it begs the question of who decides 
what constitutes a nuisance. 
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restrict certain uses of property but also reciprocally benefit the affected property 
owners;85 and regulations aimed at solving civil disputes.86 
 In terms of the first ad hoc consideration, namely the economic impact of the 
regulation on a property holder, courts have affirmed that this requires a balancing of 
the conflicting private and public interests. This weighing of interests approach holds 
that the greater the diminution in value, the more compelling the state’s interest must 
be to justify the diminution.87 Regulation is less likely to be considered a taking if the 
diminution in value is minimal.88 In Agins v City of Tiburon89 (Agins) the Court stated 
that regulation that “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or 
denies an owner economically viable use of his land” will constitute an 
unconstitutional taking.90 Singer argues that although this phrase suggests that 
regulation should not only be rationally related to but also substantially advance 
legitimate state interests, courts have not to date struck down legislation on the 
ground that it did not “substantially” advance legitimate state interests.91 Instead, 
courts defer to the legislature’s judgment that the law will advance those interests.92 
However, in Lingle v Chevron, USA, Inc93 the Court held that the “substantially 
advances” means-end consideration is relevant under the due process clause and 
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should be considered prior to a takings claim, since if a law fails to promote a 
legitimate end, that is the end of the matter.94 
 With regard to the second ad hoc consideration, namely “investment-backed 
expectations”, the Court held in Penn Central that owners are not entitled to the 
“most beneficial use” of their property.95 The dilemma regarding conflicts between the 
regulation and the protection of property rights is that, on the one hand, property 
owners must be able to rely on the law as it stands at the time they invest, otherwise 
constitutional property protection will be meaningless. On the other hand, the state 
should also have the power to change the law, otherwise it would not be able to 
protect the public welfare.96 Property owners can therefore not expect the law to 
remain unchanged or expect compensation for every change that affects their pre-
existing rights.97 However, purchasing property with knowledge that the use of the 
land is already restricted, for instance by zoning or building legislation, does not 
automatically bar a claim for compensation.98 One of the factors that are taken into 
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account when assessing investment-backed expectations is whether the landowner 
had prior knowledge of such restrictions when acquiring the land.99 
 Eagle argues that the Penn Central balancing test might never have been 
intended to express a set of tests with objective criteria but rather intended to provide 
some protection to landowners deemed unfairly harmed by changes in land use 
regulations.100 Furthermore, each of the factors of the Penn Central balancing test 
depends on the others for content and meaning.101 According to Eagle, the Penn 
Central balancing test does not have a firm grounding in property law or substantive 
due process and therefore it conjectures upon claimants expectations regarding what 
they owned, together with inherently subjective notions of fairness.102 This, together 
with the absence of objective criteria in the Penn Central balancing test creates legal 
uncertainty for both property owners and the state regarding their respective rights 
and obligations and results in protracted litigation and arbitrary outcomes.103 
Therefore, there is a constant tension in takings law between the usual ad hoc 
balancing approach to resolving takings cases and the per se categorical takings.104 
Property holders try to shoehorn their cases into the existing per se rules to avoid the 
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unpredictability of the ad hoc balancing tests.105 This creates expansionary pressure 
on the existing per se categories. However, it is doubtful that courts will go further 
than they have already in embracing per se taking rules.106 Although they provide 
greater certainty, it is at the price of reduced sensitivity to individual circumstances. 
Such sensitivity is the very hallmark of takings law.107  
 The case law on regulatory takings is extremely complex. Academic authors 
often comment that it is incomprehensible. Heller and Krier state that the courts have 
“turned the words of the Takings Clause into a cryptogram that only the Justices in a 
given case are able to decipher (and seldom do all of them agree)”.108 Sax points out 
the Supreme Court’s varied approach to regulatory takings, focusing on relatively 
objective rules such as the degree of the economic loss to the owner, while at other 
times adopting more open-ended standards which leave a wide margin of discretion 
to the presiding judge of the case at hand.109 Furthermore, Sax argues that the 
Supreme Court has not settled on a satisfactory rationale for the cases and operates 
somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often conflicting theories 
without developing any clear approach to the constitutional problem.110 Poirier states 
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that the vagueness in the takings doctrine may well reflect a deeply ingrained societal 
disagreement about the nature of private property and the role of government.111 
Poirier states that the notion of property is heterogeneous and this in itself accounts 
for at least some of the difficulty in providing clear rules for the doctrine of regulatory 
takings.112 Lubens argues that US jurisprudence does not regard property as a 
fundamental right and as such, US courts do not scrutinise property regulation to the 
same degree as non-economic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, or freedom of religion.113 Property rights are subject to any measure that 
passes a weak “rationality” standard of judicial review.114 Although property rights 
have gained greater protection under the takings clause over time, “the decisions 
hailed by property rights partisans and property owners as paradigm-shifting victories 
[continues to be] doctrinally cautious and often limited in application”.115 
 According to Singer, the ultimate question in takings claims is found in the 
Court’s statement in Armstrong v United States116 that the takings clause is aimed at 
preventing the state from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”.117 According to 
Sax, the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent arbitrary state action and 
considered to constitute “a bulwark against unfairness, rather than against mere 
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value diminution”.118 The duty to pay compensation plays an important role in this 
regard. According to Sax, compensation protects private property owners against 
arbitrary, unfair or tyrannical state actions.119 Considerations of fairness and justice 
are the determinative criteria by which courts distinguish between constitutional 
regulations and unconstitutional takings.120 However, what is fair and just depends on 
various things.121 In this regard, some authors argue that these situations are best 
dealt with by appropriate legislative measures.122 
 The doctrine of regulatory takings is one solution to save the type of excessive 
regulatory measures discussed in chapter 1 from being declared invalid. In terms of 
the US doctrine of regulatory takings, courts treat an interference with property rights, 
which was effected in terms of the state’s police power, as a taking which requires 
compensation if the court determines that that the impact of such regulatory measure 
is so harsh and excessive that it cannot be upheld without compensation. Therefore, 
the doctrine of regulatory takings allows courts to uphold excessive regulatory 
measures by treating them as expropriation of property that requires the payment of 
compensation, even though the state did not intend to formally expropriate the 
affected property holder.  
 Despite reservations on the appropriateness of regulatory takings solution for 
South African law in light of the judicial controversy and difficulty in determining when 
a regulatory measure constitutes regulatory taking which requires compensation, the 
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phraseology of the US property clause may make this solution unique to the US law 
context. The Fifth Amendment refers to “takings” of property which is wider than 
“expropriation”. The term taking is not limited to state acquisitions of property but also 
includes regulatory state actions that effect a burden that is tantamount to 
expropriation of property. However, in light of the South African Constitutional Court’s 
recent ruling in Agri SA regarding state acquisition as a requirement for expropriation, 
it seems unlikely that constructive expropriation can be recognised in South African 
law.123 
 
2 1 3 Irish law 
The constitutional property clause in the Irish Constitution is interesting for this 
comparative overview because the meaning of this uniquely phrased provision has 
also by and large been developed in the jurisprudence, but with an outcome that 
differs significantly from its American counterpart. Articles 40.3.2 and 43 constitute 
the property clause in the Constitution of Ireland 1937 (Irish Constitution).124 The 
precise relationship between these two articles is unclear but current jurisprudence 
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generally accepts that they serve as a double guarantee in the protection of property 
rights.125 Article 40.3.2 guarantees protection from “unjust attack” on property whilst 
article 43.2 provides that the state may regulate property according to the principles 
of social justice. Furthermore, article 43.2 authorises the state to delimit by law, as 
occasion may require, the exercise of property rights with a view to reconcile their 
exercise with the exigencies of the common good.126 The open-textured 
constitutional principles of “social justice” and the “exigencies of the common good” 
in article 43 are judicially interpreted and differentiated on the basis that the principles 
of social justice are relevant in determining whether the reasons advanced for the 
limitation can justify the restriction on the exercise of property rights. On the other 
hand, considering the exigencies of the common good focuses on the means that 
could be adopted to achieve socially-just public objectives.127 Van der Walt argues 
that the requirements in article 43.2 contain both formal and normative aspects.128 
The formal aspects contained in article 43.2 require that the limitation must be 
authorised by law and must not be applied arbitrarily. The normative aspects relate to 
the fact that the limitation must reconcile the exercise of rights with the exigencies of 
the common good, which may imply some form of proportionality test to ensure that 
the limitation maintains a fair balance between the individual property holder’s 
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interests and the public interest.129 According to case law, article 40.3.2 and article 
43 should be read together.130 Walsh’s analysis of case law on the relationship 
between these two articles leads to the conclusion that property as an institution is 
protected by article 43.1 and the rights flowing from ownership are secured against 
unjust attack by article 40.3.2, but this security is qualified by the state’s power to 
regulate the exercise of property rights in terms of article 43.2.131  
 The Irish Constitution does not explicitly distinguish between deprivation and 
expropriation of property. The state’s power in terms of article 43.2 includes both 
formal expropriation and the (uncompensated) regulation of property rights.132 
Moreover, the term “unjust attack” in article 40.3.2 does not only refer to 
expropriation but also includes regulatory interferences with property that amount to 
expropriation without compensation.133 Therefore, an interference with property rights 
can constitute an unjust attack on property rights if it does not comply with the formal 
requirements of law (therefore not being authorised and consequently invalid) or if 
the impact of the regulatory measure is so extensive and disproportionate that it 
cannot be upheld without compensation. Therefore, in some instances, the absence 
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of article 40.3.2. See also AJ van der Walt “The protection of private property under the Irish 
Constitution: A comparative and theoretical perspective” in O Doyle & E Carolan (eds) The Irish 
Constitution: Governance and values (2008) chap 22 at 402. 
132
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 237, 239. See also 
R Walsh “The Constitution, property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin 
University Law Journal 1-34 at 16 fn 78, 20. 
133
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 237, 239. See also 
R Walsh “The Constitution, property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin 
University Law Journal 1-34 at 6, 12-13. 
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of compensation can constitute a ground for claiming an unjust attack on property 
rights and result in invalidity of the regulatory measure. It is difficult to identify the 
precise location of the threshold where regulation shades into regulatory taking.134 
Various factors are taken into account when determining whether an unjust attack 
has occurred, namely retrospectivity; lack of fair procedures; unreasonableness and 
irrationality; discrimination; lack of proportionality; and in some cases, the lack of 
compensation.135 The focus in this overview is on fairness in the distribution of 
regulatory burdens and the absence of compensation. 
 The principle of equality plays an important role in curtailing the state’s 
regulatory power.136 Regulatory measures that unfairly concentrate the cost of 
attaining a public benefit on a discrete category of individuals will usually be struck 
down if the principle of fairness indicates that these costs should rather have been 
spread evenly across society by paying compensation.137 The constitutional source 
of this limit is unclear, since there is no indication in article 40.3.2 or article 43 of this 
principle.138 In some cases, the impact on the affected owner is given substantial 
weight in determining whether an unjust attack has occurred, while in other cases the 
importance of the public interest at stake outweighs considerations of the excessive 
or disproportionate impact of the measure.139 Walsh states that there is no clear 
                                                   
134
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 175. 
135
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 184, citing J & J Haire and Company 
Ltd v Minister for Health [2009] IEHC 562. For a discussion on each of these factors, see R Walsh 
Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 184-233; G Hogan & G Whyte JM Kelly: The 
Irish Constitution (4
th
 ed 2003) 1996-2011. 
136
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 203.  
137
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 204. R Walsh “The Constitution, 
property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin University Law Journal 1-34 at 31, 
citing Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Health (Amendment) (No 2) Bill, 2004 [2005] IESC 7, 
states that it is constitutionally unacceptable to expect a particularly vulnerable group within society to 
carry the cost of achieving a general social good. 
138
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 209. 
139
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 204. 
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distinction between permissible and impermissible distributions and that the “intuitive 
sense of fairness held by the deciding judges appears to be driving the doctrine, 
rather than any constraining principle”.140  
Furthermore, not all regulatory measures that impose the costs of public 
benefits on discrete groups in society will be unjust. Various qualifications to the 
general principle that social costs should be fairly distributed among society as a 
whole have emerged from case law.141 One such qualification is based on a profit-
making rationale, also referred to as the harm-benefit distinction, in terms of which 
the person responsible for the creation of a social harm may be required to pay for its 
resolution since it would be unjust if such person were allowed to take the profits and 
let society carry the costs.142 Generally, individuals cannot be required to pay for 
social costs that do not result from some harm they caused,143 but the justification for 
the harm-benefit qualification lies in the fact that the burden imposed by the 
regulatory system is balanced by the benefits that accrue to an individual within such 
a system.144 Walsh points out that this distinction is often used to support decisions 
upholding, rather than striking down, restrictions on the exercise of property rights.145 
The harm-benefit distinction depends on a prior understanding of property rights that 
                                                   
140
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 204, 209. 
141
 See R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 204-230 for a discussion on the 
qualifications that have developed in Irish case law. 
142
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 209-210, 216-219 lists examples of 
instances where this qualification may apply, namely a polluter may be required to pay for pollution-
remediation; or an industrialist must ensure a safe workplace. Furthermore, examples of these 
instances are not limited to cases where legislation authorises the kind of activity. See also G Hogan & 
G Whyte JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 ed 2003) 2003; K Gray “Can environmental regulation 
constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 
161-181 at 164 fn 19. This corresponds to US law where the state is allowed to restrict the use of 
property without paying compensation if the restriction is imposed to respond to externalities caused 
by the property owner’s use of the property. Exactions is one example where this principle is 
applicable. See the discussion of regulatory takings in US law above. 
143
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 210. See also G Hogan & G Whyte 
JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 ed 2003) 2003. 
144
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 220.  
145
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 219, 222  
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can ordinarily be asserted without any question of harm-creating arising.146 This 
distinction is not always easy to make. Walsh argues that cases decided on the 
harm-benefit distinction are in reality decided in terms of the “deciding judge’s sense 
of fairness and on an unarticulated understanding of the value and content of a 
minimum core of rights that an owner is regarded as entitled to exercise regardless of 
their impact on the rights of others or on the common good”.147 In addition to the 
harm-benefit qualification, which excludes compensation when an additional burden 
that is imposed on a property owner is justified by the fact that the burden is intended 
to balance out a harm caused by the owner’s use of the property, the possibility of 
claiming compensation is also qualified when a regulatory burden imposed on 
property owners is balanced out by other more or less reciprocal benefits.148 
Furthermore, a claim for a compensable infringement of property will rarely succeed 
if it can be shown that the affected owner is left with a residue of reasonable 
alternative use of his property.149 
 Although the Irish Constitution does not distinguish between deprivation and 
expropriation of property, case law reveals that the legislature has greater freedom to 
regulate the use of property than it has to appropriate rights, even though the 
restriction on the exercise of an owner’s property rights may result in a substantial 
                                                   
146
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 210, citing FI Michelman “Property, 
utility, and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations of ‘just compensation’ law” (1967) 80 
Harvard Law Review 1165-1258 at 1197, states that “a benchmark of ‘neutral’ conduct which enables 
us to say where refusal to confer benefits (not reversible without compensation) slips over into 
readiness to inflict harms (reversible without compensation)”. 
147
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 211, 222. 
148
 With regard to environmental regulation, K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking 
of property at common law?” (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 163, 
referring to the position in common law jurisdictions, states that it is arguable whether an affected 
owner suffers a loss since the public benefit of the regulation secures an “average reciprocity of 
advantage” and therefore a dimension of compensation is already inherent in the regulatory 
mechanism. 
149
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 177. See also R Walsh “The Constitution, 
property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin University Law Journal 1-34 at 26. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
adverse loss of value.150 The unique terminology of the Irish property clause allows 
courts to treat excessive regulatory interferences with property as an unjust attack if it 
is not accompanied by compensation. However, not every regulatory limitation that 
results in the decline in value of the affected property will constitute a compensable 
infringement of property.151 In Central Dublin Development Association v Attorney 
General152 (Central Dublin) the Irish Supreme Court held that “some restrictions on 
the exercise of some of the rights that together constitute ownership do not call for 
compensation because the restriction is not an unjust attack”.153 Similarly, in M & F 
Quirke & Sons v An Bord Pleanála154 the Supreme Court stated that  
“not all interferences with property rights will require compensation to be paid to 
ensure constitutional legitimacy. Compensation will be required in circumstances 
where property is wholly expropriated or where the bundle of rights which 
constitute ownership are substantially taken away but lesser interferences with 
property rights would not require compensation”.155  
Expropriation or regulatory measures that appropriate or restrict property rights in 
total will almost always require compensation in order to be constitutional, but in 
cases that fall short of full appropriation, it is a matter of degree whether 
compensation will be a validity requirement.156 Contrary to the civil law tradition, 
acquisition of title is not a requirement for an interference to constitute a taking (and a 
                                                   
150
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 251 argues that this creates an 
incentive for the legislature to stretch the boundaries of regulation to achieve legislative goals.  
151
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 174. Gray’s article is based on the approach 
followed in common law jurisdictions. 
152
 [1975] 109 ILTR 69 at 84. 
153
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 247-248, 253. See also R Walsh 
“The Constitution, property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin University Law 
Journal 1-34 at 12-13. 
154
 [2010] 2 ILRM 91 at 110. 
155
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 247-248, 253. 
156
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 167, with reference to common law jurisdictions, 
states that a regulatory limitation may amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation where 
such interference results in the removal of all reasonable uses of the affected property. 
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concomitant duty to compensate) in Irish law.157 In Re Article 26 of the Constitution 
and the Health (Amendment) (No 2) Bill, 2004158 the Supreme Court stated that  
“where an Act of the Oireachtas [Parliament] interferes with a property right, the 
presence or absence of compensation is generally a material consideration when 
deciding whether that interference is justified pursuant to Article 43 or whether it 
constitutes an ‘unjust attack’ on those rights and that in practice substantial 
encroachment on rights, without compensation, will rarely be justified”. 
Moreover, a compensable infringement is more easily established when the 
regulatory limitation causes a substantial interference with the incidents of ownership 
rather than the loss of economic value.159 Walsh argues that courts pay relatively 
little regard to the actual extent of the impact of the restriction on the value of the 
affected property rights, and focus instead on the nature of the restriction.160 
Therefore, restrictions that constitute appropriation of the total rights in the affected 
property, as opposed to restrictions that result from regulation of the exercise of 
property rights, would more readily be held to constitute an unjust attack on property 
in the absence of compensation. Furthermore, with regard to regulatory limitations of 
property, Walsh states that the entitlement to compensation is largely determined by 
                                                   
157
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 173, citing O D Cars Ltd v Belfast Corporation 
[1959] NI 62 at 13 in which the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held, with reference to the trend in US 
law, that “there may be a taking of property for which just compensation is payable though the taking 
is not a taking over but a taking away, as by a prohibition or restriction or some other form of 
interference”. 
158
 [2005] IESC 7 at 31-32. See also D O’Donne “Property rights in the Irish Constitution: Rights for 
rich people, or a pillar for free society?” in O Doyle & E Carolan (eds) The Irish Constitution: 
Governance and values (2008) chap 23 at 426-427. 
159
 K Gray “Can environmental regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 161-181 at 174 (footnotes omitted), referring to common law 
jurisdictions. See also J Casey Constitutional law in Ireland (3
rd
 ed 2000) 678. 
160
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 253. See also R Walsh “The 
Constitution, property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin University Law 
Journal 1-34 at 3, 26. 
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the public interest furthered by the particular regulatory measure rather than by 
reference to the extent of the impact of the restriction on property rights.161 
 The term “unjust attack” is unique to the Irish property clause and allows 
courts to treat interferences with property rights that result from a regulatory measure 
as something similar to regulatory takings in US law. Although Irish law does not 
adopt the US regulatory takings doctrine in the strict sense, excessive regulatory 
measure may in some instances be declared invalid if they are not accompanied by 
compensation. Stated differently, Irish law requires the state, in some instances, to 
provide compensation to individual property owners who have to bear a regulatory 
burden for the benefit of the public as a whole, even though the state did not formally 
expropriate the affected property owner’s property. However, in the absence of a 
regulatory takings doctrine compensation does not amount to regulatory excess 
being salvaged by way of requiring compensation. In instances where the 
considerations set out above do not inidcate that compensation is required, 
compensation cannot achieve anything and the remedy for regulatory excess 
remains invalidation. 
With regard to the impact of a regulatory interference with property, in light of 
the absence of a distinction between deprivation and expropriation in the Irish 
property clause, it is a matter of degree whether compensation is required for the 
validity of a specific regulatory interference. An excessive regulatory measure will 
constitute unjust attack on property rights if such regulatory measure is not 
accompanied by compensation.162 In light of the explicit distinction between 
                                                   
161
 R Walsh “The Constitution, property rights and proportionality: A reappraisal” (2009) 31 Dublin 
University Law Journal 1-34 at 26. 
162
 R Walsh Private property rights in the Irish Constitution (2011) 235. See also AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 237-238; K Gray “Can environmental 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
deprivation and expropriation in section 25 of the South African Constitution and the 
explicit compensation requirement in section 25(2), it seems unlikely that the Irish 
courts’ approach to compensation can provide an example for South African courts to 
develop an appropriate remedy to save excessive regulatory measures from being 
declared invalid.163 
 
2 1 4 Swiss law 
Property is entrenched in article 26 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation of 18 April 1999 (Swiss Constitution).164 Article 26(2) of the Swiss 
Constitution requires the state to compensate property owners for regulatory 
limitations that fall within the category of “material expropriation”.165 Material 
expropriation can be distinguished from formal expropriation in that there is no 
transfer of the property to the state, but the effects caused by the regulation are 
materially the same as in a case of formal expropriation.166 In addition to article 26 of 
                                                                                                                                                               
regulation constitute a taking of property at common law?” (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 161-181 at 167-168. 
163
 See the discussion on constructive expropriation in South African law below. 
164
 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18 April 1999, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html# (accessed on 28.08.2013). 
Article 26(1) of the Swiss Constitution provides that “[t]he right to own property is guaranteed”. See 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf (accessed on 02.09.2013) for an official English translation 
of the Swiss Constitution. 
165
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 350, 359. See also KA Vallender “Art. 26 
Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA Vallender (eds) Die 
schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 331. Article 26(2) of the Swiss 
Constitution states that “[t]he compulsory purchase of property and any restriction on ownership that is 
equivalent to compulsory purchase shall be compensated in full”. See 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf (accessed on 06.08.2014) for an official English translation 
of the Swiss Constitution. The restriction on ownership that is equivalent to compulsory purchase is 
also referred to as “material expropriation” in Swiss law. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property 
law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 420; E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in 
Swiss law – A comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458. 
166
 AJ van der Walt “The property clause in the new Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
1999” (2004) 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 326-332 at 328. See also E Riva “Regulatory takings in 
American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A comparison of the applicable standards” 
(1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 429. 
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the Swiss Constitution, various federal statutes also provide a basis upon which a 
claim for compensation for material expropriation can be founded.167  
The scope and content of the entrenched property guarantee are largely 
determined by the legislature.168 However, the legislature’s power in this regard is not 
unrestrained. Article 36 is applicable to restrictions on fundamental rights.169 Article 
36(1) and (2) contains the formal requirements for a valid interference with property 
rights. Any state interference with property rights must be for a public purpose and 
must be authorised by law.170 Any limitation of a fundamental right that does not 
serve a public purpose or is not authorised by law is in conflict with section 36 of the 
                                                   
167
 See for example Article 5.2 of the Raumplanungsgesetz (RPG) vom 22 Juni 1979 available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19790171/index.html (accessed on 28.08.2013); 
Article 18.1 of the Bundesgesetz über die Nationalstrassen (NSG) vom 8 März 1960, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19600028/index.html (accessed on 2.09.2013); 
Article 18u of the Eisenbahngesetz (EBG) vom 20 Dezember 1957, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19570252/index.html (accessed on 2.09.2013); 
Article 44 of the Luftfahrtgesetz (LFG) vom 21 Dezember 1948, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19480335/index.html (accessed on 2.09.2013). 
168
 KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA 
Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 332 states that 
the Swiss property guarantee contains a similar institutional (Institutsgarantie) and individual 
(Bestandesgarantie) guarantee than that in German law. See E Riva “Regulatory takings in American 
law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 
The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 428-429 for a discussion on the two basic concepts underlying the 
property guarantee in Swiss law. 
169
 AJ van der Walt “The property clause in the new Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
1999” (2004) 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 326-332 at 332 fn 30 states that there is a resemblance 
between article 36 of the Swiss Constitution and section 36 of the South African Constitution. Article 
36 provides that 
“1 Restrictions on fundamental rights must have a legal basis. Significant restrictions 
must have their basis in a federal act. The foregoing does not apply in cases of serious 
and immediate danger where no other course of action is possible. 
2 Restrictions on fundamental rights must be justified in the public interest or for the 
protection of the fundamental rights of others. 
3 Any restrictions on fundamental rights must be proportionate. 
4 The essence of fundamental rights is sacrosanct”. 
See http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf (accessed on 06.08.2014) for an official English 
translation of the Swiss Constitution. See KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; 
P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: 
Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 339-434 for a discussion of the respective requirements in article 36. 
170
 KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA 
Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 341. 
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Swiss Constitution and invalid.171 It is not possible to salvage the invalidity with the 
payment of compensation.  
In addition to the formal requirements in article 36(1) and (2), article 36(3) 
requires that the state interference with property rights must be proportionate. 
Furthermore, article 36(4) guarantees protection of the core content of property 
rights. Van der Walt states that although the explicit proportionality guarantee and the 
formal guarantee of the core content of each fundamental right in article 36 of the 
Swiss Constitution are German in origin, the application of the proportionality 
principles results in different outcomes.172 The proportionality principle in both 
German and Swiss law ensures that the legislature, in the determination of the 
content and limits of individual property rights, establishes an equitable balance 
between the interests of the individual and the social interest.173 However, an 
infringement of the proportionality principle in German law may result in the 
regulation being invalid, whereas in Swiss law it can found a claim for compensation 
on the basis of material expropriation.174 
In contrast to US and Irish law,175 Swiss law is unique in the sense that the 
Swiss Constitution explicitly provides for compensation in instances where there was 
no formal expropriation of property, but the impact that results from a particular 
regulatory limitation on property rights is tantamount to that of expropriation (referred 
to as material expropriation). Swiss law draws a distinction between formal 
                                                   
171
 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 433. 
172
 AJ van der Walt “The property clause in the new Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
1999” (2004) 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 326-332 at 332 fn 30. 
173
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 365. 
174
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 366 fn 111. 
175
 In US and Irish law courts award compensation for excessive regulatory limitations on property 
rights without statutory authority to do so. See the discussion on US and Irish law above. 
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expropriation; “normal” uncompensated police power regulation of the use of private 
property; and regulatory restrictions on the use of property, described as material 
expropriations, that are only valid when accompanied by compensation.176 The 
criteria for distinguishing between material expropriation and less significant 
regulatory infringements of property are determined by the courts.177  
Vallender178 states that the Federal Supreme Court has been consistent in its 
jurisprudence that a material expropriation can present itself in two forms, namely by 
imposing a burden similar to that of formal expropriation in the sense of prohibiting or 
severely restricting the affected property owner’s existing or foreseeable future use of 
property in such a way that an essential entitlement deriving from that property right 
is taken away or, in cases where the burden is less severe, the infringement results 
in a Sonderopfer (individual sacrifice) in a way that violates the principle of equality 
because it singles out an individual owner or a select group of property owners to 
sacrifice the use and enjoyment of their property for the benefit of the public in 
general.179 In both instances the limitation would be unreasonable in the absence of 
                                                   
176
 AJ van der Walt “The property clause in the new Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
1999” (2004) 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 326-332 at 327-328. See also KA Vallender “Art. 26 
Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA Vallender (eds) Die 
schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 345. According to E Riva 
“Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A comparison of the 
applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 442 fn 78, the term police power is 
narrower than its US law counterpart. It only embraces measures that are directly aimed at protecting 
public health, safety, morals and order, and does not serve the purpose of enhancing the general 
welfare. 
177
 KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA 
Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 347. See also 
E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A comparison 
of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 425. 
178
 The standard formulation of material expropriation is set out by the Federal Supreme Court in BGE 
91 I 329 (1965). See KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ 
Schweizer & KA Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 
at 346-347. See also E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss 
law – A comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 431-432. 
179
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 360-361, 420; AJ van der Walt “The 
property clause in the new Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1999” (2004) 15 
Stellenbosch Law Review 326-332 at 328. See also W Schaumann “Enteignung und 
Enteignungsentschädigung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des 
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compensation. Riva points out that the protection against the severe infringement of 
an essential entitlement deriving from property emanates from the property 
guarantee, whilst the protection against special sacrifice is a feature of the equality 
principle.180 
The severity of the impact of a regulatory measure is determined with reference 
to a value-oriented test.181 Generally, compensation is not required for regulatory 
restrictions of property that are objectively considered to be slight or insignificant or of 
temporary duration.182 Vallender argues that an infringement is insignificant if the 
property owner can still put the property to good and economic use.183 With regard to 
the protection of future uses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court restricts the 
protection to only those uses that are reasonably foreseeable and are likely to realise 
in the near future.184 
                                                                                                                                                               
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts” (1960) 5/6 Juristenzeitung 142-150 at 146. E Riva “Regulatory 
takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A comparison of the applicable 
standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 429-432 sets out the development of material 
expropriation in the Federal Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  
180
 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 453. 
181
 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 446-447. 
182
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 360; KA Vallender “Art. 26 
Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA Vallender (eds) Die 
schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 346. An example of a temporary 
restriction of property is found in BGE 120 Ia 209 (1994) where the Federal Supreme Court held that a 
three to four year building moratorium does not establish a claim for compensation. 
183
 KA Vallender “Art. 26 Eigentumsgarantie” in B Ehrenzeller; P Mastronardi; RJ Schweizer & KA 
Vallender (eds) Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: Kommentar (2002) 328-352 at 345. 
184
 BGE 91 I 329 (1965). AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 360 fn 88 states 
that vague hopes or possibilities are not sufficient to merit protection. Courts take the legal and 
economic situation of the property holder into account when determining the probability that a future 
use could reasonably have been realised in the near future. The crucial moment for testing the 
foreseeability and probability of a future use is the moment when the regulation becomes effective. 
See also discussion in E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in 
Swiss law – A comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 432, 
449-453. 
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The second ground upon which a claim for material expropriation can be based, 
namely special sacrifice, is a fairness test that bears no relation to value.185 The 
payment of compensation in these instances is aimed at re-establishing the 
equilibrium destroyed by the applicable regulatory measure.186 Although the 
regulatory interference in the second instance need not be as significant as in the 
first mentioned instance, the interference must still be intense to the extent that it 
justifies compensation.187 Awards in terms of this principle occur very seldom. Riva 
argues that the Swiss test for material expropriation is really a combination of an 
express value diminution inquiry with an implied singling-out standard.188 
 The Swiss Constitution expressly recognises a second category of 
expropriation, namely regulatory interferences with property that has the same 
effects as expropriation. This type of excessive regulatory interferences is referred to 
as material expropriations. Swiss case law is clear on the matter that a regulatory 
interference that effects a harsh and excessive burden on a property holder or a 
regulatory interference that results in a limitation of one owner’s property rights for 
the benefit of the public as a whole, although the burden may be less severe, 
constitutes material expropriation. The payment of compensation is a validity 
requirement for material expropriation. Therefore, the Swiss example of material 
expropriation is one possible solution to save excessive regulatory measures from 
being declared invalid. However, the explicit provision for compensation for material 
expropriation in the Swiss property clause makes the solution in that context unique 
and difficult to transfer to other jurisdictions. The South African Constitution does not 
                                                   
185
 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 446-447. 
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 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 453. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 361. 
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 E Riva “Regulatory takings in American law and ‘material expropriation’ in Swiss law – A 
comparison of the applicable standards” (1984) 16 The Urban Lawyer 425-458 at 454. 
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have a similar provision in section 25. The Swiss example is therefore of limited 
value to jurisdictions that do not have an explicit provision for something like 
constructive expropriation in their Constitutions. Therefore, unless section 25 of the 
South African Constitution is amended to expressly provide compensation for 
constructive expropriation, Swiss law does not serve as a good comparative source 
for the development of an alternative remedy to address the problem discussed in 
chapter 1. 
 
2 2  Conclusion 
The notion of constructive expropriation is one example of an alternative remedy to 
the invalidation of excessive regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful and 
legitimate and serve a necessary and important public purpose but effects a burden 
that is excessive and disproportionate and renders the regulatory interference 
arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the South African Constitution. In terms of the 
doctrine of constructive expropriation, this type of excessive regulatory measure is 
judicially transformed into expropriation because it cannot be upheld without the 
payment of compensation. The compensation is therefore aimed at softening the 
harsh and excessiveness of the regulatory burden on the property owner; 
transforming the regulatory measure into or treating it as expropriation is the chosen 
method to root the compensation requirement in the constitution. 
 The notion of regulatory taking was developed in US law. Irish and Swiss law 
also recognise something similar to regulatory takings, in each case suited to the 
formulation of the relevant constitutional text. It is evident in the discussion of the 
three jurisdictions above that it is universally difficult for courts to precisely define 
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when a regulatory interference with property rights shades into expropriation and 
requires compensation to be valid. The factors considered by the courts in these 
jurisdictions overlap to some degree but do not necessarily carry the same weight in 
the respective jurisdictions.  
 The terminology used by the US and Irish property clauses and the explicit 
recognitions of material expropriation in the Swiss property clause assist the 
recognition and application of the doctrine of constructive expropriation or regulatory 
takings. The term “takings” in the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution is not 
limited to formal expropriation of property but also includes regulatory interferences 
that have the same effect as expropriation. The US courts are therefore capable to 
uphold regulatory interferences of property rights that they deem excessive and 
disproportionate by requiring the state to pay compensation, even though the state 
did not formally expropriate the affected property holder. Similarly, the Irish 
Constitution does not distinguish between deprivation and expropriation of property. 
The requirement to pay compensation is not limited to formal expropriation of 
property. However, in the absence of a state acquisition of the affected property, it is 
a matter of degree whether compensation is a validity requirement. The absence of 
compensation constitutes an unjust attack on property if a regulatory interference 
effects a severe limitation of the owner’s property rights. Therefore, the Irish courts 
can sometimes uphold regulatory interferences with property that do not amount to 
formal expropriation of property but that have the same effects as expropriation by 
requiring the state to pay compensation. However, this possibility does not exist 
when regulatory measures are simply excessive; in thos ecases the Irish courts will 
usually invalidate the regulatory measure. Furthermore, the Swiss Constitution is 
unique in the sense that the constitutional text explicitly expressly recognises a 
second category of expropriation, namely material expropriation. Courts treat 
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regulatory interferences that cause a severe limitation of property rights or that affect 
one or a small group of property owners as material expropriation of property. 
Compensation is a validity requirement for a material expropriation. In this sense, 
excessive regulatory measures are constitutionally valid provided that they are 
accompanied by compensation. 
 The legal uncertainty and conflicting theories in the US and Irish law regarding 
the judicial determination when an excessive regulatory interference with property 
rights shades into expropriation and requires compensation raises doubt whether 
constructive expropriation is generally an appropriate alternative remedy to excessive 
regulatory measures discussed in chapter 1. Furthermore, the terminology in the US 
and Irish Constitution and the explicit provision of material expropriation in the Swiss 
Constitution renders the notion of something like constructive expropriation unique to 
these foreign law contexts. It is unlikely and arguably impossible to recognise and 
develop something like constructive expropriation in South African law, especially 
with regard to the FNB logic and methodology regarding the application of section 25 
of the South African Constitution, state acquisition of property as a fixed requirement 
for expropriation, and the South African courts’ general reluctance to recognise the 
doctrine of constructive expropriation.189 
 
                                                   
189
 See the discussion of South African law below. 
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3 South African law on constructive expropriation 
3 1 Introduction 
The question whether constructive expropriation is at all possible or should be 
developed in South African law remains a controversial issue. South African courts 
seem reluctant to recognise such a doctrine. In light of the recent Constitutional Court 
decision in Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy190 (Agri SA) it seems doubtful 
whether a doctrine of constructive expropriation can be developed in South African 
law, but the Court failed to reject it explicitly. South African legal scholars also seem 
to have divergent opinions on whether constructive expropriation could serve a useful 
purpose in South African law and, if it could, whether it would be possible to employ 
it. 
 Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution explicitly differentiates between two forms of 
state interference with property, namely deprivation and expropriation. No clear-cut 
formula exists to distinguish these two categories from each other. The textual 
distinction in the property clause requires substantive content to be ascribed to these 
two forms of state interferences which would facilitate distinguishing them from each 
other.191 The need for such distinction arises from the fact that deprivation and 
expropriation are generally defined with reference to, or in contrast with each 
other.192 Furthermore, the distinction is necessary to analyse whether there is room 
for the recognition of the constructive expropriation as a possible solution to the 
problem. Constructive expropriation occupies a grey area between deprivation and 
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 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
191
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 191; T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ 
vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
conversations (2008) 265-281 at 267. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 192; J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 
2012) 213; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
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expropriation. Constructive expropriation would mean that courts, instead of 
invalidating a necessary and important regulatory deprivation that effects arbitrary 
deprivation of property, may treat it as expropriation and require the payment of 
compensation.  
 In Agri SA the Constitutional Court held that “there is an overlap and no bold 
line of demarcation between sections 25(1) and 25(2)”.193 Therefore, deprivation and 
expropriation are generally defined with reference to one another. General identifying 
characteristics of expropriation include the acquisition of title over an object by the 
state194 or by another private person.195 Expropriation may also entail the destruction 
of property.196 Southwood,197 Gildenhuys198 and Currie and De Waal199 argue that no 
expropriation exists without some transfer or acquisition of rights.200 However, Van 
der Walt argues that state acquisition cannot be regarded as the single defining 
characteristic of expropriation.201 In some instances the functional element of 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 48. 
194
 In Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paras 31, 32 citing Minister of Defence v 
Commercial Properties Ltd and Others 1955 (3) SA 324 (N) at 327 G in which the court held that 
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Harksen held the term “expropriation” involves acquisition of rights in property by a public authority for 
a public purpose and against the payment of compensation, while deprivation falls short of such 
acquisition. The Court also referred to Beckenstrater v Sand Rivier Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 
(T) at 515 A. In Transvaal Investment Co Ltd v Springs Municipality 1922 AD 337 at 341 the Court 
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property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 337, 344; PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
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prescription, labour tenancy and restitution (2000) 15. 
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nd
 ed 2001) 8. 
199
 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 553. 
200
 See also J Murphy “Interpreting the property clause in the Constitution Act of 1993” (1995) 10 
South African Public Law 107-130 at 115-116. 
201
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 337-338, 345. AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 338 argues that it is incorrect to require 
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expropriation might be the loss of the affected property by its former holder rather 
than acquisition by the state. It is not always possible to tell whether the state 
acquired the affected property or any property at all.202 However, if a court has to 
distinguish between expropriation and deprivation by regulatory measures, it should 
be cautious not to extend the meaning of expropriation to situations where the 
deprivation does not have the effect of property being acquired by the state.203 This 
issue seems to have been settled in Agri SA where the Constitutional Court held that 
“[t]here can be no expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in 
property being acquired by the state”.204 Therefore, state acquisition of the affected 
property seems to be a necessary requirement for the establishment of expropriation. 
 Deprivation, on the other hand, can be characterised as a generally 
uncompensated, regulatory restriction or limitation on the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of property by the state in terms of its police power.205 Deprivation is 
usually effected through legislation or other law and is aimed at promoting or 
securing public health, public security and public safety.206 A physical taking of 
                                                                                                                                                               
actual dispossession or acquisition since it may seem to restrict expropriations to tangible property. 
See also AJ van der Walt & H Botha “Coming to grips with the new constitutional order: Critical 
comments on Harksen v Lane NO” (1998) 13 South African Public Law 17-41 at 21. H Mostert “The 
distinction between deprivations and expropriations and the future of the ‘doctrine’ of constructive 
expropriation in South Africa” (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 567-592 at 573, 577 
argues that the element of appropriation cannot be a prerequisite for expropriation since no explicit 
mention of such requirement is made in section 25. 
202
 PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 541. H Mostert “The distinction between deprivations and expropriations and the future of the 
‘doctrine’ of constructive expropriation in South Africa” (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 567-592 at 572 states that the entitlements lost by the affected property owner may be different 
from those entitlements acquired by the state. 
203
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 63-64. 
204
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. 
205
 H Mostert “The distinction between deprivations and expropriations and the future of the ‘doctrine’ 
of constructive expropriation in South Africa” (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 567-
592 at 572. 
206
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
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property is not necessary to constitute deprivation.207 In chapter 1 it is pointed out 
that the Constitutional Court’s definition of deprivation was not always consistent but 
the chapter concludes that the matter seems settled that any interference with the 
use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property, subject to the de minimis principle, 
constitutes deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1).208 
 Narrowing the focus on the extent of a state infringement as a means to 
distinguish between deprivation and expropriation could be too abstract to sufficiently 
justify the context-sensitive interpretation that is required in the constitutional property 
enquiry.209 A more effective method to distinguish between the two categories may 
be, in addition to any indication that the state or another person acquired the 
property, to view the effect of an infringement on the affected property owner as a 
useful indicator of the intention with which the infringement was made,210 especially 
when viewed alongside the origin of the authorising power.211 Expropriation is 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57; Mkontwana 
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 See the discussion on deprivation in chapter 1. 
209
 PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
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2006) 543. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 
(CC) para 49. 
210
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 PJ Badenhorst; JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
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exercised in terms of the power of eminent domain.212 Expropriation usually only 
affects a specific property or owner, whereas deprivation affects a certain category of 
property or class of persons generally.213 Expropriation is brought about unilaterally 
by state action and since it is considered an original form of acquisition of ownership 
it does not need the cooperation of the affected property owner.214 The acquisition or 
destruction is usually permanent and final in nature.215 Van der Walt agrees that 
expropriation must be final,216 but argues that the permanence on its own is not a 
reliable characteristic to distinguish between deprivation and expropriation since 
expropriation can also be temporary in exceptional instances.217 Although the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Human Rights 567-592 at 579 states that expropriations must be intended as such to be treated as 
such. 
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payment of compensation is a requirement for a valid expropriation,218 it should not 
be seen as a point of departure in developing a definition of either deprivation or 
expropriation but should rather be seen as one of the results of the distinction 
between the two categories.219 
 It is difficult to delineate the precise boundaries of expropriation in an effort to 
create a clear and exhaustive distinction between deprivation and expropriation. The 
distinction may be clear on a basic level, but becomes complex if the focus falls 
exclusively on the acquisition or benefit acquired by the state, or the extent and 
permanence of the infringement.220 If more focus is placed on the origin and nature of 
the authorising power, the chances that the two categories would be allowed to blend 
into each other become slimmer.221 In addition to the difficulty of recognising 
constructive expropriation in light of state acquisition as a fixed requirement for 
expropriation, South African courts have been reluctant to recognise this solution. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that constructive expropriation will fit in the courts’ 
approach to applying section 25. 
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 In Harksen v Lane NO and Others222 (Harksen) the Constitutional Court, dealing 
with the section 28 of the Interim Constitution,223 adopted a categorical distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation in the sense that they are clearly and 
exhaustively distinguishable from each other, without any room for identifying a third, 
grey area in between them.224 In terms of this categorical distinction recognising 
anything like a doctrine of constructive expropriation seemed unlikely. Subsequently, 
in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance225 
(FNB), the Court, this time confronted with section 25 of the 1996 Constitution, 
abandoned the categorical conceptual distinction and viewed expropriation as a 
subset of deprivation.226 Both the categorical and the subset approach seem to 
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expropriation is a form or subset of deprivation. 
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exclude the possibility of recognising constructive expropriation, since neither of 
these approaches leaves room for a grey area between deprivation and 
expropriation.227 Moreover, the requirement of state acquisition as a pre-requisite for 
expropriation set in Agri SA by the Constitutional Court logically precludes the 
recognition of constructive expropriation.228 It is necessary to trace judicial 
pronouncements on the issue before asking the question whether this construction is 
possible in South African law. 
 
3 2 Judicial views on constructive expropriation 
The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the question whether constructive 
expropriation should be recognised in South African law for the first time in Steinberg 
v South Peninsula Municipality229 (Steinberg). Although the Court did not deem it 
necessary on the facts of the case to decide the issue of constructive expropriation, it 
nevertheless held obiter that 
“there may be room for the development of a doctrine akin to constructive 
expropriation in South Africa … [but it] may be undesirable both for the pragmatic 
reason that it could introduce confusion into the law, and the theoretical reason 
that emphasis on compensation for the owner of a right which is limited by 
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executive action could for instance adversely affect the constitutional imperative 
of land reform”.230 
Van der Walt criticises the Court’s statement on the grounds that constitutional 
principles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of clarity and certainty in private law and 
that the Court’s concern regarding the impediment on land reform may be ill 
conceived since foreign law jurisprudence indicates that constructive expropriation 
usually applies with regard to commercial property and not land reform disputes.231 
Furthermore, even if constructive expropriation were to be recognised, the amount of 
compensation would have to be calculated in terms of section 25(3), which leaves 
the court enough room to ensure that the importance of land reform is taken into 
account.232 The Court’s remarks on constructive expropriation were obiter and 
therefore it had no binding effect. 
 Subsequent to Steinberg, the issue of constructive expropriation was raised in 
only a few other cases. In Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town233 the 
appellant argued that the respondents’ application to set aside the 1957 township 
approval granted by the Administrator of the Western Cape Province was no more 
than a thinly disguised effort to expropriate the appellant’s property without having to 
pay compensation. The Court refused to speculate whether this was the case 
because the case was not about expropriation.234  
                                                   
230
 Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA) para 8. According to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, situations where development of a narrow doctrine of constructive 
expropriation may prove useful are cases where a public body utilises its power to regulate private 
property so excessively that it may be characterised as expropriation. See also reference in Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province Government 
and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 65. 
231
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 379-381. 
232
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 381. 
233
 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA). 
234
 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) paras 68, 78. This 
decision was an appeal against the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd 
v The City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) on the validity of the Administrator’s township 
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 In Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and 
Works, Gauteng Province Government and Another235 (Reflect-All) the Constitutional 
Court considered whether certain provisions of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure 
Act 8 of 2001, which according to the Court effected a “serious” deprivation, amount 
to expropriation without compensation. The Court found the Steinberg decision 
instructive with regard to the suitability of developing a notion of constructive 
expropriation in South African law. However, the Constitutional Court did not express 
a clear or authoritative view on this issue and merely stated that it was not convinced 
that the adoption of this doctrine would be appropriate in the South African 
constitutional order. The Court held that the case before it, in any event, did not suit a 
development of such a doctrine because “[i]f regulation in cases such as the present 
were to be characterised as amounting to expropriation, government would be 
crippled in discharging its obligations in regulating the use of private property for 
public good”.236 
 In Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading CC237 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal again mentioned the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of 
constructive expropriation. It held that property may only be expropriated subject to 
the payment of compensation and pointed out that no such requirement exists in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
approval of the appellant’s land, 31 years prior to the appellant’s efforts to develop the property. The 
case concerned the application of the principles of administrative law, especially the Court’s discretion 
in terms of the “delay rule” in relation to administrative review. In terms of the “delay rule”, courts have 
the discretion when reviewing and considering whether to set aside an administrative decision, to 
uphold that decision despite the presence of substantive grounds for setting such decision aside 
where an undue and unreasonable delay in the commencement of review proceedings would result in 
prejudice to other parties. 
235
 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC).  
236
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Province 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 65. This is similar to what the US Supreme 
Court stated in the Mahon decision. 
237
 2012 (6) SA 638 (SCA). In this decision, the Court considered whether section 22 of the Electronic 
Communications Act 36 of 2005 (ECA), as interpreted by the appellant, infringes section 25 of the 
Constitution.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
case of deprivation.238 However, the Court stated that compensation or the offer of 
compensation may well take the regulatory interference out of the realm of 
arbitrariness.239 
 In City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd240 (Helderberg) 
the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant exceeded its 
authority in terms of section 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 
(LUPO) and thereby effected an expropriation without compensation.241 The local 
authority attached a condition to its approval of the respondent’s subdivision plan that 
required street reserves that were 32 metres wide, instead of the usual 16 metres. 
The developer claimed compensation for the additional area of land. The majority 
judgment by Farlam JA rejected the developer’s claim and held that the respondent’s 
remedy was limited to the internal appeal procedure provided for by LUPO and that it 
was therefore not entitled to claim compensation.242 However, Heher JA in his 
minority judgment agreed with the developer’s claim. Without resorting to the 
Constitution, Heher JA applied the rule of interpretation set out in Belinco (Pty) Ltd v 
Bellville Municipality243 that “a legislative intention to authorise expropriation without 
compensation will not be imputed in the absence of the express words or plain 
implication” and concluded that “section 28 is capable of meaning that the vesting of 
                                                   
238
 Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading CC 2012 (6) SA 638 (SCA) para 16. 
239
 Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading CC 2012 (6) SA 638 (SCA) para 16. 
240
 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA). See discussion of this decision in AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property 
law” 2008 (2) Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1.1; AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2008 
Annual Survey of South African Law 231-264 at 243-247. 
241
 Section 28 of LUPO provides that  
“[t]he ownership of all public streets and public places over or on land indicated as such 
at the granting of an application for subdivision under section 25 shall, after the 
confirmation of such subdivision or part thereof, vest in the local authority in whose area 
of jurisdiction that land is situated, without compensation by the local authority concerned 
if the provision of the said public streets and public places is based on the normal need 
therefor arising from the said subdivision or is in accordance with a policy determined by 
the Administrator from time to time, regard being had to such need”. 
242
 City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) para 11. 
243
 1970 (4) SA 589 (A) at 597C. 
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public places and streets beyond the normal need arising from a particular 
subdivision will give rise to a claim for compensation”.244 Farlam JA disagreed with 
Heher JA’s interpretation of section 28, stating that this could not have been the 
intention of the legislature.245 Furthermore, Farlam JA also disagreed with Heher JA’s 
finding that the relevant condition upon approval of the subdivision that provided for 
32 metres of street reserves constituted an expropriation. Farlam JA distinguished 
the vesting of land in terms of section 28 of LUPO from expropriation on the basis of 
the fact that vesting is voluntary in nature and the owner was not forced to submit to 
the vesting; he could have avoided the vesting of the portions of his land by not 
proceeding with the proposed subdivision.246 Farlam JA concluded that the 
respondent’s remedy was limited to the internal appeal procedure in section 44 of 
LUPO and judicial review. Furthermore, the respondent could not claim 
compensation if it failed to exercise those remedies.247  
 The Court’s finding in Helderberg was confirmed in City of Cape Town v Arun 
Property Developments (Pty) Ltd248 (Arun). In Arun the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the facts of the case were not distinguishable from Helderberg and 
reprimanded the court a quo for deviating from the precedent set by the Court in 
Helderberg.249 In Arun the Court emphasised that the purpose of section 28 of LUPO 
was to vest the property specified in the section in a local authority to enable it to fulfil 
                                                   
244
 City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) paras 40-41. 
245
 City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) para 3.  
246
 City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) para 4. AJ van 
der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2008 Annual Survey of South African Law 231-264 at 244 states 
that the vesting requirement in section 28 is referred to as “exactions” in US law. Furthermore, it is 
generally considered reasonable to expect the developer to donate land in so far as that land is 
required to accommodate the impact of the development. Difficulty arises when the developer is 
expected to donate land unrelated or disproportionate to the impact caused by the development. See 
the discussion on US law above.  
247
 City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 (SCA) para 11. 
248
 [2014] ZASCA 56 (16 April 2014). 
249
 City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZASCA 56 (16 April 2014) paras 
25, 29-31. 
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its obligations as a local authority in relation thereto and not to enable expropriation 
of land not based on the normal need therefor.250 The latter would have effected 
arbitrary deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution.251 
The Court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to take the condition attached 
to the township development approval on administrative review, using the internal 
remedies provided in LUPO.252 
 A similar situation as the developmental contributions in Helderberg and Arun 
arose in Conforth Investments (Pty) Ltd v Ethekwini Municipality253 (Conforth).254 The 
facts of the case were unclear and on one interpretation thereof the deprivation in 
                                                   
250
 City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZASCA 56 (16 April 2014) para 
23. 
251
 City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZASCA 56 (16 April 2014) para 
23. 
252
 City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZASCA 56 (16 April 2014) para 
28. 
253
 [2013] ZAKZDHC 68 (28 November 2013). 
254
 In this case, the plaintiff (Conforth) claimed compensation from the defendant (Municipality) for loss 
of its beneficial use, occupation and control of the property that formed the right of way registered over 
Conforth’s property. Conforth’s property bordered a highway, which was under the ownership and 
control of the Municipality. Conforth became the registered owner of the said property in 1986 and at 
the same time applied for town planning approval for the rezoning of the property. Such approval was 
granted but subject to the condition that the ownership of the portion of the site forming part of the 
existing road reservation to the highway or a right of way servitude shall be donated and transferred to 
the Municipality. Conforth completed the development but did not act on the said condition. However, 
in 2011 Conforth’s property was consolidated with an adjoining property and upon registration 
Conforth also registered a servitude of right of way over the property in favour of the Municipality. In 
the proceedings before the court Conforth based its claim for compensation on the following grounds: 
That the registration of the servitude of right of way was not a gift or donation but was done pursuant 
to the condition imposed by the town planning decision; that the imposition of the condition was 
unlawful because it constituted arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution; if the imposition of the condition constituted expropriation it entitled Conforth to 
compensation; and lastly that the court should recognise the doctrine of constructive expropriation and 
this would have entitled Conforth to be compensated. The Municipality argued that there was no 
deprivation because section 208 of the Local Authorities Ordinance 25 of 1974, which provided that 
“[t]he ownership, management and control of all public streets … and the land compromised in such 
streets and places shall vest in the council” vested ownership of the property in the Municipality long 
before Conforth acquired ownership of the land. Although the court did not draw a distinction between 
the street and the road reserve, it nevertheless held that section 208 did not deprive Conforth of its 
property since ownership of the property had already vested in the Municipality before Conforth 
acquired the land. Despite the court’s conclusion that no deprivation occurred, the court proceeded to 
consider whether section 208 effected expropriation and whether compensation was payable. In light 
of FNB, which held that expropriation is a subset of deprivation, the court’s consideration of 
expropriation after it already concluded that no deprivation occurred seems futile. See AJ van der Walt 
“Constitutional property law” 2013 (1) Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1 for a critical discussion of the 
decision. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
111 
 
question assumed the form of a development contribution (referred to as an exaction 
in US law).255 The plaintiff (Conforth) claimed compensation and based its claim on, 
inter alia, constructive expropriation. Although the High Court acknowledged that the 
question whether constructive expropriation is part of South African law has been 
raised but never authoritatively decided, it nevertheless defined what is meant by 
constructive expropriation and eventually found it unnecessary to decide the issue. In 
the case of developmental contributions, Helderberg, Arun and to a certain extent 
also Conforth indicate that the correct procedure is not to challenge the decision on 
the basis that it constitutes arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, rather to use the administrative remedies provided in the relevant 
statute, which are often administrative and judicial review. 
 In Grobler v Msimanga256 (Grobler) the South Gauteng High Court considered 
whether the court, in exercising the discretion granted in section 4(7) of the 
                                                   
255
 On the facts of the case it is not clear whether the Ordinance simultaneously vested ownership of 
the street and the road reserve in the Municipality. AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2013 
(1) Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1 discusses two possible constructions and the implications of each. 
In terms of the first construction, the Municipality acquired ownership of the street including the road 
reserve, whereas, on the second construction, the Municipality acquired ownership of the street but 
not of the road reserve. In terms of the second construction the Municipality only acquired a right of 
way servitude registered in its favour by Conforth in terms of the condition included in the township 
development approval. On the first construction, Van der Walt agrees with the court’s finding that no 
deprivation, and therefore also no expropriation could have taken place as Conforth’s predecessors in 
title had already lost ownership of the particular property before Conforth acquired the land. On this 
construction the registration of the servitude was a nullity firstly because an owner may not register a 
servitude on his own land and secondly, Conforth did not have the right to grant a servitude over 
property it did not own. Furthermore, section 208 did not constitute expropriation because the purpose 
of section 208 was not to acquire new property but to enable the proper control, administration and 
management of public roads. Van der Walt states that the second construction is more problematic 
because the purpose of the condition added to the township development approval would have been 
to acquire additional land, which assumes the form of a developmental contribution (exaction). The 
condition would therefore have constituted deprivation of property, the non-arbitrariness of which 
would have to be determined. Van der Walt argues that the second construction of the facts is 
probably not the correct version because, if section 208 vested ownership of the road reserve in the 
Municipality, the arbitrariness test should probably not address section 208 but rather the legislation 
that regulates township development approvals and the conditions that may be attached to it. 
Moreover, Van der Walt argues that even if the second construction was the correct version, the 
Helderberg decision illustrates the unwillingness of the South African courts to treat developmental 
contributions as expropriation, despite the unreasonable and disproportionate effects it may have on a 
property owners. Van der Walt states that courts prefer that claimants should rely on administrative 
remedies. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 290-291. 
256
 [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W).  
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Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE) will effectively allow expropriation without compensation. Section 4(7) of PIE 
applies to unlawful occupiers who have occupied the land in question for more than 
six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated. The section provides that  
“a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and 
equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including the 
rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households 
headed by women” (own emphasis). 
It was argued that section 4(7) created the possibility for a court to exercise its 
discretion against the granting of an eviction order. Such an order was said to 
constitute expropriation without compensation or, alternatively to allow constructive 
expropriation of the landowner’s property. The court stated that the purpose of the 
Act was to regulate eviction, to make it just and equitable, and to take into account all 
the relevant circumstances, including the rights and human dignity of unlawful 
occupiers who were landless and destitute.257 Furthermore, the court held it could 
never have been the intention of the legislature to provide a court with a discretion to 
expropriate or constructively expropriate258 a landowner through unlawful occupation 
without compensation.259 The court applied a purposive interpretation to section 4(7) 
and concluded that the section, seen in the context of PIE as a whole, did not intend 
                                                   
257
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 137.  
258
 In Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 125 the court emphasised that expropriation 
must take place in accordance with legislative measures which provide therefor. Therefore, 
expropriating land for a purpose not intended should not be enforced. According to the court, this was 
a clear indication that the legislature did not intend to incorporate a procedure for indirect expropriation 
of property into legislation by way of the provisions of PIE. 
259
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) paras 105-107, 215. See also Ndlovu v Ngcobo; 
Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 18 in which the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that  
“[t]he effect of PIE is not to expropriate the landowner and PIE cannot be used to 
expropriate someone indirectly and the landowner retains the protection of s 25 of the Bill 
of Rights. What PIE does is to delay or suspend the exercise of the landowner’s full 
propriety rights until a determination has been made whether it is just and equitable to 
evict the unlawful occupier and under what conditions. Simply put, that is what the 
procedural safeguards provided for in s 4 envisage”.  
This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) para 31. 
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to permanently deprive a landowner of ownership of property or the enjoyment of 
property and it also did not intend to provide a court with a wide discretion to grant 
eviction or to refuse it.260 Moreover, the requirement of “just and equitable” in section 
4(7) applied to the kind of order that should be granted under the circumstances.261 
 In addition to taking account of the needs and circumstances of the unlawful 
occupiers to determine what a just and equitable order should be, the court 
emphasised that it should also take into the account what the effect of such order 
would be for the landowner.262 The court considered firstly, whether a refusal to grant 
an eviction order would constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution; and secondly, whether such a deprivation could be 
regarded as expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution. The court 
applied the arbitrariness test laid down by the Constitutional Court in FNB and 
concluded that the deprivation was temporary (in the sense of delaying the 
enforcement of the eviction order in accordance with the facts and circumstances of 
the case before it) and there was a sufficient relationship between the purpose for the 
deprivation and the property as well as the person whose property was affected.263 
Therefore, the deprivation that resulted from section 4(7) was not arbitrary. However, 
the court pointed out that a permanent deprivation of property was a different 
story.264 On the other hand, the court questioned whether the refusal of an eviction 
order could constitute constructive expropriation which would require 
                                                   
260
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 132. 
261
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 102. 
262
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) paras 142-143. 
263
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 151. 
264
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 151. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) para 100 the 
Constitutional Court held that a property owner has to endure the reasonable and temporary limitation 
of its property rights without compensation to give the state a reasonable time to comply with its 
obligation of providing alternative accommodation to the occupier who stands to be evicted. However, 
the Court emphasised that it cannot be expected that the landowner bear this burden indefinitely. 
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compensation.265 According to the court, constructive expropriation was applicable 
where some state action result in loss to an affected property owner, which justifies 
the conclusion that compensation was required, even though the state did not intend 
to acquire the property for itself.266 The court held that the refusal of an eviction order 
was such an instance where the state did not acquire the property but did acquire the 
advantage of not having the obligation to provide alternative land. According to the 
court, this together with the absence of a statutory duty to pay compensation 
constituted constructive expropriation.267 However, the court held that it was never 
the intention of PIE that the legitimacy of the court’s decision not to grant eviction 
may be challenged on a constitutional basis because it constituted constructive 
expropriation without compensation.268 The consequences thereof would be the 
invalidation of the provisions of PIE that constructively expropriates landowners 
without compensation, which would inevitably frustrate land reform. According to the 
court, PIE was never intended to create such a situation.269 Furthermore, the court 
held that PIE could not have intended that the owner may claim that it had a right to 
compensation because the court’s decision constituted constructive expropriation.270 
The court held that such a conclusion would open the door for unlawful occupiers to 
unlawfully occupy land and argue that it will be just and equitable that the court 
exercise its discretion and refuse to grant eviction, which would lead to constructive 
expropriation and a concomitant obligation on the state to pay compensation. The 
effect thereof would be astronomical and could not have been intended by the 
                                                   
265
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) paras 152, 161. 
266
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 164. 
267
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 166. 
268
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 167. 
269
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 169. 
270
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 167. 
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legislature.271 Despite the court’s lengthy discussion of constructive expropriation, it 
nevertheless found it unnecessary to decide whether any refusal of an application for 
eviction of unlawful occupiers constituted arbitrary deprivation of property, or if it 
constituted expropriation, or if it warranted compensation for constructive 
expropriation.272 The court concluded that the legislature simply intended to provide 
for principles and procedures according to which courts should grant eviction orders, 
and in particular, to emphasise the circumstances and facts that should be taken into 
account by the courts in formulating eviction orders.273 The finding of this court that 
the temporary deprivation of a landowners property rights do not constitute arbitrary 
deprivation was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court.274 However, it is 
argued in chapter 4 that the burden on the landowner can be ameliorated by 
providing for compensation in PIE itself under certain circumstances. 
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy275 (Agri SA) is the most recent 
Constitutional Court decision on the distinction between deprivation and expropriation 
and may prove to answer the question whether the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation could be developed in South African law. The appellant argued that the 
commencement of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 
2002 (MPRDA) effected expropriation of its existing coal rights without the payment 
of compensation.276 In effect, the MPRDA froze the ability to sell, lease or cede 
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 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 178. 
272
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 176. 
273
 Grobler v Msimanga [2008] 3 All SA 549 (W) para 180. 
274
 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). See chapter 4 for a discussion of the Blue Moonlight decision. 
275
 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
276
 In Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 33, 42-45 the 
Constitutional Court upheld the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA). The court a quo in Agri South Africa v Minister of 
Minerals and Energy 2012 (1) SA 171 (GNP) held that the enactment of the MPRDA expropriated the 
property of former mineral right’s holders. See AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2013 (2) 
Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1.1 for a discussion on the Constitutional Court’s decision. 
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unused old order rights until they were converted into prospecting or mining rights 
with the written consent of the Minister for Mineral Resources (Minister). 
Furthermore, the MPRDA abolished the holder’s entitlement to sterilise mineral rights 
by extinguishing the holder’s entitlement not to sell or exploit minerals. In terms of the 
facts, Sebenza (Pty) Ltd (Sebenza) bought coal rights on land of which it was not the 
owner and registered them in its name in 2001. However, in 2004 the MPRDA came 
into effect and rendered Sebenza a holder of an “unused old order right”, which 
afforded Sebenza an exclusive right for a period of one year to apply for a 
prospecting or mining right. However, Sebenza was subsequently liquidated and 
could neither comply with the requirements for the application of a prospecting or 
mining right in terms of the transitional provisions of the MPRDA nor could it sell its 
coal rights due to the provisions of the MPRDA. Therefore, Sebenza claimed 
compensation in terms of Schedule II to the MPRDA, on the grounds that the 
MPRDA had expropriated its mineral rights. Agri SA subsequently procured 
Sebenza’s claim for compensation. Schedule II to the MPRDA contained the 
transitional measures for a holder of old order rights to comply with the requirements 
of the MPRDA. Furthermore, item 12 of the Schedule provided that any person who 
can prove that his property has been expropriated in terms of the MPRDA may be 
entitled to compensation from the state. However, Sebenza’s claim was never based 
on this provision. Although the Constitutional Court upheld the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, it disagreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding as to the 
nature of the property claimed to be expropriated by the MPRDA.277 According to the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not acknowledge that the 
entitlement not to mine or the ability not to exploit minerals stemmed from mineral 
                                                   
277
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 33. In Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA) paras 99, 117 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the right to mine was vested in the state and therefore concluded that Sebenza’s mineral rights did not 
constitute property. Furthermore, it held that Sebenza might have had value but that value in itself was 
not property. 
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ownership and formed one of the essential components of mineral ownership.278 
Therefore, this right was undoubtedly property with economic value.279 Furthermore, 
prior to the commencement of the MPRDA the state could only compel exploitation 
by expropriation against payment of compensation; however, under the MPRDA the 
right to compensation has been lost.280 The Court considered section 25 of the 
Constitution to determine whether there was deprivation which rose to the level of 
expropriation. The Court held that deprivation within the context of section 25 
included extinguishing of a right previously enjoyed. Furthermore, it agreed with the 
FNB decision that expropriation is a subset of deprivation.281 According to the Court, 
there was an overlap and no bold line of demarcation between deprivation and 
expropriation.282 Deprivation related to sacrifices that private property holders may 
have to make without compensation, whereas expropriation entailed state acquisition 
of that property in the public interest and must always be accompanied by 
compensation.283 Therefore, more was required to establish expropriation. The Court 
held that the MPRDA did deprive Sebenza of property within the meaning of section 
25(1) of the Constitution.284 With regard to the extent of the deprivation the Court 
considered that after the commencement of the MPRDA holders of mineral rights had 
the exclusive entitlement to apply for the right to prospect or mine but only for one 
year. In addition, the free and unregulated right to sterilise mineral rights was 
terminated and prospect and mining rights only existed and could only be sold in 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 43. 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 44, 50. The Court held that 
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or mortgaged and constituted property for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution. 
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terms of the MPRDA. However, such transfer was subject to conditions which not 
every landowner or mineral rights holder could meet (as Sebenza for example).285 
Moreover, holders of unused old order rights who could not apply for the right to 
prospect or mine within the time frame set out in the MPRDA’s transitional provisions, 
or whose applications were unsuccessful, lost all their mineral rights permanently.286 
Despite the Court’s finding that the MPRDA effected a deprivation of Sebenza’s 
property and similarly-positioned holders of pre-existing mineral rights, both parties 
agreed that the deprivation was not arbitrary.287  
 This led the Court to consider whether this deprivation rose to the level of 
expropriation. The Court held that “to prove expropriation, a claimant must establish 
that the state has acquired the substance or core of what it was deprived of”.288 
Therefore, although exact correlation was not required, there should be sufficient 
congruence or substantial similarity between the rights that were lost and the rights 
that were acquired.289 The Court emphasised that there can be no expropriation 
where deprivation does not result in property being acquired by the state.290 The 
Court recognised the dual purpose served by section 25, namely protecting existing 
private property but also promoting the equitable distribution of land and equitable 
access to our national resources. The MPRDA fell within the latter purpose in the 
sense that it is aimed at facilitating equitable access to opportunities to exploit 
minerals and petroleum resources. Although the Court held that section 25 imposed 
an obligation not to over-emphasise private property rights at the expense of the 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 51, 55. Sebenza was not in a 
financial position to apply for a prospect or mining right. Sebenza was subsequently liquidated, which 
in terms of section 56(d) of the MPRDA precluded it from being granted the right to prospect or mine.  
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 53. 
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state's social responsibilities, it held that a too narrow meaning of acquisition, 
stemming from a deprivation, could militate against the constitutional protection 
sought to be given to property rights in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution.291 
However, on the other hand, an overly liberal interpretation of acquisition could blur 
the line between deprivation and expropriation and undermine the constitutional 
imperative to transform our economy as envisioned by section 25(4) of the 
Constitution.292 The Court stated that a one-size-fits-all determination of what 
acquisition entailed was not only elusive but also inappropriate. Instead the Court 
held that an ad hoc approach was more appropriate since acquisition was likely to 
manifest in various ways, especially if the right is incorporeal in nature.293 The Court 
held that the MPRDA did deprive Sebenza of its coal rights and vested them and 
other mineral and petroleum resources in the state, which is the custodian of such 
rights on behalf of the people of South African. However, the state did not acquire 
any mineral rights, including those of Sebenza, at the commencement of the 
MPRDA.294 According to the Court, the state, as the custodian of these resources, 
was merely a facilitator or conduit through which broader and equitable access to 
mineral and petroleum resources can be realised.295 This did not take away the 
substance of unused old order rights from their holders. The Court held that “[b]ut for 
sterilisation, the core right was left intact and capable of full enjoyment by those who 
wished to and were able to exploit it”.296 Furthermore, the MPRDA, subject to the 
transitional arrangements, put an end to the rights without necessarily transferring 
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them to the state.297 In the absence of a state acquisition in this case, the Court 
concluded that there was no expropriation of Sebenza’s rights.  
 Furthermore, it held that the transitional arrangements were carefully designed 
to alleviate potential hardship and prevent expropriation.298 With regard to item 12 of 
the Schedule, the Court held that it was more a cautious approach to provide for 
unforeseen eventualities rather than an acknowledgment or reinforcement of the idea 
that the MPRDA necessarily has signposts of expropriation.299 Although the Court 
concluded that there was no expropriation in this case, it left the avenue of future 
expropriation claims open when it held that it was inappropriate to decide definitely 
that expropriation in terms of the MPRDA was incapable of ever being established.300 
 In addition to the main judgment, both Cameron J and Froneman J wrote 
separate judgments in which they agreed with the majority that the appeal should be 
dismissed, albeit on different grounds. Furthermore, both Cameron J and Froneman 
J cautioned against the majority’s finding that state acquisition was a necessary 
feature of expropriation.301 Moreover, Froneman J disagreed with the majority’s 
finding that no state acquisition took place.302 According to Froneman J, 
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298
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 74. 
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 ed 2011) 420 states that the explicit provision for compensation seems 
to negate the possibility of classifying the deprivation as constructive expropriation. 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 75. 
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 In Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 78 Cameron J stated that 
acquisition by the state was a general characteristic of expropriation but not a necessary and 
inevitable requirement. Furthermore, Cameron J argued that the determination of whether 
expropriation has occurred was a context-based ad hoc enquiry. This view was shared by Froneman J 
in Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 102 who pointed out that FNB 
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argued that “[i]t would be inadvisable to extrapolate an inflexible general rule of state acquisition as a 
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compensation was not necessary because the unused old order rights conferred on 
Sebenza under the MPRDA constituted just and equitable compensation for what it 
previously had and has now lost.303 Froneman J called it “compensation in kind” and 
viewed it as an alternative form of just and equitable compensation for expropriation 
as required by section 25(3) of the Constitution.304 However, Froneman J warned that 
the mere inclusion of “compensation in kind” provisions does not immunise legislation 
from a finding that expropriation occurred and that compensation may be payable.305  
 Froneman J’s approach would dispense the need to formally analyse the 
question when a deprivation becomes expropriation.306 However, Froneman J 
acknowledged that there was no precedent for this approach.307 Moreover, both 
Cameron J and Froneman J’s judgments are minority judgments and are therefore 
not legally binding. Therefore, in light of the majority in Agri SA state acquisition is a 
necessary requirement for expropriation. Although some deprivations involve state 
acquisition of the affected property, for example tax and forfeiture, it seems that all 
expropriations will involve acquisition. The types of excessive regulatory measures 
that are generally classified as constructive expropriation generally do not involve 
                                                                                                                                                               
minerals, it did acquire the power to allocate and dispose of exploitation rights; a power which owners 
of minerals previously had. 
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 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 79, 88. Froneman J argued 
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the transformative purpose of the MPRDA. According to Froneman J, the transitional arrangements of 
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acquisition of the affected property by the state or anybody else.308 Because the 
notion of constructive expropriation involves the judicial transformation of an 
excessive regulatory measure into expropriation, the South African Constitutional 
Court’s recognition of state acquisition as a fixed requirement for expropriation 
seems to negate the possibility of adopting the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation.309 Furthermore, although the possibility of recognising the doctrine of 
constructive expropriation in South African law has never expressly been rejected, 
the discussion of the case law above illustrates the courts’ reluctance to recognise 
constructive expropriation. Moreover, Roux and Van der Walt argue that the FNB 
methodology applicable to the interpretation and application of section 25 of the 
Constitution does not leave room for the recognition of constructive expropriation 
since an excessive regulatory measure will almost always fail the non-arbitrariness 
requirement in section 25(1) and consequently never reach the expropriation analysis 
stage in section 25(2) of the Constitution.310 
 
4 Conclusion 
In chapter 1 it is said that declaring otherwise lawful and legitimate regulatory state 
action invalid because it effects a harsh and excessive burden on one or a small 
group of property holders may not always be appropriate, especially when the 
regulatory measure serves a necessary and important public purpose. It would create 
a void if these excessive regulatory measures are declared invalid. Therefore, 
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 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2013 (2) Juta’s Quarterly Review at 2.1.1. See also J 
Murphy “Interpreting the property clause in the Constitution Act of 1993” (1995) 10 South African 
Public Law 107-130 at 118. 
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alternative approaches are considered that would save the excessive regulatory 
measure from being declared invalid. In this chapter one solution to the problem is 
considered, namely constructive expropriation or regulatory takings.311 In terms of the 
doctrine of constructive expropriation, the excessive regulatory measure falls within a 
grey area between the uncompensated regulatory control of the use and enjoyment 
of property rights in terms of the state’s police power and the expropriation of 
property in terms of the power of eminent domain, the latter of which requires the 
payment of compensation. The excessive regulatory measures that fall within this 
grey area are judicially transformed into expropriation of property that cannot be 
upheld without the payment of compensation. 
 In this chapter US, Irish and Swiss law is considered. These jurisdictions adopt 
some form of constructive expropriation approach in their respective legal contexts. 
The notion of regulatory takings was developed in the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court. The term “taking” in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 
does not only embrace formal expropriation of property but also regulatory 
interferences that has the same effect as expropriation. Courts are therefore able to 
uphold excessive regulatory measures by requiring the state to pay compensation to 
the adversely affected property holder. Almost similar to US law, the Irish 
Constitution does not distinguish between regulatory interferences and expropriation 
of property. The Irish courts are able to require compensation for expropriation as 
well as some regulatory interferences with property, but they do not use this 
construction to salvage regulatory interferences that impose an excessive burden on 
property owners – the latter are usually declared invalid.  
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 The case law of US and Irish law illustrate the difficulty the courts in these 
respective jurisdictions experience in delimiting the precise boundary line between 
regulatory interferences that owners have to endure without the payment of 
compensation and the instances where regulatory interferences become too 
excessive and harsh that it cannot be upheld without compensation. In both 
jurisdictions the principle of fairness is emphasised when courts make the distinction 
between valid regulatory interferences with property rights and regulatory 
interferences that shades into regulatory taking or unjust attack of property that are 
invalid without the payment of compensation. However, it is argued that the notion of 
fairness is subjective and judges in the respective jurisdictions seldom agree. 
Therefore, the criteria used to determine whether regulatory taking or unjust attack 
occurred is often applied haphazardly, which leads to conflicting theories and 
outcomes. Neither the state nor property owners have certainty regarding their rights 
and obligations. The US and Irish case law illustrates the uncertainty that is 
associated with the notion of constructive expropriation. In this respect it is arguably 
not a good alternative solution to salvaging excessive regulatory measures that serve 
a necessary and important public purpose from invalidity. The conflicting theories 
regarding the criteria for the determination whether regulatory taking occurred and 
the controversial outcomes in US and Irish case law should be seen as a warning 
that the seemingly inevitable subjective notions of fairness of judges that are 
associated with the application of the doctrine of constructive expropriation might 
undermine the doctrine of precedent, which the South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal views as foundational to the South African Constitution.312 
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 Furthermore, the terminology used in the US and Irish constitutions allows for 
the recognition of constructive expropriation since compensation is not limited to 
state interferences that result in acquisition of the property by the state. The terms 
“taking” in US law and “unjust attack” in Irish law recognise the duty to pay 
compensation for a wider category of state interferences of property than formal 
expropriation. Regulatory interferences that have the same effect as expropriation 
are also included under the terms “taking” and “unjust attack”. The unique 
terminology of the US and Irish constitutions renders the notion of constructive 
expropriation appropriate to the respective legal contexts. 
 The legislature explicitly provided for a second category of expropriation in the 
Swiss Constitution, namely material expropriation. The concept of material 
expropriation in Swiss law is similar to the notion of constructive expropriation. The 
Swiss courts determined the criteria when a regulatory interference with property 
constitutes material expropriation which necessitates the payment of compensation 
as a validity requirement. The criteria the Swiss courts apply to determine whether 
material expropriation occurred are relatively simple and unproblematic. Material 
expropriation can present itself in two forms. Firstly, compensation is required if the 
regulatory measure imposes and excessive burden that results in a severe loss for 
the property holder. Secondly, if the regulatory interference forces an individual or 
small group of property owners to sacrifice the use and enjoyment of their property 
for the benefit of the public as a whole, compensation is required. The Swiss 
Constitution therefore provides statutory authority for the courts to uphold excessive 
regulatory measures. The Swiss example is unique and proves a difficult source of 
comparison with jurisdictions that do not have a similar provision in their 
constitutions.  
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 The notion of constructive expropriation has been considered in South African 
law. Although the Constitutional Court has not expressly rejected the doctrine of 
constructive expropriation, the overview of South African case law above seems to 
indicate that recognition of such a doctrine is unlikely. The Constitutional Court’s 
statement in Reflect All is probably the clearest indication of the Court’s reluctance to 
develop such a doctrine.  
 Moreover, section 25 of the South African Constitution explicitly distinguishes 
between deprivation and expropriation of property. Although the boundary line 
between these two forms of state interference with property rights are not precisely 
defined, the Constitutional Court in FNB held that expropriation is a subset of 
deprivation. In this regard, the Court set out a methodology for the interpretation and 
application of section 25.313 In terms of this methodology, a court, when faced with a 
constitutional challenge based on section 25, should first consider whether the 
interference complies with section 25(1) (is therefore authorised by law and is not an 
arbitrary deprivation of property) before it can consider whether the interference 
amounts to expropriation of property that has to be tested against section 25(2) of the 
Constitution. According to Roux, the implication of the FNB methodology is that 
issues that may have been considered at the expropriation stage of the property 
analysis are telescoped into the question whether there has been arbitrary 
deprivation of property under section 25(1).314 Therefore, the application of the 
doctrine of constructive expropriation is arguably impossible in terms of the FNB 
methodology since excessive regulatory measures will most likely fail the non-
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arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1) and never reach the expropriation stage of 
the property inquiry under section 25(2). 
 However, Van der Walt states that it cannot be assumed that the courts will 
always follow the FNB methodology strictly, in the sense of starting out with the non-
arbitrariness analysis.315 Even if the courts are willing to proceed directly to the 
expropriation analysis without first considering whether the deprivation was arbitrary, 
the recognition of constructive expropriation still seems impossible in light of the 
Constitutional Court’s statement that state acquisition of the affected property is a 
fixed requirement for the establishment of expropriation.316 The requirement of state 
acquisition for the establishment of expropriation negates the recognition of 
constructive expropriation since the type of regulatory deprivations that will generally 
fall within the category of constructive expropriation do not involve acquisition of the 
affected property to the state. Therefore, the absence of state acquisition will make it 
impossible for South African courts to uphold the excessive regulatory measures 
discussed in chapter 1 by transforming them into expropriation and requiring the 
state to pay compensation.  
 In conclusion, the doctrine of constructive expropriation is one solution to save 
excessive regulatory measures from being declared invalid for effecting arbitrary 
deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. The 
comparative overview of US, Irish and Swiss law indicates that the constructive 
expropriation law approach has limited application in jurisdictions that do not have 
the same broad terminology or do not expressly provide for the category of 
constructive expropriation in their property clauses. Furthermore, the US and Irish 
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case law illustrates that the doctrine of expropriation is problematic and creates legal 
uncertainty. In South African law, despite the courts’ reluctance to recognise this 
doctrine, it seems unlikely if not impossible in light of the FNB methodology and the 
requirement of state acquisition before courts will recognise that expropriation has 
occurred.  
 Therefore, the constructive expropriation solution does not seem possible or 
appropriate in South African law. However, there are other alternative solutions in 
German, French, Dutch and Belgian law, which are discussed in chapter 3 that may 
save the excessive regulatory deprivations that serve a necessary and important 
public purpose from being declared invalid. The recognition of constructive 
expropriation is therefore not necessary in South African law. 
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1 Introduction 
As indicated in chapter 1, regulatory measures that result in individual property 
owners having to bear disproportionately harsh and excessive burdens for the sake 
of some public benefit would in principle be treated as arbitrary deprivations of 
property that are invalid for being inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 1996 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance1 (FNB) is the starting point in determining 
whether regulatory measures constitute arbitrary deprivation.2 Judging from case law, 
the South African default approach to arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional 
deprivations is to declare the regulatory infringement invalid.3 
 However, it is stated in chapter 1 that it may not always be appropriate to 
declare an otherwise legitimate but excessive or unfair regulatory deprivation invalid. 
There may be circumstances where it may be necessary to save these regulatory 
deprivations because of the important public purpose they serve. Invalidity can 
sometimes have an adverse impact on the promotion or realisation of important and 
legitimate social and public benefits. The question that arises is therefore whether it 
is possible to salvage deprivations of property that might be declared arbitrary and 
invalid because they impose an excessively harsh and disproportionate burden on 
one or a small number of property owners, but that should be upheld because of the 
importance of the public interest that they serve. It was indicated in chapter 3 that 
one solution is to treat these regulatory deprivations as constructive expropriations 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
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which require compensation. This approach would both save the regulation and 
compensate the owner who was disproportionately affected by it. However, chapter 3 
concludes that this solution might not be possible if it should turn out that constructive 
expropriation cannot be adopted in South African law. In chapter 3 it is argued that 
the doctrine of constructive expropriation is probably not suitable in the South African 
context. In that case a different solution will have to be found for those instances 
when it will be both inappropriate to invalidate the excessive regulatory measure but 
also unfair to expect an individual property owner to bear the harsh and 
disproportionate burden that results from a regulatory measure in the public interest 
without compensation. 
 In this chapter two similar but slightly different alternative approaches are 
considered, namely equalisation measures (in German law) and compensation 
based on the principle of equality before public burdens (in Belgian and Dutch law). 
These jurisdictions were all influenced by French law but German law eventually 
adopted a stricter and narrower approach than that followed in Belgian and Dutch 
law. The German equalisation approach is analysed and evaluated in comparison to 
the Belgian and Dutch approach, according to which compensation can be claimed in 
terms of the principle of equality before public burdens. Both approaches involve 
strategies by which an otherwise valid and legitimate but excessive or 
disproportionate regulatory limitation of property rights is salvaged by requiring that it 
be accompanied by compensation that is non-expropriatory in nature. The 
compensation requirement is usually regulated by statute. 
 Apart from explaining the different solutions of the two approaches discussed 
here, the comparative overview in this chapter has a second purpose. It is not 
possible to award compensation for every loss that results from a legitimate 
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regulatory infringement of property rights in terms of the state’s police power. A 
comparative overview may help identify when a regulatory burden is considered 
excessive and disproportionate and when it is necessary for compensation to 
accompany a regulatory deprivation imposed to promote a legitimate and important 
public purpose; and when the excessive regulatory measure is invalid and cannot be 
salvaged by the payment of compensation. 
 
2 The equalisation solution in German law 
2 1 Introduction 
Article 14 contains the property clause, which forms part of the Bill of Rights 
(Grundrechtskatalog) in the German Basic Law 1949 (Grundgesetz).4 The Basic Law 
authorises the legislature to determine the limit and content of property rights.5 The 
fulfilment of this obligation imposes a twofold responsibility, namely to make rules of 
private law aimed at the protection and transfer of property and secondly, to protect 
and promote the public interest, which is mainly achieved by regulation in public law.6 
                                                   
4
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 122-123 explains 
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 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
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2007) 582-639 at 601 Rdn 54; HJ Papier “Art 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 26. See also DP Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 258; H Mostert The constitutional protection and 
regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa 
and Germany (2002) 281. H Mostert “Engaged citizenship and the enabling state as factors 
determining the interference parameter of property: A comparison of German and South African law” 
(2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273 at 247-248 states that the Basic Law requires in 
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The inclusion of a property guarantee in the Bill of Rights does not prevent the state 
from limiting individual property rights; it merely restricts the state’s powers by laying 
down requirements for valid state interferences with property.7 Any regulation of 
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights is subject to the overarching values, namely 
human dignity, personality and equality, which inform the meaning of the entire Basic 
Law.8 The Constitutional Court elevated these rights to the rank of highest values of 
the legal system and views them not only as rights but also as objective principles 
that permeate the whole legal order, from public law to private law and the 
interpretation of ordinary law.9 Grimm points out that “[t]he function of constitutional 
guarantees of rights is not to make limitations as difficult as possible but to require 
special justifications for limitations that make them compatible with the general 
principles of individual autonomy and dignity”.10 
 Furthermore, the legislative duty to determine the content (Inhalt) and limits 
(Schranken) of property rights respectively must also be understood in their relation 
to the purpose of the property guarantee and the distinction between the institutional 
guarantee and the individual guarantee.11 The institutional guarantee 
                                                                                                                                                               
enabling state as factors determining the interference parameter of property: A comparison of German 
and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273 at 248; H Mostert The 
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and 
landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 292; DP Kommers The constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 259; GE van Maanen & R de Lange 
Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 168. 
7
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 128. 
8
 DP Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 
254. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 125 states that 
human dignity enjoys a measure of priority over other rights in the Bill of Rights. See also H Mostert 
The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law 
and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 287; GS Alexander The global debate over 
constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 110-111. 
9
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 387. 
10
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 391. 
11
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 131-132. See also 
R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
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(Institutionsgarantie) is associated with the positive statement in article 14.1.1 and is 
concerned with protecting the institution of private property as such.12 The 
institutional guarantee ensures the protection of core legal norms which describe the 
essence of property and guarantees that the state does not erode or abolish this 
core.13 Therefore, the institutional guarantee prevents the state from eliminating or 
removing whole categories of property objects from the sphere of private property 
without a constitutionally acceptable justification.14 In determining the content of 
property rights, the legislature concerns itself with the preservation of existing 
property institutions and the establishment of new property institutions, and in this 
process the legislature is restricted by the institutional guarantee of property.15  
 The individual guarantee (Bestandsgarantie), on the other hand, is associated 
with the negative aspects of the property guarantee contained in articles 14.1.2, 14.2 
                                                                                                                                                               
582-639 at 604 Rdn 55; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its 
influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 81; GS 
Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example” (2003) 88 Cornell 
Law Review 733-778 at 755-757. 
12
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 129. See also R 
Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 601 Rdn 55; HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol 
2 (2002) 1-376 at 181 Rdn 332; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and 
its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 82; 
GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 114; GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental constitutional right? The German 
example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 at 739, 746. 
13
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 129. See also R 
Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 602 Rdn 60, 90; HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar 
Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 181 Rdn 335; DP Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 252-253; BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in 
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 77. H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of 
property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 82 describes that the core elements of the property concept are, for example its 
existence, availability and usefulness for individuals. 
14
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 129, 132. See also 
R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 602 Rdn 60; HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol 
2 (2002) 1-376 at 182 Rdn 335; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and 
its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 83. 
15
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 132-133. See also 
H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 286. 
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and 14.3, which authorise the state to regulate and expropriate property rights.16 The 
individual guarantee allows the state to interfere with property rights but 
simultaneously lays down the boundaries of and requirements for valid 
interferences.17 The state may only interfere with individual property rights in 
accordance with legal requirements and for a public purpose which justifiably 
overrides the individual property guarantee.18 Therefore, the individual property 
guarantee is aimed at protecting individual property owners against regulatory 
excess (Übermaβverbot), namely to prevent disproportionate effects of regulation on 
individual holdings.19 In the determination of the limits of property rights, the 
legislature is concerned with the exercise of individual property rights and the limits 
thereof, and in this process the legislature is restricted by the individual guarantee of 
property.20 The focus of this is primarily on the individual guarantee of property, since 
this study concerns regulatory state actions that are lawful and legitimate on an 
institutional level but the relevant regulatory measure is exercised in a way that may 
offend the individual guarantee of property. 
                                                   
16
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 128-130. Van der 
Walt explains that the institutional guarantee is concerned with state interference of property in 
general, for example land, water or minerals; whereas the individual guarantee is more concerned with 
state interference with property rights in a specific piece of land, or specific water use right, or specific 
mineral right to secure existing property holdings against improper deprivation. See also R Wendt 
“Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 582-639 
at 604 Rdn 70; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on 
the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 81-82. 
17
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 128. See also R 
Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 604 Rdn 70. 
18
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 128-129. See also 
R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 605 Rdn 73. 
19
 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 602 Rdn 60. See also H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of 
property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 83.  
20
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
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 The individual guarantee and the restrictions on the legislature’s power to 
determine the limits of property rights are reinforced by the proportionality principle.21 
In German law, a law can violate the Constitution not only when it goes too far in 
limiting a fundamental right (Übermaβverbot) but also when it does too little to protect 
a fundamental right (Üntermaβverbot).22 A regulatory limitation that goes too far in 
regulating the boundaries of either the individual or the institutional guarantee results 
in invalidity of the regulatory measure.23 
 
2 2 The proportionality principle (Verhältnismäβigkeit) 
Article 14.1.2 provides that the content and limits of property rights shall be defined 
by law. The legislature may regulate property, but only to the extent authorised by the 
Basic Law.24 Although the Basic Law creates the legislative duty to establish and 
maintain an equitable property regime, it simultaneously limits the legislature’s 
powers to regulate property by prohibiting regulatory excess (Übermaβverbot).25 The 
social obligation (Sozialnützigkeitsgebot) in article 14.2 is continuously applicable in 
                                                   
21
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 365 states that although the proportionality 
principle is not expressly mentioned in the Basic Law, it is derived from the rule of law principle and 
forms a fundamental aspect of German constitutional jurisprudence. See also GS Alexander “Property 
as a fundamental constitutional right? The German example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 
at 749; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 142; DP Currie 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 307. 
22
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 392.  
23
 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 605 Rdn 73, 75; HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 36 Rdn 28. 
24
 HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 183 
Rdn 337. 
25
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 132. See H Mostert 
The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law 
and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 260, 287. 
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the determination of the content and limits of property rights under article 14.1.2.26 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the social obligation of ownership is 
intended to fortify the idea that ownership is not absolute and that property rights are 
always subordinate to the public interest.27 The fundamental principles underlying the 
property clause that inform the institutional and individual guarantees provide 
protection against excessive regulation by the legislature.28 Therefore, the dual task 
of the legislature, namely to protect existing property rights and at the same time 
protect and promote the public interest, should be seen against the dual function of 
the property guarantee.29  
                                                   
26
 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 602 Rdn 59, 605 Rdn 72. Wendt states that there is a view that article 14.2 creates 
direct legal duties for property owners. However, there are in fact very little duties recognised as 
binding in relation to the legitimate use of property. (“Demgegenüber würde die Auffassung, Art 14.2 
erzuege (auch) unmittelbar Rechtspflichten des Eigentümers, dazu führen, dass in Wahrheit weniger 
die Pflichtenbindung als der Eigentumsgebrauch für legitimerungsbedürftig erklärt würde.”) See also 
DP Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 253; 
AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 133. DP Currie The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 290-291 explains that the social obligations of 
property have been held to permit considerable regulation. In BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des 
Mieters) para 18 the Federal Constitutional Court held that although the social obligation imposes a 
constitutional duty on property owners to serve the well-being of the community, it does not in itself 
create subjective property rights. See also GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional 
property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 97; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 139. GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige 
overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 168 argue that the social obligation imposes a duty on property owners to 
tolerate the limitation of their property rights without having a right to compensation. However, an 
exception to this duty exists when the burden imposed by the regulatory measure is so extreme that it 
cannot be expected of the property owner to tolerate it without compensation. 
27
 BVerfGE 51, 1 (1979) (Kleingarten). See also GS Alexander “Property as a fundamental 
constitutional right? The German example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 at 750; AJ van der 
Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
28
 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 602 Rdn 59, 605 Rdn 73. See also H Mostert The constitutional protection and 
regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa 
and Germany (2002) 82-83. L Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle 
of proportionality and the doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative analysis” (1999) 14 South 
African Public Law 178-215 at 178, 180 states that there is no general limitation clause in the Basic 
Law that applies to all fundamental rights. Instead, the German Bill of Rights regulates the limitation of 
each fundamental right individually. The principle of proportionality is applicable once it has been 
determined that a fundamental right may legally be restricted. See also HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz 
& G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 183 Rdn 337. 
29
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 292. See also BJPG Roozendaal 
Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 69; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 132. 
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Moreover, any limitation of a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights also has to 
comply with article 19 of the Basic Law.30 Article 19.1 contains formal requirements 
for restrictions on such rights, and article 19.2 provides an outer restriction on the 
legislature’s constitutional authority to limit any fundamental right.31 In addition to 
article 19, the Basic Law attaches special limitation clauses to most rights and 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights.32 However, Grimm points out that laws are more often 
found to be unconstitutional for violating the proportionality principle than because 
they violate the written limitation clause.33 Therefore, it is the unwritten proportionality 
                                                   
30
 L Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative analysis” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 178-215 at 
180 states that article 19 provides general guidelines for the limitation of fundamental rights. See also 
H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 261; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 159. See http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch-gg.html (accessed 20.02.2013) for the English translation of article 
19: 
“(1) [i]nsofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a 
law, such law must apply generally and not merely to a single case. In addition, the law 
must specify the basic right affected and the Article in which it appears.  
(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected”. 
31
 R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 602 Rdn 57; HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 182 Rdn 333. See also GS Alexander The global debate over 
constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 122. H Mostert The 
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and 
landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 261 states that the article 19(1) constitutes the 
Schranken-Schranken in the German constitutional dogmatic structure. Schranken-Schranken refers 
to the fact that the legislature, in exercising its power to limit specific basic rights, may only act within 
the borders of limitation set by the Basic Law. L Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with 
reference to the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative 
analysis” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 178-215 at 181, 187 argues that article 19(2) does not 
bind only the legislature but the executive and the judiciary as well. The protection afforded by article 
19(2) ensures that no fundamental right may be restricted to such an extent that only an empty shell 
remains, regardless of the existence of a pressing need of public interest. See also H Mostert The 
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and 
landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 261-262. Section 19(2) seems to reinforce the 
institutional guarantee of property in article 14.1.1 of the Basic Law. 
32
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 386. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative 
analysis (1999) 158; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its 
influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 263. 
33
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 386. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative 
analysis (1999) 160-161.  
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principle that primarily functions as the protection of fundamental rights against 
excessive regulation in German law.34 
The proportionality principle, although not explicitly mentioned in the Basic Law, 
fulfils a fundamental role in German constitutional jurisprudence.35 According to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, the textual basis for the proportionality principle is found 
in the principle of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat).36 Grimm points out that the 
proportionality test is older than the Basic Law.37 Grimm also emphasises that the 
Federal Constitutional Court has never elaborated on the precise source of the 
proportionality principle or how it flows from the rule of law.38 A possible reason for 
this may be the Court’s initial uncertainty as to role the proportionality would play in 
                                                   
34
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 386. See also H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of 
property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 262. 
35
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 365; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 142. See also GS Alexander “Property as a 
fundamental constitutional right? The German example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 at 
749; DP Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 307. 
36
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 385. See also GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: 
Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 133-134; H Mostert The constitutional protection 
and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South 
Africa and Germany (2002); AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis 
(1999) 161; L Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of 
proportionality and the doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative analysis” (1999) 14 South African 
Public Law 178-215 at 191-193; DP Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(1994) 309. M Cohen-Eliya & I Porat “American balancing and German proportionality: The historical 
origins” (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263-286 at 272 explain that the 
proportionality principle corresponds to the Rechtsstaat principle and also complements it. The 
Rechtsstaat principle allows the state to interfere with individual rights but only to the extent that such 
interference is explicitly authorised by law. The proportionality principle limits this power further, 
permitting the state to exercise only those measures that are necessary to achieve its legitimate goals. 
37
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 384. A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional rights and their limitations (2012) 
177 argues that the proportionality principle has its historical roots in 18
th
 century German 
administrative law. Furthermore, Barak states that most German commentators argue that Carl 
Gottlieb Svarez (1746-1798) was, more than anyone else, responsible for the development of modern 
proportionality (footnotes omitted). 
38
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 386.  
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the future, but once its prominence became apparent, the principle had already been 
established, which negated the need for further reasoning.39 
The constitutionality of state regulation of property is premised on the upholding 
of the proportionality principle.40 The proportionality principle requires that an 
equitable balance must be established between the interests of individual property 
holders and the public interest.41 It ensures that regulatory restrictions on property 
are justified and prohibits the imposition of a disproportionate burden on property 
owners. A burden may be disproportionate either for being unsuitable for the 
regulative purpose it seeks to achieve or because it imposes a heavier burden than is 
required or justified by the purpose for which it is imposed.42 
The proportionality test consists of three steps.43 Firstly, the purpose of the law 
is considered. According to Grimm, ascertaining the purpose is not part of the 
                                                   
39
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 386. 
40
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 289. 
41
 HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 175 
Rdn 315. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 133, 135 
states that “[t]he function of the proportionality principle … is to ensure that the regulation starts with 
but also ends with the public interest, and that it respects and protects both the public interest and the 
individual interests equally”. See also H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of 
property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 262; DP Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 295. L 
Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and the 
doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative analysis” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 178-215 at 
193 argues that the meaning and content of the principle of proportionality depends on its application. 
The principle of proportionality does not only find application as a norm of constitutional interpretation, 
but is also applied with reference to the drafting of legislation and the exercise of administrative 
discretion. 
42
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 140. 
43
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 387. See also HJ Papier “Art. 14” in T Maunz & G Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol 2 (2002) 1-376 at 175 Rdn 315; A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional rights and their 
limitations (2012) 180; GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for 
American takings jurisprudence (2006) 134; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of 
property and its influence on the reform of private law and landownership in South Africa and 
Germany (2002) 289; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 
135; AJ van der Walt “Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of 
constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 273-331 at 
288; L Blaauw-Wolf “The ‘balancing of interests’ with reference to the principle of proportionality and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
141 
 
proportionality test but merely a starting point.44 The second step considers whether 
the law is necessary or whether less invasive means exist that will achieve the same 
purpose. The third step requires that the burden should be proportionate to the 
benefits to be achieved from the limitation’s purpose. Not many laws fail the test in 
the first or second step as they merely require that the purpose sought to be 
achieved should be legitimate in the sense of not being prohibited by the 
Constitution.45 The last requirement, namely proportionality in the narrow sense,46 
applies in the final stage of the inquiry. This requirement is not intended to provide 
the courts with the opportunity to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature but 
rather to make sure that the legislature did not exceed its legislative competence.47 
Therefore, the proportionality principle gives rise to the prohibition of excessive 
regulation.48 
The practical effect of the prohibition against excessive regulation and the way it 
is derived from the proportionality principle is illustrated by the so-called “grading” or 
“scaling” of social limitations of property according to its relation to the property 
                                                                                                                                                               
the doctrine of Güterabwägung – a comparative analysis” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 178-215 
at 194. 
44
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 388. 
45
 D Grimm “Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 Toronto 
Law Journal 383-397 at 388-389. See also M Cohen-Eliya & I Porat “American balancing and German 
proportionality: The historical origins” (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263-286 at 
285. 
46
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 295-296 distinguishes between 
proportionality in the wider sense and proportionality in the narrow sense. Proportionality in the wider 
sense requires an appropriate relationship between the concepts of private property and public 
interest, whereas proportionality in the narrow sense is concerned with the suitability of a specific 
interference for a specific purpose. 
47
 GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 135. 
48
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 290. 
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holder and its social function (Abstufung der Sozialpflichtigkeit).49 Mostert 
emphasises that the property guarantee in article 14 does not distinguish between 
different kinds of property.50 Instead, the level of scrutiny of property right 
infringements varies according to the nature of the property and its importance to the 
individual as well as the public at large.51 This means that the closer a specific 
property right is to the personal liberty of its holder, the more the legislature is 
restricted in interfering with that right. However, the further a specific right is removed 
from the sphere of the holder’s personal liberty, the easier it becomes for the 
legislature to regulate the limits of that right.52 The effect of this “grading” or “scaling” 
approach is that certain types of property can be subjected to stricter, more far-
reaching regulation because the public interest in regulating those properties is 
greater than the individual interest in not having them regulated. The “grading” or 
                                                   
49
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 135. See also H 
Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 242, 297. 
50
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 242. 
51
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 297, 242. 
52
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 297. AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 135, 140 explains that the “scaling” 
approach is based on the fact that the social interests affected by the use of the property extends 
beyond only those of the holder’s interests, especially when the property is further away in relation to 
the individual property holder’s sphere of personal liberty. See GS Alexander The global debate over 
constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 102-103, 112, 135-138 for 
a discussion on the underlying reasons behind property protection and the varying degree of 
protection afforded to different types of property rights. See also GS Alexander “Property as a 
fundamental constitutional right? The German example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733-778 at 
738-739, 769. In a comparison between the protection of property as a fundamental right entrenched 
in the German and American constitutions, Alexander pays particular attention to the question of 
purposive and contextual issues that underlie the recognition of interests as property and the degree 
of protection afforded to such interests. The “grading” or “scaling” approach serves as a good example 
to illustrate this point. The German Basic Law does not treat property as a fundamental right across 
the board. It rather treats property as a fundamental right, accorded with the highest degree of 
protection, but only in cases in which the affected interest immediately at stake implicates the owner’s 
ability to act as an autonomous moral and political agent. These interests are strongly protected 
because these interests serve other primary constitutional values, in particular human dignity and self-
realisation. According to Alexander, German jurisprudence indicates that the degree of property 
protection against regulatory infringements is stronger in instances where the interests immediately 
affected serves a personal or social function rather than an economic, wealth-creating function. See 
also H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform 
of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 297-298. 
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“scaling” approach is therefore used to determine the extent to which the legislature 
may legitimately limit a particular property right. 
The social relevance of a specific kind of property is dependent on time and 
place, but this assessment does not affect the concept of property in private law. 
Furthermore, taking the social relevance of a specific kind of property into account 
when scrutinising the constitutional validity of a particular regulatory interference with 
such property does not render socially relevant property more or less valuable than 
property without any particular social relevance.53 Instead, it merely influences the 
courts’ and the legislature’s obligation to consider certain issues when attempting to 
regulate specific kinds of property.54 For example, land is an indispensable and 
limited resource of great social import and can therefore be subjected to far-reaching 
social regulation.55 An example relating to land is the legislation regulating the 
landlord and tenant relationship.56 The “grading” or “scaling” approach was applied 
by the Federal Constitutional Court in a number of decisions dealing with rent control 
legislation, which was enacted during a period of dire housing shortages. For 
example, in the Besitzrecht des Mieters57 decision the Federal Constitutional Court 
had to consider whether a lessee of residential property could claim protection in 
terms of article 14 of the Basic Law against the lessor’s right to cancel the lease. The 
                                                   
53
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 298. 
54
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 298. 
55
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 136. See also AJ 
van der Walt “Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of 
constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 273-331 at 
288; H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform 
of private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 298; H Mostert “Engaged 
citizenship and the enabling state as factors determining the interference parameter of property: A 
comparison of German and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273 at 248. 
56
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 136. 
57
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters). For an English discussion of the case, see AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 138-139.  
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lessor was elderly and in poor health and claimed she needed the apartment for her 
son to be closer at hand when she needed him.58 The Court held that the lessee had 
a property right just like the lessor, which was protected by article 14.1.1.59 The Court 
held that a person’s home was the centre of his private existence.60 Therefore, the 
legislature has a duty to ensure that both the lessor and the lessee’s property 
interests were harmonised when it regulated the content and limits of property rights 
in terms of article 14.1.2.61 The Court also held that a lessor may only cancel the 
lease if the purpose for the cancellation was reasonable and feasible.62 The decision 
illustrates that the social relevance of the rental property in relation to the sphere of 
individual liberty of the owner and the lessee respectively is a primary consideration 
in the courts’ determination of whether the particular rent control legislation and its 
application are proportionate.63 
The individual property guarantee and the restriction it imposes on the 
legislature in determining the limits of property rights is reinforced by the 
proportionality principle, which requires the legislature to establish and maintain a fair 
balance between individual property interest and the public interest.64 The effect of a 
finding that a regulatory measure goes too far and disrupts this proportionate balance 
led to the development of controversial approaches in the Civil and Administrative 
Courts, both of which awarded compensation for the effect that excessive regulatory 
measures had on property owners. Subsequently, the Federal Constitutional Court 
                                                   
58
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters) para 3. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 138. 
59
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters) para 19. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 139. 
60
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters) para 21. 
61
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters) para 27. 
62
 BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993) (Besitzrecht des Mieters) para 32. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 139. 
63
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 139. 
64
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
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rejected these approaches and declared that disproportionate and excessive 
regulatory measures which are unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
 
2 3 The development of the equalisation solution 
2 3 1 Two initial solutions involving compensation instead of invalidity 
The consequences that follow a finding that the legislature exceeded its legitimate 
legislative power may vary. Above it is mentioned that excessive regulation 
constitutes one example where the legislature exceeds its legitimate legislative 
authority. Initially it was said that a regulatory infringement of property may be 
excessive either because it constitutes an expropriation-like infringement 
(enteignender Eingriff) or because it constitutes a quasi-expropriatory infringement 
(enteignungsgleicher Eingriff). The consequences differ according to the type of 
infringement. An enteignender Eingriff refers to a regulatory measure that directly 
interferes with the property rights of the affected individual to such an extent that he 
is expected to make a special sacrifice.65 This type of infringement is usually the 
unintended, unexpected and unforeseen side-effect of an otherwise lawful and 
legitimate regulatory measure and generally it is considered appropriate that these 
regulatory measures should give rise to a claim for compensation.66 The notion of an 
enteignungsgleicher Eingriff, on the other hand, refers to infringements of property 
                                                   
65
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 281. 
66
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 282. See also F Ossenbühl & M 
Cornils Staatshaftungsrecht (6
th
 ed 2013) 135; BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in 
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 75-76; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A 
comparative analysis (1999) 141-142, 325; GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional 
property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 116. See also the discussion in U 
Kischel “Wann ist die Inhaltsbestimmung ausgleichpflichtig?” (2003) 58 JuristenZeitung 604-613 at 
604-605. 
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rights that result from a regulatory state action that is not properly authorised; or 
where the state omitted to act where it had a legal duty to do so and an infringement 
resulted from this omission.67 These types of regulatory interferences are illegal and 
unlawful and therefore constitutionally invalid.68 It is not possible for the property 
owner to accept the enteignungsgleicher Eingriff on the condition that compensation 
is paid.69 The only remedy the affected owner has in this case is to challenge the 
constitutional validity of the regulatory limitation. 
However, even the unintended enteignende Eingriffe can be doctrinally 
problematic, especially with regard to the structure of article 14 of the Basic Law. 
German law, with regard to this type of regulatory infringement, could have 
developed in the same way as US and Irish law, to recognise something like 
constructive expropriation.70 At some point it looked as if the courts, especially the 
civil courts, were treating enteignende Eingriffe as instances of constructive 
expropriation. In German law the civil, constitutional and administrative courts have 
jurisdiction in matters pertaining to expropriation.71 As a result, the respective courts’ 
                                                   
67
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 282. See also F Ossenbühl & M 
Cornils Staatshaftungsrecht (6
th
 ed 2013) 135. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property 
clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 141-142, 325; GS Alexander The global debate over 
constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 116. 
68
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 282. See also F Ossenbühl & M 
Cornils Staatshaftungsrecht (6
th
 ed 2013) 135. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property 
clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 141-142; GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional 
property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 116. 
69
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 306. See also BVerfGE 58, 300 
(1981) (Naβauskiesung). 
70
 See the discussion on constructive expropriation in chapter 2. 
71
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 122-123 discusses 
the German court structure and the jurisdictions of the various courts. He identifies that the following 
courts are of particular interest for purposes of article 14: The Federal Court of Justice in Civil Matters 
(Bundesgerichtshof, cited as the BGH in case law), which is the highest “ordinary” civil court, has 
jurisdiction with regard to the compensation that is payable upon expropriation; the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, cited as BVerwG in case law), which is the highest 
administrative court, has jurisdiction with regard to the validity of administrative actions and decisions; 
and lastly the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, cited as BVerfG in case law) 
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analytical approaches to regulation and expropriation were not always consistent. 
Furthermore, the different courts developed and applied different theories in 
determining issues related to the compensation for the regulation and expropriation 
of property.72 
The civil courts developed and applied the doctrine of individual sacrifice 
(Sonderopfertheorie), which determined that a regulatory interference with property 
constitutes expropriation that requires compensation if the infringement breaches the 
principle of equality.73 The principle of equality is infringed when a regulatory 
measure singles out a specific owner or a small group of owners to bear a burden 
that should generally be borne by the public as a whole.74 The civil courts’ approach 
led to the broadening of the notion of expropriation and thereby inevitably extended 
the compensation requirement for formal expropriation to regulatory actions that were 
                                                                                                                                                               
has jurisdiction with regard to all constitutional matters, especially whether legislation, state action and 
other federal or lower courts’ jurisprudence are in conformity with the Basic Law. See also H Mostert 
The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law 
and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 311. 
72
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 311. See also GS Alexander The 
global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 116. 
73
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 311. See also M Albrod 
Entschädigungsbedürftige Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen des Eigentums nach Artikel 14 1, 2 
GG (1995) 1. 
74
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 311. See also F Ossenbühl & M 
Cornils Staatshaftungsrecht (6
th
 ed 2013) 142 states that a Sonderopfer manifests itself in a “den 
einzelnen ungleich belastenden Eingriff von hoher Hand” (an unequal burden that results from a 
particular infringing state action). MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: 
Een Europeesrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 205 points out that the Sonderopfer 
theory bears some similarities to the égalité principle. See the discussion on the égalité principle 
below. H Mostert “Engaged citizenship and the enabling state as factors determining the interference 
parameter of property: A comparison of German and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law 
Journal 238-273 at 249 explains that the doctrine originated from the idea that expropriation requires a 
special sacrifice from the individual landowner, which goes against the principles of equality and 
therefore needs to be evened out. The doctrine introduced the criterion of an “unacceptable, 
unreasonable and extraordinary sacrifice” (unzumutbare Sonderopfer) to determine whether 
compensation for expropriation was necessary. See also BJPG Roozendaal 
Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 71; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 141.  
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deemed to have created an unusual sacrifice, although the particular interference did 
not constitute an expropriation in the strict sense.75  
By contrast, the administrative courts developed and applied the doctrine of 
intensity (Schweretheorie), which took into account the intensity of the regulatory 
measures directed against the property, together with the extent of the burden 
imposed on the individual owner to determine whether the proportionality principle 
has been breached.76 If the proportionality principle has been breached, the 
regulation of property could not be justified without compensation.77  
In effect, both approaches resembled the notion of constructive expropriation in 
the sense that they construed an expropriation on the basis of what was perceived, in 
two different ways, as excessive non-expropriatory, regulatory measures. Mostert 
points out that although the Schweretheorie was more widely supported than the 
Sonderopfertheorie, both these theories were criticised because neither explained 
why certain owners were forced to suffer the regulatory interference of their property 
without compensation, whilst others were entitled to compensation, or did not have to 
suffer the same kind of infringement.78 However, the approach to enteignende 
Eingriffe in German law was drastically changed in the Naβauskiesung decision 
                                                   
75
 F Ossenbühl & M Cornils Staatshaftungsrecht (6
th
 ed 2013) 326. See also BJPG Roozendaal 
Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 85. 
76
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 311-312. See also M Albrod 
Entschädigungsbedürftige Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen des Eigentums nach Artikel 14 1, 2 
GG (1995) 1; BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland 
(1998) 78. 
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 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 312. See also H Mostert 
“Engaged citizenship and the enabling state as factors determining the interference parameter of 
property: A comparison of German and South African law” (2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-
273 at 250. GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American 
takings jurisprudence (2006) 118 explains that the doctrine of intensity was used “as a means of 
determining that a particular regulatory limitation on property would be disproportionate but for the 
cushioning effect of a state conferred equalization benefit”. 
78
 H Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of 
private law and landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 312-313. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
when the Federal Constitutional Court had the opportunity for the first time to clarify 
the inconsistent approaches to the determination of regulation and expropriation of 
property that had developed in the civil and administrative courts. 
 
2 3 2 The constructive expropriation solution is rejected: The Naβauskiesung 
decision79 
The plaintiff in this case had owned and operated a quarry since 1936. He extracted 
gravel from below the groundwater level (Naβauskiesung), thereby creating a 
manmade lake in the quarry. In terms of an amendment to the Federal Water 
Resources Act of 1957 (the Act),80 landowners were required to obtain a permit to 
use any surface or groundwater. The Act sought to preserve public water supplies 
from contamination or other uses that were damaging to the public welfare. Existing 
rights were provided for by way of a continuation of an existing permit, or a new 
permit, or compensation for the loss of an existing permit. The plaintiff’s application to 
continue using the groundwater on his property for purposes of extracting gravel was 
denied.81 The reason given by the authority for its refusal of the plaintiff’s application 
was that the distance from the quarry to the Waterworks’ water plant was only 120m, 
which created the risk that any contamination of the flooded gravel pit could easily 
                                                   
79
 For a discussion of the case refer to AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative 
analysis (1999) 142-145; H Mostert “Engaged citizenship and the enabling state as factors 
determining the interference parameter of property: A comparison of German and South African law” 
(2010) 127 South African Law Journal 238-273 at 251-252; DP Kommers The constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 257-261; GS Alexander The global 
debate over constitutional property: Lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 118-119, 139-
147; BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 85-
95. 
80
 Wasserhaushaltzgesetz – WHG 16.02.1976 (BGBI S 3017). 
81
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 309. 
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spread to the city’s water wells and endanger public water safety.82 The plaintiff 
approached the courts and argued that the authority’s refusal to grant him a permit 
constituted an expropriation which entitled him to compensation.83 The Federal Court 
of Justice in Civil Matters referred the case to the Federal Constitutional Court to 
determine whether the Act, which was meant to determine the content and limits of 
property rights in terms of articles 14.1.2 and 14.2, was perhaps unconstitutional 
because the restriction of the landowner’s rights with regard to the use of 
groundwater went too far (in terms of the prohibition against excessive regulation or 
Übermaβverbot). The Federal Court of Justice upheld the plaintiff’s claim on the 
basis that the refusal of the plaintiff’s application to extract gravel from the 
groundwater on his property constituted an enteignender Eingriff which required the 
payment of compensation.84 This was in line with previous judgments in which the 
Federal Court of Justice held that the refusal of a water permit in terms of the Act for 
the purpose of gravel extraction effected expropriation if the pre-existing gravel 
extraction was not only economically reasonable but could also be realised.85 
 In this decision, the Federal Constitutional Court addressed the different 
approaches to the determination of regulation and expropriation of property that had 
developed in the administrative and civil courts. The Federal Constitutional Court set 
out the jurisdiction of the various federal courts with regard to aspects of the 
constitutional property guarantee. The Court held that the civil courts’ jurisdiction was 
restricted to the amount of compensation for expropriation, which means that a valid 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 309. 
83
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 309. BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk 
en Nederland (1998) 85 points out that the plaintiff did not approach the administrative courts. Instead, 
he approached the civil courts and claimed compensation for the refusal of the relevant authority to 
grant him a water permit in terms of the Act. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 330. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 330. 
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expropriation should already exist.86 There was therefore no justification for the civil 
courts’ Sonderopfertheorie approach in which the court awarded compensation for 
regulatory deprivations that imposed an excessive and harsh burden on an individual 
property owner (enteignende Eingriffe).87 The civil courts were not allowed to 
indirectly transform what they saw as excessive regulatory actions into expropriation 
by awarding compensation. The validity requirements for expropriation are set out in 
article 14.3 of the Basic Law. According to the Court, the most important requirement 
in this regard is that expropriation should be authorised by valid law, which must set 
out the nature and measure of compensation to be paid for expropriation.88 The 
Court emphasised that this Junktim-Klausel (linking clause) means that a regulatory 
statute, which does not provide for compensation, cannot be used to found a claim 
for compensation based on expropriation.89 Therefore, the correct approach to 
regulatory limitations that exceed the scope of legitimate legislative regulatory power 
is not to claim compensation but to attack the validity of the law or action in the 
administrative courts.90 The Court held that the administrative courts have jurisdiction 
with regard to the validity of administrative decisions and actions pertaining to 
expropriation.91 However, when the constitutionality of legislation, state actions or 
court decisions is challenged, the matter should be referred to the Federal 
Constitutional Court.92 The administrative courts do not have the power to transform 
a regulatory action that is invalid for exceeding the scope of the regulatory power into 
an expropriation by awarding compensation. 
                                                   
86
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 323. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 324. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 323. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 324. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 324. 
91
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 322-323. 
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 The question before the Court was therefore whether the Federal Water 
Resources Act was in accordance with article 14 of the Basic Law. The Federal Court 
of Justice’s approach was premised on the assumption that groundwater formed part 
of the landowner’s property as meant by § 905 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) (Civil Code) and that the property owner’s right in respect to the groundwater 
found on his property was significantly limited by the Act.93 The commencement of 
the Water Resources Act detached groundwater from landownership and abolished 
the private landowner’s private ownership of groundwater and also limited the 
landowner’s access to the groundwater.94 Furthermore, the Federal Court of Justice 
adhered to the legal view that the right to property included every possible and 
economically reasonable use of that property, as determined by §903 BGB.95 Any 
interference with such an economically reasonable use of the property must therefore 
be treated as an interference that diminishes the landowner’s ownership. However, 
the Federal Constitutional Court held that this legal perspective could not be 
maintained.96 The Court stated that the legal view that the private law right to 
property conferred by the BGB took priority over the public law right to property 
entrenched in the Basic Law did not correspond with the Basic Law.97 The right to 
property as guaranteed in the Basic Law must be derived from the Basic Law itself, it 
cannot be derived from legal norms that rank lower than the Basic Law. Furthermore, 
                                                   
93
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 310, 330. §905 BGB provides “[d]as Recht des Eigentümers eines 
Grundstücks erstreckt sich auf den Raum über der Oberfläche und auf den Erdkörper unter der 
Oberfläche” (The right of the owner of a plot of land extends to the space above the surface and to the 
subsoil under the surface). See www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3642 
(accessed on 18.07.2014) for an official translation of the German Civil Code (BGB). 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 328, 323. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 334. §903 BGB provides “[d]er Eigentümer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht 
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influence). See www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3642 (accessed on 
18.07.2014) for an official translation of the German Civil Code (BGB). 
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the scope of the property right guarantee in the Basic Law cannot be determined on 
the basis of private law regulations.98 
 According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Water Resources Act was not 
intended to expropriate property.99 The Act constituted a regulation of property in the 
sense of defining the limits and content of property in relation to groundwater for 
purposes of article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law.100 The Basic Law mandates the 
legislature to define property in a way that protects the interests of private property 
owners as well as the general public interest. However, the legislature may only limit 
property rights to the extent authorised by the Basic Law.101 The fact that the Act 
removed a specific category of property (groundwater) from the sphere of private 
ownership does not necessarily conflict with the institutional property guarantee.102 
The Court held that the objections to the Act rest on the mistaken assumption that 
groundwater was legally inseparable from the right to property.103 According to the 
Court, it was incorrect to assume that the commencement of the Act would lead to an 
erosion of the core of property rights because it would be subject to total control in 
the public interest.104 A property owners’ entitlement to use and dispose of his 
property was not lost because the right to use groundwater is made subject to state 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 335. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 337. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 337-338. 
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 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) 338. 
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 ed 1997) 260. 
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approval.105 The Court emphasised that the constitutional right to property does not 
guarantee the most economically viable use of the property.106 The Court considered 
the legal position of the plaintiff before and after the commencement of the Act. It  
held that the Act would have been incompatible with the Basic Law if it abruptly and 
without any transitional period abolished pre-existing rights to use groundwater.107 
Furthermore, the Court held that the Act was not unconstitutional because it denied 
the right to the continuous use of property (groundwater) without the payment of 
compensation.108 The constitutional guarantee of property does not imply that a 
property entitlement must endure in perpetuity or that it can be taken away only by 
means of expropriation.109 The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly 
emphasised that the legislature, in reforming a specific aspect of law, was not limited 
to the two alternatives of either preserving the previous legal position or paying 
compensation for changes to the existing order.110 The legislature may, within the 
framework of article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law, alter or reform individual legal positions 
when such change is justified by the public interest, provided that it does not infringe 
on the individual property guarantee.111 In this case the Court found that legislature 
provided adequate and reasonable transitional measures in the Act that afforded the 
plaintiff the possibility of continuing his unhindered use of groundwater without a 
permit for five years from the commencement of the Act.112 The Court concluded that 
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the Act did not infringe the individual property guarantee in article 14 of the Basic 
Law and did not give rise to a duty to pay compensation.113 
 In this case the Court created a categorical dichotomy between regulatory 
deprivation and expropriation of property. The Court put an end to the civil and 
administrative courts’ respective approaches to the determination whether a 
regulatory interference constitutes deprivation or expropriation of property. In this 
regard, the Court emphasised the respective courts’ jurisdiction. The Federal 
Constitutional Court criticised the practice that developed in the civil courts to award 
compensation for the regulatory interference that resulted from an administrative 
decision without challenging the validity of the administrative decision in the 
administrative courts.114 The Court held that the civil courts jurisdiction is restricted to 
disputes regarding the amount of compensation payable on expropriation. The 
presence of a valid expropriation was therefore a pre-requisite. It was therefore no 
longer possible for the civil courts to award compensation to property owners who 
have been forced to bear a harsh and disproportionate burden that resulted from a 
regulatory deprivation of property in terms of 14.1.2 of the Basic Law. The 
appropriate route for the property owner in this case is to approach the administrative 
courts and challenge the validity of the administrative action that gives rise to the 
harsh and disproportionate burden. If the administrative action effected a harsh and 
disproportionate burden in the opinion of the administrative court, the regulatory 
measure must be invalidated. It cannot be upheld on the condition that compensation 
should be payable. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly rejected the 
notion of constructive expropriation which would allow the courts to transform 
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excessive regulatory measures into expropriation and require the payment of 
compensation. 
 
2 3 3 The equalisation solution is accepted: The Denkmalschutz decision115 
The Federal Constitutional Court had to consider the compatibility of the Monument 
Protection Act of the Rhineland-Palatinate116 (the Act) with article 14 of the Basic 
Law. The Act regulated the protection, restoration and maintenance of historic 
buildings and objects and required private owners of buildings protected by the Act to 
apply for prior state approval before any such building could be demolished or 
altered. The claimant in this case was the owner of a villa which was built during the 
Grunderzeit, a period during the nineteenth century that was known for the grandeur 
of its buildings.117 The property (villa) was initially used as a residential house but 
became unsuitable for this use and has since 1981 been standing vacant.118 In 1981 
the claimant applied in terms of the Act to the relevant authority for permission to 
demolish the villa since she no longer had any economically viable use for the 
building. For years she had tried to find a meaningful alternative use for it, including 
attempts to lease the property. However, her efforts were unsuccessful. In addition, 
the claimant also offered free use of the villa to the local authority to utilise it as a 
museum, subject to the condition that it had to bear the maintenance costs of the 
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villa. This offer was turned down on the basis that the estimated maintenance costs 
exceeded 1 million Deutsche Marks (DM).119 Furthermore, the claimant’s annual 
maintenance costs were estimated at 300 000 DM. On the facts of the case it was 
clear that the claimant’s efforts and monetary expenditure on the villa were 
disproportionate to her use and enjoyment of the villa.120 However, despite this fact, 
the local authority nevertheless refused to grant the claimant permission to demolish 
the villa.121 In 1983 the villa was placed under formal protection.122 The claimant’s 
subsequent appeals to the administrative courts against the local authority’s decision 
to refuse her permission to demolish the villa were without success. The Higher 
Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) dismissed the claimant’s appeal on 
the grounds that the relevant authority, in terms of the Act, only had to consider the 
historical value and nature of the building in deciding whether the building should be 
placed under formal protection. It held that other considerations such as the financial 
position of the private owner or the economic viability of the remaining uses for the 
property need not be taken into account.123 With regard to the demolition order, the 
Court held that it was not in the public interest to demolish the villa.124 § 13 of the Act 
which concerned demolition orders did not require the decision maker to consider the 
interests of property owners when deciding whether to grant or refuse a demolition 
order. Therefore, the Act did not make provision for the impact that refusal of a 
demolition order would have on the affected property owner, including for example 
the fact that the building would be rendered useless or impose an uneconomical 
burden on the owner with regard to the restoration and maintenance of the 
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building.125 The Court found the decision to place the claimant’s building under formal 
protection and the decision to refuse the demolition order to be valid. Furthermore, 
the Court did not consider the financial burden on the claimant as extensive as was 
alleged, since it would be payable over a long period of time.126 
 On appeal, the Federal Constitutional Court considered whether § 13 of the Act 
was in accordance with article 14 of the Basic Law.127 The claimant argued that § 13 
of the Act infringed the property guarantee in article 14 of the Basic Law because the 
refusal of a demolition order constituted an enteignender Eingriff, the nature and 
extent of which required the payment of compensation but which the Act failed to 
provide.128 The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the infringement that resulted 
from § 13 of the Act constituted a regulatory interference with property rights under 
article 14.1.2.129 The Court held that the Act applied in abstract and generally by 
affecting all landowners’ use rights in relation to monument buildings on their land. 
Therefore, § 13 of the Act did not constitute expropriation of property under article 
14.3 of the Basic Law.130 As a first step it was therefore held that the authorising 
statute does not deal with or authorise expropriation. 
 The next step is to assess the validity of the regulatory action undertaken in 
terms of the Act. The Court held that the legislature must, in its determination of the 
contents and limits of property rights under article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law, establish 
an equitable balance between the interests of the public and the interests of private 
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property owners.131 Furthermore, the legislature should uphold other constitutional 
principles underlying the property guarantee and may not limit property beyond the 
purpose for which the legislation was enacted.132 Although the Basic Law authorises 
the legislature to determine the limits and contents of property rights, it 
simultaneously sets the limits to which the legislature may legitimately interfere with 
property rights. The Court confirmed the Naβauskiesung decision in which it held that 
regulatory interferences with property rights that exceed the limits set by the Basic 
Law are illegal and gives rise to a constitutional challenge of the validity of the 
legislation. This type of regulatory interference cannot be used as the basis to found 
a claim for compensation.133 
 With regard to the validity of § 13 of the Act, the Court held that the Act, in 
contrast to other similar legislation, did not consider the interests of private owners. 
Moreover, the burden that resulted from the refusal to grant a demolition order was, 
in certain situations, disproportionate.134 The Court held that the protection of historic 
and culturally valuable buildings was in the public interest and generally could be 
justified under article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law.135 Furthermore, the Court held that the 
consent-based procedure adopted in § 13 of the Act was a suitable and necessary 
method to protect these types of buildings.136 The Court was of the opinion that there 
was no other equally effective and less invasive method available to fulfil the purpose 
sought to be achieved by the Act.137 The Court stated that the burden imposed by the 
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Act would in most cases not be disproportionate.138 In light of the important social 
function fulfilled by historical and culturally valuable property, the Court emphasised 
that owners of such property must accept that their rights in relation to such property 
may legitimately be limited. Furthermore, article 14 of the Basic Law does not 
guarantee owners exploitation of the most beneficial use of their property.139  
 However, the situation was different when the owner no longer had any 
meaningful use of the protected building or his existing use of the property becomes 
impractical.140 According to the Court, the burden that resulted from the legislation 
would be disproportionate if it deprived the owner of a historic building of all 
reasonable use of the property, including the possibility of selling the property.141 The 
Court held that the refusal to grant a demolition order in these instances would not be 
reasonable.142 In these circumstances, if the legislature was of the view that the 
public interest still required conservation of the particular building, the state would 
have to expropriate the property.143 The Court found § 13 to be unconstitutional 
because it imposes a disproportionate burden on property owners and contained no 
measures that prevent the burden from being disproportionate.144  
 § 31 of the Act contains a salvatorische Klausel (compensation clause) which 
allows compensation to be awarded in instances when the burden that results from 
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the application of the Act is deemed excessive and expropriatory in nature.145 
However, the Court found that § 31 of the Act does not remedy the disproportionate 
burden that resulted from the refusal to grant the demolition order.146 The Court 
recognised that the legislature could prevent the burden that results from a regulatory 
interference in terms of article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law from being disproportionate by 
providing for Ausgleichsmaβnahmen (equalisation measures).147 However, the Court 
found that § 31 could not fulfil this function because the requirements and conditions 
that regulated the grounds for an entitlement to equalisation (Ausgleich) were too 
vague.148 The legislature may, in principle, enforce regulatory measures that cause 
harsh and excessive interferences with property rights; provided that it is 
accompanied by equalisation measures that prevent the imposition of 
disproportionate and unequal burdens on property owners.149 However, this would 
only in exceptional circumstances, be in accordance with article 14.1 of the Basic 
Law.150 The Court stressed that equalisation measures were not a general 
permissible constitutional means to bring disproportionate regulatory limitations of 
property rights in accordance with article 14.1 of the Basic Law.151 Regulatory 
measures that determine the content and limits of property rights must be in 
conformity with the constitutional protection of the core of property rights and the 
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principle of equality, even in the absence of equalisation measures.152 Equalisation 
measures can, in exceptional cases, where the application of the Act imposes an 
unreasonable burden on property owners, be utilised to ameliorate the 
disproportionate and unequal burden, but they cannot solve all problems with 
disproportionality.153 The Court held that equalisation measures do not help when 
neither technical, administrative, nor financial measures provided for in the statute 
can bring the regulatory interference in line with the principle of proportionality.154 
 The Court held that equalisation measures should comply with the following 
requirements to be in accordance with article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law:155 (a) 
Equalisation measures require a legal basis.156 Consequently, a claim for 
compensation may only be considered if such monetary equalisation measure is 
specifically provided for in the relevant statute.157 (b) The statutory inclusion of a 
general claim to monetary compensation for harsh and excessive regulatory 
interferences that may result from the application of the specific legislation does not 
constitute an appropriate equalisation measure. Such general compensation 
provision will not prevent the regulatory burden from offending against the 
proportionality principle.158 The Court emphasised that the individual property 
guarantee in article 14.1 of the Basic Law requires the legislature to avoid imposing 
disproportionate burdens on property owners and preserve as far as possible the 
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owners’ beneficial use of the property.159 The instruments available to the legislature 
in this regard include transitional measures, exception and exemption provisions as 
well as other administrative and technical measures. If such equalisation measures 
are not possible or only possible by means of disproportionate or unreasonable 
costs, financial equalisation measures may be considered or it may be necessary to 
allow the owner to force the state to expropriate the property at market value.160 (c) 
The legislature, when determining the content and limits of property rights must also 
at the same time determine the nature and extent of possible and appropriate 
equalisation measures for otherwise disproportionate burdens and stipulate the 
grounds that would entitle a property owner to these equalisation measures.161 
 The Court held that the correct approach for a property owner whose property 
rights have disproportionately been infringed under article 14.1.1 of the Basic Law 
was to challenge the relevant administrative action in the administrative courts.162 
The Court emphasised that it was no longer possible for such regulatory measure to 
remain in force by awarding compensation to equalise the disproportionate burden 
under article 14.1.2 of the Basic Law.163 The legislature can attach substantive 
equalisation measures to supplement procedural administrative provisions and 
thereby ensure that, if appropriate and necessary, the extent of the infringement of a 
property right or the burden on the individual property owner that results from the 
administrative action be equalised.164 Furthermore, the Court held that when the 
equalisation measure comprises of monetary compensation, the statute should at 
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least set out the grounds that would entitle a property owner to a claim for 
compensation.165 The Court concluded that § 31 of the Act did not satisfy these 
requirements.166 Solely on the basis of the absence of exception or exclusion 
measures or any other administrative or technical measures, § 31 constituted an 
inappropriate equalisation measure to ameliorate the disproportionate burden that 
resulted from the refusal to grant a demolition order under § 13 of the Act.167 
 The Court nevertheless held that the incompatibility of § 13 of the Act with 
article 14.1 of the Basic Law did not result in the invalidity of the provision.168 Such 
legal consequence could be avoided if the legislature provides for equalisation 
measures in the statute that would prevent the burden from being disproportionate 
and consequently unconstitutional.169 The Court did not consider invalidating § 13 of 
the Act to be appropriate. Invalidating the Act would have created a lacuna in the 
area pertaining to the protection of historic buildings and monuments. The Court 
stated that the demolition of historic and culturally valuable buildings would always 
require state approval.170 Furthermore, the relevant authority must use its discretion 
and take the interests of the affected property owner into account when deciding 
whether to grant the demolition order.171 The refusal of a demolition order would be 
unconstitutional in cases where the preservation of the protected building would 
impose an unreasonable burden on the property owner.172 However, such a result 
would thwart the legislature’s intention to protect historic and culturally valuable 
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buildings in the public interest.173 The Court held that the legislature’s intention can 
be realised in a constitutionally valid manner. As a result, the Court suspended the 
invalidity of § 13 of the Act to give the legislature the opportunity to revise the Act and 
insert equalisation measures that appropriately equalise the disproportionate burden 
on individual property owners in certain instances. 
 With regard to determining whether an interference with property rights 
constitutes a regulatory deprivation or expropriation, the Federal Constitutional Court 
in this case went further than it did in Naβauskiesung and also considered whether 
equalisation measures can remedy excessive regulation. The Court considered the 
various types of equalisation measures and set out the requirements thereof. The 
Court held that other (lesser) equalisation measures, for example transitional 
arrangements and regulatory exceptions, should first be exhausted before reverting 
to financial equalisation.174 Kischel states that an equalisation obligation 
(Ausgleichspflicht) does not only, or primarily, mean financial equalisation 
payments.175 Non-financial measures are not only possible but also have precedence 
over financial equalisation payments. However, they are still equalisation measures 
that serve the same purpose, namely to prevent the harsh burden that may result 
from the application of regulatory laws from being disproportionate under article 
14.1.2 of the Basic Law. 
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 Importantly, the Court stated that “kompensatorische Entschädigungsansprüche 
… sollen … nur durch ein Gesetz geschehen”176 (a claim for compensatory 
equalisation is only possible if it is provided for in the statute), which unambiguously 
removed the existing uncertainty about the question whether equalisation measures 
had to be expressly provided for in the infringing legislation.177 Van der Walt states 
that the possible harm that may result from the regulatory state action must be 
foreseeable and the authorising statutory framework should provide an appropriate 
equalisation measures to reduce the burden.178 Legislation may therefore not include 
a blanket provision to cover all unforeseen circumstances where the regulatory action 
has unexpected harsh effects for an individual property owner.179 Therefore, a 
prerequisite for an equalisation measure is a clause (Entschädigungsklausel) in the 
regulatory statute that explicitly and clearly regulates the nature and extent of the 
appropriate equalisation measures and specifies the grounds when a claim for 
equalisation may arise and awards the relevant agency the discretion to make 
equalisation payments.180  
 
2 4 Concluding remarks 
The notion of something similar to constructive expropriation was considered in 
German law by the civil, administrative and constitutional courts. The civil and 
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administrative courts developed and applied two different methods to transform 
excessive regulatory measures into expropriation and require the payment of 
compensation. However, the Federal Constitutional Court considered the civil and 
administrative courts’ respective approaches and found that neither of the two courts 
had jurisdiction to consider whether excessive regulatory measures constitute 
expropriation. Furthermore, the Court held that the judicial requirement of 
compensation for excessive regulatory measures was in conflict with the Basic Law, 
especially article 14.3 which sets out the requirements for valid deprivation. 
Therefore, in Naβauskiesung the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly rejected the 
possibility of recognising any solution like constructive expropriation. Moreover, in 
Naβauskiesung181 the Federal Constitutional Court made it clear that the type of 
excessive regulatory measures discussed in chapter 1 are invalid and cannot form 
the basis for a claim for compensation.  
The question whether the provision of non-expropriatorty compensation could 
equalise the excessiveness of the burden and thereby prevent the regulatory 
measure from being disproportionate and consequently invalid was raised in 
Naβauskiesung but expressly considered in Denkmalschutz.182 In Denkmalschutz the 
Federal Constitutional Court made it clear that excessive regulatory measures may 
be upheld if the legislature explicitly provides for equalisation measures in the 
specific regulatory statute.183 However, equalisation measures are only allowed in 
exceptional circumstances and must be sufficient and appropriate in preventing the 
excessive regulatory burden from being disproportionate. Non-monetary equalisation 
measures take precedence over monetary equalisation. Furthermore, the 
equalisation measures must be clear and detailed since a vague, catch-all provision 
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will not be seen as a valid equalisation measure. Therefore, in the absence of such 
specific statutory provision for compensatory equalisation, the affected property 
owner cannot claim compensation and if it is found to be excessive the regulatory 
limitation will be declared invalid.184 
 
3 The égalité principle in Dutch and Belgian law  
3 1 Introduction 
The equality before public burdens principle (égalité principle) originated in French 
administrative law, which in turn influenced Dutch and Belgian law. The French 
égalité principle also had an influence on German law,185 particularly in the German 
civil and administrative jurisprudence prior to the Naβauskiesung decision. According 
to Ossenbühl and Cornils, the claim to compensation against a public authority for 
the infringement of property rights of the individual through the exercise of 
administrative powers (Aufopferungsanspruch) is rooted in natural law in terms of the 
Prinzip der Lastengleichheit (principle of equal burdens).186  
The égalité principle is a judicial instrument developed to apply in situations 
where a lawful regulatory state action results in an unequal and disproportionate 
burden being imposed on an individual or a small group of property owners. Different 
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criteria are applied to determine whether the égalité principle is applicable and 
whether the loss resulting from a regulatory measure should be compensated. This 
section discusses the development of the égalité principle in French, Dutch and 
Belgian law briefly and highlights its application in the respective jurisdictions. 
 
3 2 Origin of the égalité principle in French administrative law  
No-fault liability is essentially judge-made law.187 Errera states that no-fault liability is 
the exception to the prevailing fault-based liability rule in French law.188 The notion of 
no-fault liability is a judicial answer to situations in which the classical rules could not 
apply without creating substantial inequality and unfairness.189 However, the égalité 
principle is not clear-cut or without shortcomings.190 
The French Administrative Court (Conseil d’État) is the supreme and final 
instance regarding the validity of administrative acts.191 Initially, the state could only 
be held liable for damage that resulted from unlawful state action (responsabilité pour 
faute) but later developments expanded the scope of state liability to include 
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reasoning are not always clear and complete and are often muddled with useless complexities. Errera 
points out that some reorganisation is needed, but argues that it is primarily the task of Parliament, 
with the assistance of the courts and the executive. 
191
 LN Brown & JS Bell French administrative law (5
th
 ed 1998) 44 states that the Conseil d’État is the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 
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damages that arise from lawful state action (responsabilité sans faute).192 Two 
fundamental principles, namely “balance of the contract” (responsabilité pour risque) 
(also referred to as the risk principle) and “equality before public burdens” (égalité 
devant les charges publiques, hereafter the égalité principle) played an important role 
in the development of state liability for lawful state actions.193 Of particular 
importance is the second principle, the égalité principle. The égalité principle is 
primarily applicable to loss that results from legal instruments such as administrative 
decisions, regulations and legislation.194 The principle also applies to loss that results 
from state actions that are factual in nature, for example where loss is caused by 
public works (travaux et ouvrages publics).195 The origin of this principle dates back 
to the French Revolution.196 The égalité principle is entrenched, albeit not in express 
terms, in article 13 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789 
(Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen).197 The égalité principle 
underscores the fact that public burdens should be evenly distributed amongst those 
                                                   
192
 GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 169. R Errera “The 
scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 
157-180 at 173 emphasises that no-fault liability is the exception to the rule that the state can only be 
held liable once fault has been established. 
193
 GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 169. See MKG 
Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans 
en Europees recht (2010) 193-195 for a discussion on the distinction between these two foundations 
for state liability. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis 
(1999) 524; MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een 
Europeesrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 116. 
194
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 932, 966. 
195
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 932, 966. For example where an owner of a commercial 
premises looses income due to the state’s undertaking in building a road resulted in restricting or 
hindering public access to the owner’s premises. 
196
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 36. 
197
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 38, 136. See also GE van Maanen & R de Lange 
Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 170; BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in 
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 153; W Konijnenbelt “De egalite devant les charges 
publiques in het Franse administratieve recht” (1971) 5 Bestuurswetenschappen 263-298 at 267. 
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affected by it, including property owners.198 If one person, in comparison with another 
similarly situated person, has to bear a disproportionally heavy burden for the benefit 
of the public as a whole the state has a duty to pay compensation.199 
 It was only after the French Administrative Court declared the égalité principle a 
constitutional principle that it started functioning as an autonomous, direct basis of 
state liability.200 The Couitéas201 decision is seen as the origin of the jurisprudence on 
the égalité principle.202 In the Couitéas decision, the French Administrative Court not 
only developed the doctrine of no-fault state liability for lawful state action but also 
                                                   
198
 GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 170. See also AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 275. MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis 
van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 2 states that 
the égalité principle requires that “de lasten die het gevolg zijn van overheidshandelen in het 
algemeen belang, niet ten laste van een toevallige burgen komen, maar door de gemeenschap 
worden gedragen” (burdens that result from state action in the public interest should not rest on one 
individudal but should be borne by the public as a whole). 
199
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 3. AJ van der Walt “Compensation for excessive or unfair 
regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 
South African Public Law 273-331 at 298-299 explains that the compensation claim is based upon 
administrative law and not the constitutional property clause or on private property law. 
200
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 42. See also R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault 
liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 172; MJW van 
Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 118. 
201
 CE 30 November 1923 Recueil des décisions du Conseil d’Etat 789 (Couitéas). In this case a 
private owner’s property was unlawfully occupied by approximately 8 000 Tunisian rebels. A French 
court granted an eviction order, and ordered military assistance, should it have been necessary, to 
effect the eviction order. In terms of French law the administration may, on grounds of public order or 
of security, refuse its help. However, if the refusal continues for a certain period, the state must 
compensate the burdened property holder. The French Minister feared military assistance would 
cause public upheaval and therefore refused to execute the eviction order. Although the Conseil d’État 
found that the administrative decision not to comply with the court order was lawful, it awarded 
compensation to the property owner who could not make any use of his property for the entire period 
of unlawful occupation. For a summary and discussion of the decision, see MKG Tjepkema 
Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en 
Europees recht (2010) 150-153. See also the summary of the decision in R Errera “The scope and 
meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 
157; MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 111. 
202
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 193. BJPG Roozendaal Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in 
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 153 points out that the Conseil d’État applied the égalité 
principle without ever using the term. The Conseil d’État expressly mentioned the term for the first time 
in the CE 2 June 1944 Recueil des décisions du Conseil d’Etat 159 (Fays) decision. 
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developed the criteria to determine when liability could exist.203 The égalité principle 
is breached when an individual or a limited group of property owners suffer a loss, 
caused by otherwise lawful state action, that is not suffered by other similarly situated 
owners (spécialité),204 provided that the loss is abnormal (anormalité).205 If both these 
principles are complied with, the state must compensate the affected property 
owners.206  
 In La Fleurette,207 the Conseil d’État extended the scope of the égalité principle 
to state liability arising from formal legislation.208 Errera states that liability arising 
                                                   
203
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 46. 
204
 R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 
Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 162 points out that the spécialité requirement does not only 
require the unequal distribution of burdens but also that the affected persons suffer a loss for the 
exclusive benefit of others. See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het 
égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
205
 GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 170. See also 
Roozendaal BJPG Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland (1998) 154-157; 
R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current 
Legal Problems 157-180 at 161; W Konijnenbelt “De egalite devant les charges publiques in het 
Franse administratieve recht” (1971) 5 Bestuurswetenschappen 263-298 at 284. AJ van der Walt 
“Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice 
relating to regulatory takings” (1999) 14 South African Public Law 273-331 at 296 states that a 
regulatory interference is regarded as abnormal when “it deprives the property holder of the right itself 
or of all enjoyment of the right, or undermines the meaning of the right, or empties the right of all its 
content, or when it affects not only the property but also the persons occupying the property, in a 
significant manner, thereby threatening their right to liberty as well as their property”. 
206
 GE van Maanen & R de Lange Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad (4
th
 ed 2005) 170 mention that it is 
difficult in practice to comply with these two requirements. See also MJW van Casteren 
Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende studie 
(1997) 119. 
207
 CE 14 January 1938 Recueil des décisions du Conseil d’Etat 25 (La Fleurette). In this case, a 
statutory ban was imposed on the production and sale of a product resembling cream for purposes of 
protecting the dairy industry. La Fleurette specialised in, and was the sole producer of the product, 
claimed compensation for the loss it suffered from the cessation of its enterprise. The Conseil d’Etat 
found that the motive behind the legislative prohibition was not to protect the public health and safety, 
since no harm could be established, but was a purely economic decision to protect the dairy industry 
from dairy-substitute products in a period of recession. The Conseil d’Etat held that although the 
legislation made no provision for compensation, there was nothing in the statute that indicated that the 
legislature had intended that the plaintiff should bear the loss. Although the Court never explicitly 
mentioned the égalité principle, it concluded that the loss is a loss that should be borne by society as a 
whole. See the summary and discussion of this decision in MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op 
basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 154-
157. See also the summary of the decision in R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in 
French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 158. 
208
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 154. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
173 
 
from statute has had a restricted development.209 The Conseil d’État has since La 
Fleurette become more reserved.210 If the legislature explicitly excludes 
compensation, or limits it to a fixed amount, or restricts it to certain specified 
instances, the courts cannot go further than what the statute provides for.211 
However, when the legislature does not say anything about compensation, the courts 
try to establish the intention of the legislature.212 According to Tjepkema, the public 
interest served by the legislation guides the Conseil d’État in establishing the 
intention of the legislature.213 A distinction is drawn between three instances. Firstly, 
no right to compensation exists if legislation prohibits a specific activity that is harmful 
to the public or morally unworthy of legal protection.214 Secondly, the courts adopt a 
more deferential approach with regard to recognising a duty to compensate in 
instances where the legislature not only foresees the burden but also envisages that 
the burden should be unequally distributed.215 This is especially the case where 
legislation is enacted for the advancement of economic policy adopted by the state, 
the achievement of which would be greatly impeded if an equal distribution of 
                                                   
209
 R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 
Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 158. MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het 
égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 155 points out that 
since the La Fleurette decision, the Conseil d’Etat has only recognised state liability arising from 
statute in three cases. 
210
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 156. 
211
 R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 
Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 159-160. 
212
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 156. 
213
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 157. 
214
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 157-158. See also R Errera “The scope and meaning of 
no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 160. The 
position is similar in US law. See for example Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623 (1887) paras 668-669 in 
which the Supreme Court held that “[a] prohibition upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, 
in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit [which 
would, in both instances, require compensation].” 
215
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 158-161. 
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burdens would lead to a duty to compensate. However, the unequal distribution of 
the regulatory burden should be necessary and should be in direct relation to 
achieving the public purpose.216 Thirdly, no right to compensation exists where the 
legislation is aimed at serving a specific, general public interest.217 However, Errera 
criticises the Courts’ approach in using the purpose of the statute as justification for 
the decision not to award compensation.218 
 Tjepkema argues that there has been a shift in the Conseil d’État’s approach to 
state liability arising from formal legislation since 2003.219 In terms of the new 
approach, the intention of the legislature still plays a role but it is no longer a 
determinative factor in instances where the legislature remains silent on the matter of 
compensation. The Conseil d’État now primarily focuses on the spécialité and 
anormalité requirements of the loss, regardless of the public purpose sought to be 
achieved by the specific legislation.220 If the legislature wishes to exclude 
compensation it has to do so explicitly in the relevant legislation.  
 The égalité principle applies to those situations where the regulatory burden 
complained of in a specific case, is an inherent and necessary consequence of a 
regulatory state action that is performed in the public interest.221 Although the 
regulatory limitation of an owner’s property rights is the consequence of a conscious 
choice for a specific measure to fulfil the public purpose, the disproportionate effects 
                                                   
216
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 160. 
217
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 162-164. 
218
 R Errera “The scope and meaning of no-fault liability in French administrative law” (1986) 39 
Current Legal Problems 157-180 at 160-161. 
219
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 165. 
220
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 168. 
221
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
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of such measure are not always known beforehand.222 However, the supervening 
loss itself is almost always a logical and foreseeable consequence of regulatory state 
actions.223 Moreover, despite the foreseeability of the regulatory burden, the 
regulatory state action is necessary and important and has to be taken.224 It is in 
these instances where the court may award compensation to the adversely affected 
property owner(s) in terms of the égalité principle if the regulatory burden complies 
with the requirements of spécialité and anormalité. Compensation cannot be 
awarded for every regulatory burden that results from lawful state actions. Therefore, 
the spécialité and anormalité requirements function as limits to this type of liability.225 
A burden fulfils the spécialité requirement if it only applies to an individual property 
owner or a small group of property owners and not to other similarly situated owners. 
Burdens that are imposed on the whole community or group of a certain size are, in 
principle, not in breach of the égalité principle.226 Furthermore, a burden fulfils the 
anormalité requirement if it effects an excessive limitation of an owner’s property 
rights and is disproportionate to the purpose sought to be achieved by the relevant 
legislation. Burdens that are classified as an accepted risk, or belong to the normal 
business risks, or fall under the normal social risks borne by everyone, do not give 
rise to a duty to pay compensation.227  
                                                   
222
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
223
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
224
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
225
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967. 
226
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 360-361, 967. The égalité principle only applies when one 
subgroup of the bigger group, who all share a specific characteristic, suffer a disproportionate burden. 
227
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 967-968. 
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 Unlike German law, the legislature need not specifically provide for 
compensation before a claim to compensation can be established. On the contrary, if 
the legislature wishes to exclude legislation in a specific instance it would have to 
provide this explicitly in the specific statute. The payment of compensation in terms of 
the égalité principle is not compensation for expropriation. Rather, it fulfils the same 
function as equalisation measures in German law in the sense that it evens out the 
disproportionate and excessive burden that result from an excessive regulatory 
measure. 
 
3 3 Nadeelcompensatie in Dutch law 
French law played a significant role in the development of Dutch administrative law in 
general, especially in the development of liability for lawful state action in terms of the 
égalité principle.228 The égalité principle was only introduced in Dutch law in the 
1930s, after the La Fleurette decision of the French Conseil d’Etat.229 In Dutch law 
various courts have jurisdiction to determine whether compensation for a lawful state 
action is payable in a specific case. In this regard, Dutch law differs from French law. 
In French law only one institution, namely the Conseil d’Etat has jurisdiction to decide 
                                                   
228
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 11. See also EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor 
nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 459. 
229
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 477. 
See the discussion of the La Fleurette decision above. MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij 
rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 202. However, 
MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, 
Frans en Europees recht (2010) 961 points out that there were already in the late 1920s references to 
the égalité principle in Dutch literature and therefore indicates that the French jurisprudence in the CE 
30 November 1923 Recueil des décisions du Conseil d’Etat 789 (Couitéas) decision did not go 
unnoticed in Dutch law. 
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this issue.230 Therefore, the question whether compensation for lawful state action is 
payable developed differently in the two jurisdictions.231  
In both Dutch and French law, a right to compensation for lawful state action 
can exist in instances where compensation is specifically provided for in the relevant 
statute, but also in the absence of such a statutory compensation provision.232 
However, the relationship between a right to compensation for lawful state action and 
compensation in terms of an explicit statutory provision for compensation and the 
relationship between a right to compensation and an award for compensation without 
a specific statutory basis are not the same in the two jurisdictions.233 Van Casteren 
describes the attitude of the French legislature as more amenable and states that it 
was the French judges who did the breakthrough work in no-fault state liability.234 
Conversely, the Dutch legislature is more cautious of judicial activism and has single-
handedly, without judicial interference, introduced compensatory initiatives, 
especially in the areas of building and spatial planning laws.235 However, this did not 
preclude the development of compensation for lawful state action outside the 
                                                   
230
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 202. 
231
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 202. 
232
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 203. See also BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte gevolgen. 
De verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE van Maanen; BPM van 
Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 91-199 at 95; 
MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, 
Frans en Europees recht (2010) 959. 
233
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 203. 
234
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 203. 
235
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 203. Van Casteren points out that the German legislature’s 
initiatives are generally shaped by judicial perspectives. See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie 
op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 961-
962. 
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statutory regulatory context.236 Both French and Dutch law refer to the égalité 
principle as the basis upon which a claim for compensation for lawful state action is 
founded.237 This principle is entrenched as the basis for such compensation in 
French law. However, in Dutch law, the judiciary has left the debate regarding the 
foundation of such claim mostly to the academic literature.238 Although there is no 
consensus in Dutch law on the principle(s) that govern nadeelcompensatie, it is 
generally accepted that the égalité principle plays an important role.239 However, the 
scope and application of the égalité principle remains unclear in Dutch law.240 
In Dutch law, the point of departure is that there is no general right to 
compensation for lawful state action. Initially, a right to compensation only existed if it 
was explicitly provided for in the legislation or if the particular state action that 
brought about the loss was unlawful.241 However, courts found that it was, in some 
situations, untenable and unfair to expect an individual to bear the burden that results 
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 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 203. 
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 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 204. 
238
 MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 204. 
239
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 497. 
See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 197, 931; BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte 
gevolgen. De verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; 
BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 91-
199 at 95. 
240
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 197, 931. BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte 
gevolgen. De verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; 
BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 91-
199 at 95 also emphasises the uncertainty regarding the extent of the duty to pay nadeelcompensatie. 
241
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 501; 
MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, 
Frans en Europees recht (2010) 25, 70; BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte gevolgen. De 
verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van 
Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 91-199 at 97; 
BPM van Ravels “Nadeelcompensatie en andere vergoedingen in die waterstaatszorg” in JE Hoitink; 
GE Van Maanen; BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige 
overheidsdaad (2002) 261-423 at 263. 
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from a lawful state action without compensation.242 Therefore, under the influence of 
French law, Dutch courts developed and applied the notion of nadeelcompensatie 
(compensation for no-fault state liability).243 However, the judicial foundation for the 
application of nadeelcompensatie was uncertain and various alternatives were 
suggested in legislation, case law and in the academic literature.244 
Initially, a right to nadeelcompensatie only existed when property had been 
expropriated.245 No right to nadeelcompensatie existed for any other lawful 
interferences with property. As a result, expropriation was defined widely to enable 
more types of interferences with property to be characterised as expropriation.246 It 
was only later that a distinction was drawn between expropriation, which requires full 
compensation, and other forms of lawful regulatory interference with property rights 
which could not be classified as expropriation but that nevertheless, in certain 
circumstances, required compensation.247 The latter type of compensation was 
                                                   
242
 BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte gevolgen. De verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het -
bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) 
Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 99. 
243
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 961. 
244
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 499. 
The discussion on nadeelcompensatie in Dutch law will primarily be focused on the égalité principle 
and the other legal foundations for nadeelcompensatie will only briefly be mentioned in the extent that 
they relate to the égalité principle. 
245
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 100. 
246
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 455. 
MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke en 
rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 206 states that although expropriation is, as a point of departure, a 
lawful state action which requires compensation, expropriation does not fall within the ambit of the 
doctrine of compensation for lawful state action. French law follows an independent procedure for 
expropriation and compensation for expropriation is dealt with differently than compensation in terms 
of no-fault state liability. To a lesser extent, this is also the position in Dutch law. Van Casteren states 
that the expropriation laws find their foundation in article 14 of the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet voor 
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 Augustus 1815). 
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based on some form of fairness consideration.248 However, fairness was often 
determined on the basis of elements that make up the égalité principle.249 
De Jongh did a historical analysis of the legal foundations for 
nadeelcompensatie in legislation, case law and literature from the period between 
1815 until 2011 and concludes that the égalité principle forms the unwritten legal 
basis for nadeelcompensatie.250 Moreover, she argues that this was the case even 
before it was explicitly recognised as a principle on which a direct right to 
nadeelcompensatie could be based.251 A private law approach was adopted in the 
literature and by the judiciary to find a legal basis for nadeelcompensatie during the 
period 1940 up to 1982. In terms of this approach, nadeelcompensatie was founded 
on a creative interpretation of the Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), which only recognises 
compensation for unlawful state actions.252 This led to the distortion of otherwise 
lawful but excessive regulatory measures into unlawful state actions which would 
then allow the courts to grant compensation. Even though a public law approach, in 
terms of which compensation could be claimed for lawful state action, gained 
                                                   
248
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 456. 
See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 21; JE Hoitink “Schadevergoeding in het omgevingsrecht: 
Speurtocht naar ‘verklarende principes’” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van Ravels & BJ 
Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 201-259 at 233. 
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 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 458. 
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 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 502. 
See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 1-127 for a similar historical analysis of the reception and 
development of the égalité principle in Dutch law. 
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 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 502. 
252
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 461. 
See also MJW van Casteren Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatig EG-optreden: Een Europeesrechtelijke 
en rechtsvergelijkende studie (1997) 207; MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het 
égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 961. 
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influence during this period it was only in the period after 1982 that the legal grounds 
for nadeelcompensatie in this respect crystallised.253  
With regard to legislation, various statutes have since the beginning of the 
1960s provided for a right to nadeelcompensatie, including for example the Forestry 
Act of 1961 (Boswet), Monuments Act of 1961 (Monumentenwet) and the Act on 
Spatial Planning of 1965 (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening).254 Tjepkema states that 
the parliamentary debate surrounding the adoption of these statutory compensation 
provisions for no-fault state liability was based on a “reasonableness formula”.255 In 
terms of this reasonableness formula the question whether a right to compensation 
existed depended on whether the loss that would result from the statute fell within the 
“normal risks having to be borne by everyone in society” or constituted an “abnormal” 
and “disproportionate” burden.256 In view of this approach, Tjepkema argues that an 
explicit recognition of the égalité principle did not seem necessary. Dutch law thereby 
implicitly adopted a solution that strongly resembled the one applicable in French 
law.257 A right to nadeelcompensatie outside the statutory framework was only 
recognised for the first time in the 20th century, particularly at the end of the 1960s 
and the early 1970s.258  
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 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 462. 
254
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 459. 
See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963. 
258
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 457, 
461. See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek 
naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963; BPM van Ravels “De reikwijdte van het beginsel 
van de gelijkheid voor de openbare lasten: Een grensverkenning” in PFA Bierbooms; H Pasman & 
GMF Snijders (eds) Aspecten van aansprakelijkheid (2005) 73-96 at 73. 
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According to Tjepkema, one reason for the uncertainty regarding the content 
and scope of the égalité principle is the different approaches adopted by the Hoge 
Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) and the Raad van State (Dutch Administrative Court), 
respectively, in the criteria used to determine the applicability and scope of the 
égalité principle.259 Both the Raad van State and the Hoge Raad (although less 
explicitly than the Raad van State) refer to the égalité principle as the only ground for 
nadeelcompensatie.260 At the beginning of the 1970s a new system of administrative 
compensation (bestuurscompensatie) in regard to administrative decisions in the 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Verkeer en Waterstaat) 
developed in the Raad van State.261 In terms of this development, the state was 
obliged to take into account the possible adverse impact on rights and interests 
affected before making a lawful decision.262 Tjepkema emphasises that although this 
development could not be seen as an application of the égalité principle,263 it led to 
the creation of a new rule in the Paul Krugerbrug cases264 whereby a right to 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 5. 
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See also BPM van Ravels “De reikwijdte van het beginsel van de gelijkheid voor de openbare lasten: 
Een grensverkenning” in PFA Bierbooms; H Pasman & GMF Snijders (eds) Aspecten van 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 104-105, 963. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 963. 
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 ARRvS 12 January 1982, AB 1982, 299 (Paul Krugerbrug I); ARRvS 22 November 1983, AB 1984, 
154 (Paul Krugerbrug II). See MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: 
Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 107-109 for a summary and 
discussion of the decision. The facts of the case were that the Ministery of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management (Verkeer en Waterstaat) decided to granted the city of Utrecht permission to 
built a bridge over a specific channel. However, a shipyard (De Liesbosch) located on the channel 
suffered a loss due to the fact that ships of a certain width (12-14 metres), which accounted for half 
the income of the shipyard, could not get access to that shipyard. The question in the first case was 
whether there was sufficient consideration of the shipyard’s rights and interests before the decision 
was taken to grant the permission. The decision to grant permission was subject to the condition that 
the city had to take reasonable measures that would prevent third parties from suffering losses. In this 
case there was no consideration of the extent of the shipyard’s loss or the amount of compensation 
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compensation flowed from the obligation to establish a just and equitable balance of 
interests prior to the taking of the administrative decision.265 This prior balancing is 
needed to fulfil the proportionality principle, which would be breached and render the 
regulatory measure susceptible to invalidation if the public authority did not do a 
proper balancing of the rights and interests that are infringed by a lawful state 
interference, either by not granting, or granting insufficient compensation.266 The 
obligation to carefully analyse, before the decision is taken, the adverse 
consequences that would follow from a lawful decision was often impractical since it 
is not always a guaranteed certainty that the loss will actually occur and it was often 
difficult to determine to what extent this loss should be compensated.267 
Even though the Raad van State never mentioned the égalité principle, the 
conditions which had to be fulfilled to hold the state liable strongly resembled the 
criteria linked to the égalité principle.268 Providing compensation for the 
disproportionate burden that may result from the exercise of an administrative 
decision (in the sense of the égalité principle) will ensure that such a decision is in 
accordance with the evenredigheidsbeginsel (proportionality principle) in article 3:4 
paragraph 4 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht of 4 June 1992 (Awb) (General 
                                                                                                                                                               
the shipyard would be entitled to. The absence of this led the Raad van State to conclude that the 
decision to grant permission to build the bridge was in conflict with the non-arbitrariness requirement. 
The Raad van State held that the shipyard had to be informed, prior to taking the decision to grant the 
permission, how the amount of compensation will be determined and under what conditions one would 
be entitled to compensation. In the second case, the question was whether the amount of 
compensation payable to the shipyard as determined by the Minister was sufficient.  
265
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 106, 963-964. The primary purpose in terms of the system 
of bestuurscompensatie was not to determine the conditions when the state will be liable but rather to 
determine the requirements for a proper balancing of interests. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 107, 964. 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 964. 
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Administrative Law Act, hereafter GALA).269 Although it is accepted in the literature 
that the égalité principle is the sole independent ground for nadeelcompensatie, this 
view was challenged in the beginning of the 21st century.270 The introduction of 
GALA, especially in light of the Raad van State’s coupling of the 
evenredigheidsbeginsel in article 3:4 paragraph 2 of GALA and the right to 
nadeelcompensatie, raised the question of which principle forms the legal basis for 
nadeelcompensatie.271 Moreover, this coupling of the égalité principle to the 
evenredigheidsbeginsel in article 3:4 paragraph 2 of GALA was criticized because 
they concern two different types of proportionality.272 The evenredigheidsbeginsel 
consists of a means-end analysis.273 A means-end analysis differs from a 
proportionality analysis in terms of the égalité principle. In terms of a means-end 
analysis the focus is on the relationship between the public interests served and the 
private interests affected by the regulatory state actions, whereas proportionality 
focuses on the intensity of the effect of the infringement.274 The question whether 
nadeelcompensatie is required only becomes applicable if there was an appropriate 
balance between the purpose sought to be achieved and the private interests 
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 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 116, 964. 
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 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 464.  
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Article 3:4 paragraph 2 GALA codifies the proportionality principle (evenredigheidsbeginsel). See also 
BJ Schueler “Goede besluiten met slechte gevolgen. De verplichting tot nadeelcompensatie in het 
bestuursrecht” in JE Hoitink; GE van Maanen; BPM van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) 
Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 91-199 at 95.  
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Maanen; BPM van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad 
(2002) 91-199 at 95.  
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See also MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 119; See also JE Hoitink “Schadevergoeding in het 
omgevingsrecht: Speurtocht naar ‘verklarende principes’” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van 
Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 201-259 at 242. 
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affected by the regulatory interference.275 The means-end analysis is closer to what 
is known as rationality analysis in South African law, whereas proportionality in terms 
of the égalité principle requires an additional assessment of the fairness of the effect 
of the regulatory action. Therefore, nadeelcompensatie can only be considered in the 
proportionality analysis. If there was no proportionality in the means-ends analysis 
the regulatory measure is invalid for being unnecessary and therefore unauthorised 
and it cannot be saved by the payment of nadeelcompensatie. In Van Vlodrop276 the 
Raad van State for the first time recognised the égalité principle as an independent 
legal ground for the duty to pay nadeelcompensatie.277 Furthermore, the Raad van 
State has since 2003 explicitly stated that the égalité principle no longer finds its 
foundation in article 3:4 paragraph 2 of GALA, thereby making it possible to consider 
nadeelcompensatie after the loss has occurred.278 Therefore, it is now possible for an 
administrative decision which is proportionate in terms of article 3:4 paragraph 2 of 
GALA to be disproportionate in terms of the égalité principle.279 
The development of the égalité principle in the Raad van State played a role in 
the civil law as well, as illustrated in the Leffers280 and Staat/Lavrijsen281 decisions of 
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 ABRvS 6 May 1997, AB 1997, 229 (Van Vlodrop). MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis 
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the Hoge Raad.282 In both decisions the Hoge Raad explicitly recognised that state 
actions can be unlawful if it imposes a disproportionate burden.283 This view is based 
on the égalité principle.284 The implication of this construction that an otherwise lawful 
regulatory state action which imposes a disproportionate burden on an individual 
renders the regulatory state action unlawful and thereby gives rise to a duty to 
compensate the affected individual.285 In Staat/Lavrijsen the Hoge Raad followed the 
Raad van State approach prior to the Van Vlodrop decision and coupled the égalité 
principle to article 3:4 paragraph 2 of GALA, which requires a means-ends analysis 
prior to taking decision or making legislation.286 The implication of this decision is that 
the Hoge Raad’s jurisprudence in this respect is susceptible to the same criticism as 
that of the Raad van State prior to its uncoupling of the égalité principle and article 
3:4 paragraph 2 of GALA.287 However, the égalité principle, although explicitly 
recognised by the Hoge Raad, does not yet function as an independent legal basis 
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for nadeelcompensatie.288 Moreover, the Hoge Raad, despite criticism, does not yet 
acknowledge that the state can be liable for lawful regulatory actions.289 
In the literature, the role played by other legal grounds than the égalité principle 
is considered in relation to nadeelcompensatie. These alternative grounds include 
the principle of legitimate expectations (vertrouwensbeginsel), legal certainty 
principle (rechtzekerheid), and the evenredigheidsbeginsel (principle of 
proportionality in the sense of means-ends proportionality).290 The principle of legal 
certainty requires a level of confidence in the protection of vested rights and 
interests.291 The principle of legal certainty and the principle of legitimate expectation 
are closely related. The legal certainty principle seeks to ensure that private property 
owners may legitimately rely on the duration of the decisions they make in regard to 
their property. In turn, these decisions are based on legitimate expectations created 
by the state.292 De Jongh argues that the limited role played by the principle of legal 
certainty and the principle of legitimate expectation in both legislation and judicial 
reasoning is a clear indication that they cannot be regarded as an independent legal 
basis for nadeelcompensatie.293 Moreover, De Jongh states that although the 
principle of legal certainty forms a relevant factor to consider in the question whether 
nadeelcompensatie should in a specific case be awarded, it is the égalité principle 
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that forms the underlying legal foundation for nadeelcompensatie.294 The principle of 
legal certainty provides a ground of justification for the nadeelcompensatie, whereas 
the principle of legitimate expectation constitutes a relevant legal element in the 
testing of the infringing state action to the égalité principle.295 These two principles 
play a role in the balancing of interests that should be done prior to regulatory 
interferences with property.296 However, the fact that these two principles might be 
infringed by the regulatory measure does not by definition influence the decision 
whether to infringe upon private property rights. This decision is dependent on the 
interests that these principles serve in relation to interests served by the regulatory 
measure.297 Furthermore, these principles only play a supplementary role in the 
determination of whether nadeelcompensatie is required.298 The fact that the 
regulatory measure may infringe upon a property owner’s legitimate expectation can 
influence the question whether there was a special burden, which is one of the two 
requirements of the égalité principle.299 On the other hand, the infringement of the 
principle of legal certainty can influence the question of whether the burden was 
abnormal, which is the second requirement of égalité principle.300 Therefore, none of 
these two principles forms an independent legal foundation for nadeelcompensatie; 
                                                   
294
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 483. 
295
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482. 
296
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482. 
See also JE Hoitink “Schadevergoeding in het omgevingsrecht: Speurtocht naar ‘verklarende 
principes’” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding 
bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 201-259 at 235. 
297
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482. 
298
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482. 
See also JE Hoitink “Schadevergoeding in het omgevingsrecht: Speurtocht naar ‘verklarende 
principes’” in JE Hoitink; GE Van Maanen; BPM Van Ravels & BJ Schueler (eds) Schadevergoeding 
bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad (2002) 201-259 at 235. 
299
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482. 
300
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 482-
483. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
 
they are only factors that are relevant in determining whether the égalité principle has 
been breached.301  
Another alternative ground as legal basis for nadeelcompensatie is the 
evenredigheidsbeginsel.302 In terms of the evenredigheidsbeginsel, the interests 
served by the regulatory measure must be proportionate to the interests affected by 
such measure for it to be lawful.303 If there was no weighing of interests prior to 
effecting the regulatory measure the regulatory measure is deemed to constitute an 
unlawful state action with a concomitant duty to pay compensation.304 According to 
De Jongh, this point of departure influenced academics to refer to the 
evenredigheidsbeginsel as the legal foundation for nadeelcompensatie.305 This is 
also the approach followed by the Hoge Raad in civil cases.306 Scheuler argues that 
the provision of nadeelcompensatie can constitute one method to prevent a decision 
from being unlawful because it infringes upon the proportionality principle in terms of 
a means-ends analysis.307 Furthermore, if the regulatory interference is 
disproportionate, for example because there were other, less invasive means to fulfil 
the purpose (ends), it constitutes a ground for invalidating the regulatory measure. 
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Compensation may not be used to buy the validity of inherrently unlawful regulatory 
measures.308 De Jongh criticises this approach and states that it only shifts the 
boundary between lawful and unlawful regulatory measures to the boundary between 
lawful and doubtful instances and the boundary between doubtful and unlawful 
instances, thereby creating a grey area.309 De Jongh states that it is already difficult 
to draw the distinction between lawful and unlawful state actions and the creation of a 
grey area does not resolve the issue.310 Moreover, to award nadeelcompensatie in 
terms of the evenredigheidsbeginsel does not explain the conditions upon which, in a 
specific case, compensation should be provided.311 Therefore, an additional legal 
ground, other than the evenredigheidsbeginsel, is needed to explain the instances 
when the loss that resulted from a regulatory state action (therefore after the fact) 
should be compensated to prevent the state action from constituting an unlawful 
action.312 Another important criticism raised against the evenredigheidsbeginsel 
theory is that it revolves around a distinction between lawful and unlawful actions and 
does not bring about clarity regarding the legal foundation for compensaton for lawful 
state action.313 Compensation for lawful state action applies to loss that resulted from 
state action that is authorised by law and was exercised in compliance with the 
relevant autorising statute; therefore, lawful state action.314 However, compensation 
for unlawful action applies to loss that results from state action which was in conflict 
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with the law, therefore unlawful.315 De Jongh argues that it is not only better 
dogmatically to use the correct terminology, but she also emphasises that the rights 
and duties of each type of state action are different.316 The compensation for unlawful 
state action is full compensation as a point of departure, whereas the compensation 
for lawful state action is usually only compensation for loss that falls outside the 
normal social risk that everyone is expected to carry without compensation (normaal 
maatschappelijk risico).317  
The criticism against the evenredigheidsbeginsel indicates that it cannot be 
recognised as the independent legal ground for nadeelcompensatie. The 
evenredigheidsbegisel only plays a role in determining whether the regulatory state 
action was lawful or unlawful.318 The question whether nadeelcompensatie is 
applicable only enters the picture when the regulatory state action is lawful in 
accordance with the evenredigheidsbeginsel.319 Despite the arguments regarding the 
existence of other legal grounds besides the égalité principle, De Jongh states that 
there is general consensus amongst scholars that the égalité principle forms the 
independent legal ground for a right to nadeelcompensatie and that the other 
principles are only of subsidiary importance in the sense of having an influence on 
the question whether, in a specific case, an abnormal and a special burden exist.320  
The scope and application of the égalité principle is often problematic in Dutch 
law. In Dutch law, unlike French law, the égalité principle is generally viewed as the 
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main principle governing compensation for lawful state action.321 In addition to the 
égalité principle, French law also recognises a risk principle in terms of which 
compensation for lawful state action can be awarded.322 Tjepkema states that 
although Dutch law does not have a similar risk principle, there may be instances 
where loss results from hazardous state actions that might guide Dutch courts to 
award nadeelcompensatie in terms of the égalité principle.323 Tjepkema argues that 
the criteria applicable to limiting state liability in these instances are not derived from 
the égalité principle but from civil law, in particular the fault of the victim and the 
notion that insignificant (de minimis) damages should not be compensated.324 The 
irrelevance of the special and abnormal burden in limiting state liability for loss that 
results from hazardous state actions might lead to an incoherent no-fault state liability 
doctrine.325 According to De Jongh, the loss that results from hazardous state actions 
does not belong in the category of compensation for lawful state actions but under 
the category of compensation for unlawful state actions.326 Tjepkema argues that the 
égalité principle should only be applicable to instances where the loss is the result of 
a public burden, which he defines as “damage which is consciously caused to an 
individual by a public authority, and which is the necessary and inevitable 
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consequence of an action performed in the general interest”.327 The requirement that 
the action should be taken in the public interest is important, since the public interest 
justifies the payment of compensation.328 The public interest may, as a rule, not be 
used as the basis to refuse a right to compensation. However, an exception exists 
where the general interest is served by deliberately making a distinction between 
certain groups. In these instances the unequal burden will be in the general interest 
and would not give rise to a duty to pay compensation.329 Furthermore, the fact that 
the loss has to result from a conscious choice for a specific measure implies that a 
balancing of interests took place.330 Tjepkema argues that “conscious” should not be 
interpreted narrowly to only apply to situations where the loss was foreseen, but 
should be given a wide interpretation to apply to situations where the state accepted 
that the loss that results from the regulatory state action is a necessary and inevitable 
consequence (inherent to the specific means chosen) of serving a public purpose.331 
The requirements that the burden should be both special and abnormal before 
an affected party is entitled to claim compensation in terms of the égalité principle 
fulfil the function of limiting state liability. However, it is not always easy to determine 
when these two requirements have been complied with.332 The special burden 
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requirement plays a more limited role than the abnormal burden requirement.333 
Tjepkema argues that this is so because courts seldom test the relevant lawful 
regulatory state action against reference groups to determine whether the burden 
qualifies as special.334 Moreover, Tjepkema states that the special burden 
requirement should not amount to a comparison between the affected property 
holder and others and argues that the comparison takes place at a more abstract 
level.335 Therefore, the burden is special when only one individual is affected by a 
legal act.336 However, Tjepkema emphasises that the determining factor will in almost 
all cases be whether the burden is abnormal.337 Abnormality is the umbrella term 
which covers various criteria that are useful to determine whether there is a duty to 
pay compensation.338 The relevant criteria included under the term “abnormal” 
include the existence of loss that falls outside the normal societal risks that owners 
are required to bear without the payment of compensation (normaal maatschappelijk 
risico), loss that falls outside normal business risks (normaal ondernemersrisico) and 
loss that cannot be attributed to the acceptance of risk (risico-aanvaarding).339 A 
combination of these criteria will usually determine whether liability exists but 
according to Tjepkema, the normal societal risk criterion is the most important since it 
                                                   
333
 EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 475. 
MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar nationaal, 
Frans en Europees recht (2010) 972 states that the special burden requierement plays an important 
role but in practice it is often not explicitly tested against.  
334
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 381, 972. 
335
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 972. 
336
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 972. 
337
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 972. See also EL de Jongh De rechtsgronden voor 
nadeelcompensatie in rechtshistorisch perspectief (2012) 458. 
338
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 973. 
339
 MKG Tjepkema Nadeelcompensatie op basis van het égalitébeginsel: Een onderzoek naar 
nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (2010) 973. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
195 
 
covers many different aspects, including the nature of the measure that effected the 
burden and the nature, extent, intensity and the foreseeability of the burden.340 Once 
it has been established that the regulatory interference with property constitutes an 
abnormal burden, one of the elements of the égalité principle has been satisfied. If 
the second requirement of the égalité principle, namely that it is a special burden, is 
also complied with an obligation to pay nadeelcompensatie arises.341 De Jongh 
states that these two requirements are interrelated - the existence of a special 
burden plays a role in the determination of whether the burden is abnormal, and the 
existence of an abnormal burden plays a role in the determination of whether the 
burden is special.342 
Since the explicit recognition of the égalité principle, its scope and application 
has increasingly become clearer. De Jongh argues that codification of this principle 
will lead to even more clarity of the principle’s scope and application and lead to 
greater legal uniformity.343 New legislation, the Wet nadeelcompensatie en 
schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige besluiten of 31 January 2013, provides a clearer 
division of jurisdiction for claims based on lawful or unlawful state actions.344 This Act 
includes a separate section, which has not yet entered into force, that introduces a 
general compensation rule which transforms the égalité principle into a general 
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ground for the liability of public authorities for loss that arises from lawful state 
actions.345 According to Engelhard et al, the idea is to incorporate this into the 
General Administrative Law Act (GALA).346 
 
3 4 Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Belgian law 
The traditional point of departure in Belgian law is that infringements of property 
imposed in the public interest are not compensated unless the aggrieved citizen 
could prove that the state acted unlawfully or if compensation is expressly provided 
for in the applicable statute or by-law.347 However, in the past this often resulted in 
unfairness. Verrijdt highlights three judicial developments that detract from the 
requirement of fault or the express legislative provision of compensation, namely the 
recognition of de facto expropriation (referred to as constructive expropriation in 
South African law or regulatory takings in US law) by the Belgian Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR);348 the adoption of a stricter 
proportionality test compared to the proportionality test in article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (article 1 of the First 
Protocol) by the Belgian Hof van Cassatie (Supreme Court); and recognition by both 
the Hof van Cassatie and the Constitutional Court of the equality before public 
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burdens principle (égalité principle) as a general legal principle.349 These three 
developments make it possible for an aggrieved claimant to claim compensation for 
excessive regulatory measures, even in the absence of an unlawful state action or a 
statutory right to compensation. 
To understand the first judicial development, it is necessary to consider how 
limitations of property rights are categorised in Belgian law. Courts draw a distinction 
between expropriation on the one hand and regulatory measures that limit property 
rights on the other hand.350 Traditionally, article 16 of the Constitution does not apply 
to the limitations of property rights brought about by regulatory measures.351 
According to both the Hof van Cassatie and the Belgian Constitutional Court, article 
16 of the Belgische Grondwet of 17 February 1994 (Belgian Constitution)352 is only 
applicable where there is an expropriation in the sense of a transfer of title.353 
However, the Belgian Constitutional Court recognises the notion of de facto 
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expropriation of property.354 This development was influenced by jurisprudence of the 
ECHR dealing with article 1 of the First Protocol.355 Conversely, the Hof van Cassatie 
rejects the notion of constructive expropriation356 and holds on to the limited 
application of article 16 to instances of actual expropriation.357 
Lierman states that the influence of article 1 of the First Protocol goes further 
than the recognition of de facto expropriation of property.358 The Belgian 
Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that the guarantee in article 16 of the 
Constitution, which provides that property may only be expropriated in terms of law 
and the payment of fair compensation, is analogous to the protection in article 1 of 
the First Protocol.359 The main difference between article 16 of the Constitution and 
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article 1 of the First Protocol relates to the scope of application and the protection 
awarded by the respective provisions. Article 1 of the First Protocol has a wider field 
of application than article 16 of the Constitution. Article 16 of the Constitution only 
applies to formal expropriation, whereas article 1 of the First Protocol applies to 
expropriation as well as regulatory state action.360 Therefore, in terms of article 16 of 
the Constitution, compensation is only required when the state formally expropriated 
property. However, compensation may be required for expropriation as well as some 
excessive regulatory state actions in terms of article 1 of the First Protocol. Verrijdt 
argues that although “analogous” does not mean identical, reading these two 
sections together widens the scope of article 16’s application, allowing it to be 
interpreted in light of the jurisprudence of the ECHR.361 The implication of this 
analogy is that any infringement of property rights has to comply with the respective 
guarantees in article 16 of the Constitution as well as article 1 of the First Protocol.362 
This would imply that any limitation of property rights, not only expropriation, may be 
subject to the compensation requirement in article 16 of the Constitution.363  
The second judicial development relates to the various courts’ approach to the 
proportionality test. The Hof van Cassatie adopts a more stringent proportionality 
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analysis than the ECHR and the Constitutional Court.364 The ECHR and the 
Constitutional Court regard the possibility of compensation merely as one of the 
elements that should be considered in the proportionality analysis. Article 1 of the 
First Protocol does not guarantee an inherent right to compensation for the normal 
regulation of property but the existence, scope and mode of compensation play a role 
in the proportionality test.365 Therefore, the absence of compensation would not 
necessarily amount to an infringement of article 1 of the First Protocol. However, the 
Hof van Cassatie regards the presence of compensation as a fundamental 
requirement; the terms of the compensation are also incorporated into the 
proportionality test.366 Instead of recognising a third category, as the Constitutional 
Court and the ECHR do, namely de facto expropriation that requires compensation, 
the Hof van Cassatie employs a strict definition of expropriation. However, the Hof 
van Cassatie created a category of non-expropriatory regulatory interferences with 
an owner’s use and enjoyment of his property rights that cannot be upheld without 
compensation.367 The compensation in these excessive regulatory instances is non-
expropriatory and is founded on the égalité principle. 
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 The third judicial development is the recognition of the égalité principle as a 
general legal principle.368 General legal principles are defined as norms which are 
directly or indirectly inferred by judges as underlying the general legal order.369 
General legal principles are regarded as fundamental principles that allow judges to 
complete or supplement incomplete legislation. However, general legal principles 
cannot be applied in a manner that goes against the express wishes of the 
legislature.370 A distinction is therefore drawn between general legal principles with a 
legislative value and those with a constitutional value.371 General legal principles with 
a constitutional value are regarded as supplementary to the Constitution and are 
hierarchically above legislation.372 In the Immo Antwerpia decision,373 the Hof van 
Cassatie recognised expressly, for the first time, that the égalité principle can form 
the basis for state liability.374 Previously the equality before public burdens principle 
was incorporated into the law of nuisance (abnormale burehinder) and served as a 
standard against which nuisance was tested, especially nuisance relating to public 
works.375 However, the Hof van Cassatie held that the égalité principle is founded in 
article 16 of the Constitution and thereby uncoupled the equality before public 
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burdens principle from the law of nuisance.376 This approach by the Hof van Cassatie 
influenced the Belgian Constitutional Court that in the Mafar377 decision held that it 
could test legislation providing compensation, or the absence thereof, against the 
égalité principle.378 Therefore, in Mafar the Constitutional Court confirmed the 
constitutional value of the principle of equality before public burdens.379 The 
implication of recognising a legal principle with constitutional value is that, in 
principle, a right to compensation does exist and the legislature can, within certain 
limits, determine the mode of such compensation. However, if legislation does not 
provide for compensation for the unfair or disproportionate part of a loss caused by 
its implementation, the court may step in to correct the lacuna.380 General legal 
principles with legislative value, on the other hand, are only supplementary to the 
particular legislation and are hierarchically only above executive decisions of the 
administrative organs of state.381  
                                                   
376
 S Verbist “De gelijkheid voor de openbare lasten en artikel 16 van de Grondwet” in M Boes; J 
Ghysels; D Lindemans & R Palmans (eds) Vijftig jaar bescherming van het eigendomsrecht: Liber 
Amicorum Martin Denys (2012) 341-348 at 342. 
377
 GwH 19 April 2012 (Mafar). 
378
 S Lierman & P van de Weyer “Rechtspreken aan de hand van een pluraliteit van rechtsnormen: 
Meer of minderwaarde voor de rechtsbescherming bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad?” in F Deruyck; G 
Goethals; L Huybrechts; J Leclercq; J Rozie; M Rozie; P Traest & R Verstraeten (eds) Amicus curiae 
liber amicorum Marc de Swaef (2013) 267-279 at 275. 
379
 GwH 19 April 2012 (Mafar). S Lierman & P van de Weyer “Rechtspreken aan de hand van een 
pluraliteit van rechtsnormen: Meer of minderwaarde voor de rechtsbescherming bij rechtmatige 
overheidsdaad?” in F Deruyck; G Goethals; L Huybrechts; J Leclercq; J Rozie; M Rozie; P Traest & R 
Verstraeten (eds) Amicus curiae liber amicorum Marc de Swaef (2013) 267-279 at 277. 
380
 W Verrijdt “Naar een principieel recht op vergoeding: Artikel 1 van het Eerste Aanvullend Protocol 
bij het EVRM en het beginsel van de gelijkheid van de burgers voor de openbare lasten” in R 
Palmans; V Sagaert & W Verrijdt (eds) Eigendomsbeperkingen: De erfdienstbaarheid van openbaar 
nut (2012) 195-251 at 241. 
381
 J Geens & S Verbist “De gelijkheid voor de openbare lasten als grondslag voor 
overheidsaansprakelijkheid” 2011 Burger Bestuur & Beleid 120-129 at 124. See also S Lierman & P 
van de Weyer “Rechtspreken aan de hand van een pluraliteit van rechtsnormen: Meer of 
minderwaarde voor de rechtsbescherming bij rechtmatige overheidsdaad?” in F Deruyck; G Goethals; 
L Huybrechts; J Leclercq; J Rozie; M Rozie; P Traest & R Verstraeten (eds) Amicus curiae liber 
amicorum Marc de Swaef (2013) 267-279 at 274. Lierman and Van de Weyer argue that the 
recognition of the equality before public burdens principle as an autonomous legal principle by the Hof 
van Cassatie is difficult to reconcile with this Court’s previous jurisprudence that public burdens in the 
public interest does, in principle, not give rise to compensation. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
203 
 
The Hof van Cassatie and the Constitutional Court are at odds as to the 
foundation of the égalité principle. According to the Hof van Cassatie, the principle is 
founded in article 16 of the Constitution, whereas the Constitutional Court finds the 
principle’s foundation in articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution.382 Because the 
equality before public burdens principle is recognised as a principle with 
constitutional value, it is necessary to find the legal basis on which it is founded.383 
Viewing article 16 as the foundation for the égalité principle leads to the conclusion 
that a regulatory limitation of property that infringes the égalité principle also infringes 
article 16 of the Constitution.384 This is a significant departure from the Court’s 
traditional stance that article 16 is only applicable in the event of a formal 
expropriation and not where property rights have only been limited.385 On the other 
hand, viewing articles 10 and 11 as the foundation for the égalité principle is not 
reconcilable with the égalité principle because no right to compensation arises when 
article 10 or 11 of the Constitution has been infringed by lawful state action.386 
Verbist argues that it is more accurate to view the equality before public burdens 
principle as emanating from article 16 of the Constitution rather than as founded in 
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article 16.387 Another possibility is to view articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution read 
with article 1 of the First Protocol as the legal foundation for the égalité principle.388 
In conclusion, Belgian law does provide one solution to saving otherwise lawful 
and legitimate regulatory measures from being invalidated on the basis that they 
impose a disproportionate burden on one or a small group of property owners. 
Similar to French and Dutch law, Belgian law recognises that the payment of non-
expropriatory compensation in terms of the égalité principle can equalise the 
excessiveness of the regulatory burden and thereby even out the otherwise 
disproportionate burden. However, the Belgian Constitutional Court and the Hof van 
Cassatie have conflicting opinions on the foundation of and the application of the 
égalité principle. Furthermore, in addition to the égalité approach, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court also recognises the notion of constructive expropriation. 
 
4 Conclusion 
In chapter 1 it is stated that it may not always be appropriate to declare otherwise 
lawful and legitimate regulatory measures invalid because they impose a harsh and 
excessive burden on one or a small group of property owners. A comparative 
overview of foreign law indicates that there are alternative approaches to declare 
these excessive regulatory measures invalid. The foreign law approaches discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3 point out that the payment of compensation may provide an 
alternative to invalidation in the sense of softening the excessiveness of the burden 
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and thereby prevent the excessive non-expropriatory regulatory measure from being 
disproportionate and arbitrary. However, the foreign jurisdictions discussed in this 
thesis use different legal strategies upon which to found a claim for this form of 
compensation. In chapter 2 the possibility of constructive expropriation was 
considered. In terms of the constructive expropriation approach, the courts uphold 
the excessive regulatory interference with property rights by transforming the 
regulatory measure into expropriation and requiring the payment of compensation, 
even though no formal expropriation has occurred. It is argued that the notion of 
constructive expropriation is unique to the US, Irish and Swiss law context and 
cannot be easily transferred to South African law. Furthermore, the recognition of the 
notion of constructive expropriation seems unlikely, if not impossible, in South African 
law.389 
 In this chapter, a different approach is discussed with reference to German, 
Dutch and Belgian law. The notion of constructive expropriation was considered in 
German law. The civil and administrative courts developed and applied different 
strategies that resembled constructive expropriation. However, neither the civil courts 
nor the administrative courts had jurisdiction to consider whether excessive 
regulatory measures amounted to expropriation and thereby required compensation. 
In Naβauskiesung,390 the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the possibility of 
constructive expropriation on the basis of the constitutional requirements for a valid 
expropriation in article 14.3 of the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court draws 
a categorical distinction between deprivation and expropriation. Furthermore, the 
Federal Constitutional Court held that the correct procedure for an aggrieved 
claimant is to challenge the validity of the excessive regulatory measure against 
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article 14 of the Basic Law. If the excessive regulatory interference is in conflict with 
article 14 because it imposes a disproportionate burden on the claimant, the 
regulatory measure should be invalidated. The excessive regulatory measure cannot 
be upheld on the condition that compensation should be paid. Therefore, the courts 
are not able to transform excessive regulatory measures into expropriation and 
thereby require the state to pay compensation. 
 In Naβauskiesung the Federal Constitutional Court mentioned that there may be 
instances when it cannot be expected of the affected property owner to bear the 
excessive and harsh burden imposed by the excessive regulatory statute but the 
effects of the regulatory statute as such do not justify a finding of unconstitutionality. 
In these instances it may be appropriate to consider the payment of compensation to 
even out the disproportionality of the excessive burden. The possibility of 
equalisation measures was only mentioned in Naβauskiesung but in 
Denkmalschutz391 the Federal Constitutional Court set out the validity requirements 
for equalisation measures. In Denkmalschutz the Federal Constitutional Court held 
that although equalisation measures may be utilised to soften the harsh and 
excessiveness of the burden on the affected property owner and thereby prevent the 
excessive regulatory measure from being disproportionate, it is only appropriate in 
exceptional circumstances since the legislature should, as a rule, avoid imposing 
disproportionate burdens on property owners. Equalisation measures must be 
explicitly provided for in the particular regulatory statute, which must set out clearly 
and in detail when the equalisation measures will become applicable. Non-monetary 
equalisation measures such as transitional measures, exception and exemption 
measures take precedence over monetary equalisation. If the particular statute 
provides for monetary compensation, it should stipulate the criteria that would entitle 
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a claimant to compensation and how the amount of compensation should be 
calculated. A vague or blanket provision will not constitute a valid equalisation 
measure to prevent the regulatory burden from being disproportionate. The payment 
of compensation in this regard is of a non-expropriatory nature since no expropriation 
has occurred. The inclusion of a compensation provision in a regulatory statute is 
aimed at softening the harsh and excessive burden that may result in the application 
of the particular regulatory statute and thereby prevent the statute from being 
disproportionate and unconstitutional. The German equalisation approach therefore 
poses a viable alternative to the invalidation of excessive regulatory measures 
discussed in chapter 1. The statutory provision of compensation in legislation does 
not seem foreign to South African law and various South African statutes do contain 
non-expropriatory compensation provisions.392 
 Equalisation measures in German law are only applicable in exceptional 
circumstances. A similar, but less strict, approach to equalisation measures exists in 
French, Dutch and Belgian law. The legislature in French, Dutch and Belgian law 
often specifically provides non-expropriatory compensation in a particular regulatory 
statute that may impose a harsh and excessive regulatory burden on one or a small 
group of property owners. However, unlike German law, the French, Dutch and 
Belgian courts may award compensation to affected property owners even in the 
absence of such specific statutory authorisation. Moreover, the equalisation 
approach in French, Dutch and Belgian law is generally almost always monetary 
compensation, whereas monetary compensation is the relief of last resort in German 
law. The otherwise lawful regulatory statute would in German law be declared invalid 
if the effects of the regulatory statute effect a disproportionate burden and no 
equalisation compensation was specifically provided for. The judicial authority to 
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award compensation in the absence of specific statutory authorisation in French, 
Dutch and Belgian law is founded on the égalité principle.  
 The égalité principle developed in French law and was transferred to Dutch and 
Belgian law. An aggrieved property owner may be entitled to compensation under the 
égalité principle if the burden that results from the regulatory statute complies with 
both the spécialité and the anormalité requirements. A burden is special if the 
regulatory measure is only applicable to one individual owner or a small group of 
property owners in comparison to other similarly situated property owners. 
Furthermore, a burden is abnormal if the loss is significant and falls outside the loss 
that accompanies the normal social risks or normal business risks that owners are 
required to endure without the payment of compensation. The special burden 
requirement plays a more limited role in Dutch law than in French law. The special 
burden requirement is often not explicitly considered in a specific given case by the 
Dutch courts. Therefore, in Dutch law, the existence of an abnormal burden is the 
determining factor whether a duty to pay compensation in terms of the égalité 
principle exists. Belgian law follows the Dutch law approach with regard to the 
existence of the criteria necessary for the application of the égalité principle. 
 Although compensation in terms of the égalité principle may constitute one 
alternative remedy to the invalidation of excessive regulatory measures discussed in 
chapter 1, it may not be the best or a viable alternative. The égalité principle is not 
unproblematic or without shortcomings. In French law, the égalité principle forms only 
one of two bases for state liability for otherwise lawful regulatory state action. 
Therefore, the égalité principle has limited application in French law. In Dutch law, 
the foundation for a claim for non-expropriatory compensation (nadeelcompensatie) 
for loss that results from an excessive regulatory measure is controversial. It is 
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generally accepted in Dutch law that the égalité principle forms the independent and 
autonomous foundation for such compensation. In Belgian law, the Belgian Supreme 
Court and Belgian Constitutional Courts are at odds as to the foundation and 
application of the égalité principle. Furthermore, in addition to the égalité principle, 
the Belgian Constitutional Court also recognises the notion of constructive 
expropriation. However, this approach is strongly criticised by the Belgian Supreme 
Court and academic scholars.  
 In conclusion, the French, Dutch and Belgian law approach of awarding non-
expropriatory compensation in terms of the égalité principle fulfils the same function 
as equalisation measures approach in German law. The only difference is that 
compensation in terms of the égalité principle is not restricted to legislation that 
explicitly provides for compensation. If the burden imposed by the regulatory 
measure is both special and abnormal, the French, Dutch and Belgian courts may 
award compensation in terms of the égalité principle even though there is no 
statutory basis for any compensation. The legislature’s intention plays a limited role 
in the courts’ determination if compensation should be awarded for the excessive 
non-expropriatory regulatory measure. If the legislature wishes to exclude the 
possibility of compensation it has to do so explicitly.  
 The German equalisation solution is strict and cannot prevent excessive 
regulatory measures from invalidity if no compensation was explicitly provided for in 
the specific statute. In this case, the French, Dutch and Belgian égalité solution may 
come into play. In chapter 4 the possibility of awarding non-expropriatory 
compensation in the absence of statutory authority for excessive regulatory 
measures is considered. 
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1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters show that constructive expropriation and equalisation 
measures are two possible remedies that may save necessary and otherwise 
legitimate and lawful regulatory limitations of property that impose excessive burdens 
on an individual or a small group of property owners. Constructive expropriation is a 
strategy that is followed in some jurisdictions, particularly in US, Irish and Swiss law, 
which allows the courts to uphold excessive regulatory measures by requiring the 
state to pay compensation although the infringement of property did not constitute 
formal expropriation. In chapter 2 it is concluded that constructive expropriation is 
inappropriate, and perhaps even impossible, in South African law in light of the FNB 
methodology and the Constitutional Court’s recent dictum in Agri SA regarding the 
distinction between deprivation and expropriation.1  
However, the previous chapter indicates that there are alternative approaches 
to constructive expropriation that will also allow courts to recognise a right to 
compensation without having to transform the excessive regulatory measure into 
expropriation of property. In German law, the legislature often provides for 
equalisation measures, which need not always be monetary, in the legislation that 
authorises the regulatory measure resulting in excessive and disproportionate 
burdens being imposed on individual property owners and that would, in the absence 
of the equalisation measures, probably be declared invalid for excessive regulation. 
The analysis of German law in chapter 3 indicates that an otherwise lawful regulatory 
state action that imposes a disproportionate burden can be saved if equalisation 
measures aimed to prevent the burden from being disproportionate are specifically 
provided for in the statute. The nature and extent of the appropriate equalisation 
                                                   
1
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. 
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measures must be identified and the criteria when a claimant will be entitled to 
equalisation measures must be set out in the authorising legislation; it is not a judicial 
remedy. The Federal Constitutional Court regards vague, catch-all statutory 
equalisation provisions as insufficient; the regulatory statute will not be saved from 
invalidity by such a vague provision. 
Unlike German law, French, Dutch and Belgian law allows the courts to award 
compensation even in the absence of statutory equalisation provisions, on the basis 
of the égalité principle that originated in French law. The égalité principle is a 
manifestation of the equality principle and requires that burdens that result from 
regulatory state actions taken in the public interest should be distributed evenly 
amongst the public as a whole. The égalité principle is regarded as an unwritten 
principle of constitutional value. Therefore, compensation for excessive or unequally 
distributed regulatory burdens is not awarded on the basis of a constitutional property 
clause. Where a regulatory measure imposes an abnormal burden on an individual 
property holder or a small group of property holders the state must pay 
compensation, even when the relevant statute did not provide for compensation. The 
courts in the different jurisdictions apply different criteria to determine whether the 
burden resulting from the regulatory state action was special and abnormal, with the 
effect that it becomes disproportionate and gives rise to a duty to pay compensation.2  
An analysis of South African legislation reveals that the German law approach 
is not foreign to South African law. Several South African statutes do provide for 
equalisation-type measures, often monetary in nature, in the authorising statute. This 
chapter provides an overview of statutory examples that explicitly make provision for 
compensation. Furthermore, problematic regulatory measures that may be 
                                                   
2
 See the discussion on the égalité principle in chapter 3. 
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constitutionally suspect are identified and possible developments of these measures 
are discussed. The discussion in this chapter is not a complete overview of South 
African legislation that provides or should provide some form of non-expropriatory 
compensation. The legislation discussed here is selected on the basis of examples 
that were considered by the courts. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether the 
German law approach to defer to the legislature is a viable method to adopt and 
develop in the South African law context. If the German approach is followed, 
otherwise legitimate and lawful regulatory state actions will be declared invalid if the 
authorising statute does not provide compensation or if the compensation provided 
for is insufficient to properly ameliorate the burden and thereby prevent it from being 
disproportionate and arbitrary.  
In this regard, the next question is whether South African courts should be 
allowed to award compensation in instances where the authorising legislation does 
not provide compensation. Therefore, the question is whether something similar to 
the égalité principle in French, Dutch and Belgian law that allows courts to award 
non-expropriatory compensation even despite no legislative authority can be 
applicable in South African law. Moreover, it is considered how legislation that 
specifically excludes the possibility of compensation would affect the position if the 
French, Dutch and Belgian law approach is recognised in South African law. Lastly, 
the implication of the courts’ power to award constitutional damages is considered. In 
this regard, it is considered whether the possibility of constitutional damages negates 
the courts’ power to award compensation by means of statutory interpretation of the 
specific legislation itself in the absence of a compensation provision. Where 
compensation is granted in terms of legislation, it will not be compensation in terms 
of the Constitution (constitutional damages) but compensation that arises from 
statutory interpretation of the specific legislation itself. Furthermore, if it should prove 
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to be impossible to award compensation on the basis of statutory interpretation, the 
next question is whether an award of constitutional damages, in the absence of 
statutory authorisation to award compensation, will sufficiently ameliorate the harsh 
and excessive burden imposed by otherwise lawful and legitimate regulatory state 
action to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary and consequently invalid. 
 
2 Legislation that provides for non-expropriatory compensation 
2 1  Animal Diseases Act 35 of 19843 
The Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984 was enacted to, inter alia, promote animal 
health and control animal diseases. This is done by establishing control measures for 
any controlled purpose that is aimed at preventing the bringing into the Republic, or 
prevent or combat or control an outbreak or the spreading, or the eradication, of any 
animal disease.4 Although the Act is a necessary and important regulatory measure 
that falls within the core function of the police power, namely protecting and 
promoting public health and safety, the consequences that flow from the Act may in 
some circumstances be excessive and disproportionate. The control measures may 
be extensive and result in a significant loss for the affected property owner.5 For 
example, the Minister may prescribe control measures that restrict or control the 
slaughtering or hunting and the movement or removal of animals or things on, over, 
from or to land where a controlled animal disease or parasite occurs, or is suspected 
                                                   
3
 This Act has been repealed by the Animal Health Act 7 of 2002, which has not yet been brought into 
operation. Therefore, I will base my discussion on the Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984 as it is still in 
force. 
4
 Section 1 defines these protective provisions as “controlled purposes”. See also section 9 which 
authorises the Minister of Agriculture (Minister) to prescribe general or particular control measures for 
any controlled purpose that may apply in respect of the whole of the Republic or in respect of a 
particular defined area. 
5
 Section 9(2) sets out the scope of permissible control measures. 
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to be present.6 The loss for a land owner who operates a slaughter house or a 
commercial hunting enterprise may be significant, especially if the restriction on 
slaughtering or hunting is extensive and has to be endured for a long period of time. 
Furthermore, the director of the Directorate of Animal Health of the Department of 
Agriculture (director) may, in terms of section 17 of the Act, seize animals that are 
infectious or contaminated or on reasonable grounds suspected of being infectious or 
contaminated; and destroy or otherwise dispose of or order the owner concerned to 
destroy or dispose of such animals.7 Moreover, the carcass of any animal so seized, 
or slaughtered or destroyed or otherwise disposed of in terms of the Act shall be 
forfeited to the state.8 The application of section 17 may single out an individual 
property owner to carry a burden in the interest of and for the benefit of the public as 
a whole, namely the slaughtering of a private owner’s animals (infected or suspected 
to be infected) to prevent the spreading of diseases. Furthermore, the loss that may 
result from the seizure, slaughtering, destruction or disposal of the owner’s animals 
may be excessive and it may be unfair to the particular owner to forfeit the carcass of 
such animal to the state without compensation. Therefore, the regulatory burden that 
results from section 17 may constitute an excessive loss that might amount to 
arbitrary deprivation of property under section 25(1) of the Constitution. As a result, 
the legislature made provision for compensation in certain circumstances, aimed to 
reduce the burden on the affected property owner.  
 Section 19 of the Act provides that an owner of any animal which has been 
destroyed or otherwise disposed of pursuant to any control measure, or any provision 
in terms of section 17(3) or (5), or any other provision in the Act, may submit an 
                                                   
6
 Section 9(2)(c). 
7
 Section 17(1) read with subsection (3). 
8
 Section 17(5). 
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application for compensation for loss of the animal.9 Furthermore, section 19(2) sets 
out factors that need to be considered by the director when determining the amount 
of compensation payable to the affected owner. Section 19(2) of the Act makes it 
clear that the amount of compensation must be a “fair amount”.10 The factors that 
need to be taken into account include the amount statutorily prescribed for purposes 
of the section. When compensation is prescribed, it must be “based on a fair market 
value of the animal”.11 However, in the absence of such statutorily prescribed 
amount, the National Executive Officer may determine the amount of compensation 
in accordance with any criterion he deems applicable. Other factors that must also be 
considered are the value of the animal or thing that has been returned to the owner; 
the amount that is due to the state by the owner pursuant to this Act in respect of the 
animal or thing; and the amount that may accrue to the owner in terms of any 
insurance. Furthermore, section 31 authorises the Minister to make regulations that 
prescribe any matter which is required or permitted to be prescribed in terms of the 
Act. Item 30 to the Regulations of the Act sets out how the amount of compensation 
should be determined.12  
 In Minister of Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd 
and Another13 (Bluelilliesbush) the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider the 
basis upon which the amount of compensation for animals slaughtered under the Act 
was calculated. The case concerned an outbreak of bovine tuberculosis that 
occurred in the Eastern Cape. Due to the extremely contagious nature of the 
                                                   
9
 Section 19(1). 
10
 See also the interpretation of section 19(2) of the Act by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of 
Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (5) SA 522 (SCA) 
para 8. 
11
 See also Minister of Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd and Another 
2008 (5) SA 522 (SCA) para 8. 
12
 GNR 2026, GG 10469, 30 September 1986. 
13
 2008 (5) SA 522 (SCA).  
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disease, the Act mandates the slaughtering of animals that are suspected of carrying 
the disease. The respondents are part of a group of companies that run the largest 
dairy farming operations in the province, and the company involved was one of the 
largest in the country. Eight of the companies’ farms were affected by the outbreak 
and more than 7 000 animals had to be slaughtered. The issue in this case was the 
interpretation of Item 30 of the Regulations, which provided that:  
“When compensation is payable to a responsible person in terms of section 19 of 
the Act, the applicable compensation shall – (a) in the case of an infected animal, 
be 80 per cent of the fair market value thereof; (b) in the case of an animal killed 
for any controlled veterinary act or for the prevention of the spreading of a 
controlled animal disease, be 100 per cent of the fair market value thereof; …” 
The question before the Court was whether the value in Item 30(a) should be 
calculated in terms of the infected or the uninfected condition of the animal. The 
value of an animal in its uninfected condition was considerably higher than that of 
one in an infected condition.14 The Court held that the Regulation’s compensatory 
scheme retained coherence only if the value to which it referred was that of an 
uninfected animal.15  
 Regulation 30 has subsequently been amended and now only provides “[w]hen 
compensation is payable to a responsible person in terms of section 19 of the Act, 
the applicable compensation shall be determined by the director”.16 The amendment 
substituted the detailed procedural basis upon which the amount of compensation 
should be calculated with a general discretion exercised by the director to determine 
                                                   
14
 In Minister of Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (5) 
SA 522 (SCA) paras 10-11 the Supreme Court of Appeal considered that the value of an infected 
animal was that of a slaughter animal (being the value of the usable parts of the slaughtered carcass), 
whereas the value of an uninfected animal was the fair market value of a productive dairy animal, 
which was about five times more than that of a slaughter animal. 
15
 Minister of Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (5) 
SA 522 (SCA) paras 14, 18-19. See also the discussion of this decision in AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 281. 
16
 GNR 558, GG 33234, 22 May 2009. 
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the amount of compensation. In light of the discussion of equalisation measures in 
German law in chapter 3, it seems unlikely that the substitution of the detailed criteria 
upon which compensation were to be determined in Regulation 30 with a broad and 
general discretion would satisfy the requirements for a valid equalisation measure. 
One of the requirements in German law for a valid equalisation measure is that, 
especially where the equalisation is monetary in nature, the legislature has to 
stipulate in detail the circumstances when a claimant is entitled to compensation and 
the grounds upon which the amount of compensation should be calculated.17 The 
German Federal Constitutional Court regards an equalisation measure that does not 
fulfil the requirements for a valid equalisation measure as inappropriate and as failing 
in its purpose to equalise the disproportionate burden, with the effect that the 
regulatory state action is unconstitutional and should consequently be declared 
invalid.18 However, although the South African courts have not yet considered the 
validity of the amended Regulation, if the validity of this provision as it now stands 
were to be challenged in a court, the outcome will not necessarily be the same as in 
German law. Notwithstanding the fact that the Act provides for compensation in 
certain specified circumstances (those instances specified by section 19), the amount 
of which is subject to the discretion of the director, if the amount of compensation is 
too low to adequately ameliorate the excessive and disproportionate burden imposed 
on the affected property holder, it can still be challenged for authorising an arbitrary 
deprivation of property under section 25(1) of the Constitution. Moreover, section 23 
of the Act read with item 33 of the Regulations provide a procedural remedy, namely 
administrative review, which has to be exhausted before a claimant can challenge 
the constitutionality of the Act under section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
                                                   
17
 BVerfGE 100, 226 (1999) (Denkmalschutz) para 102. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 276. 
18
 See the discussion on equalisation measures in German law in chapter 3. 
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 The Act sets out a procedure to review the director’s determination of the 
amount of compensation. Section 23 provides a review procedure for persons who 
feel aggrieved by any decision taken by the director in terms of the Act. Furthermore, 
the determination of the amount of compensation constitutes administrative action, 
which is subject to review under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA).19 If a claimant, after he has exhausted all the internal remedies under 
the Act, still feels aggrieved by the director’s decision he can approach the courts for 
appropriate relief in terms of PAJA. 
 The compensation scheme provided for in section 19 is not compensation for 
expropriation since the state does not acquire any rights to the property affected by 
the Act.20 Although the carcass of the animal destroyed or otherwise disposed of in 
terms of the Act is forfeited to the state, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly 
treated forfeiture as a regulatory deprivation and not expropriation of property.21 
Therefore, the statutory compensation provision in the Act is not compensation for 
expropriation. Instead, the compensation is aimed at softening the harsh and 
excessive effects that may result from a regulatory deprivation of property in terms of 
the state’s police power. In this case, the regulatory burden imposed by the Act may, 
in certain circumstances, be disproportionate in the sense that the impact is 
excessive – it may result in total loss of property since the Act authorises the 
slaughtering or disposal of animals that are infectious or contaminated or suspected 
to be infectious or contaminated. Furthermore, the burden may also be 
disproportionate in the sense that it singles out individual property owners, such as 
                                                   
19
 Minister of Agriculture and Another v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (5) 
SA 522 (SCA) para 7. 
20
 In Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59, the 
Constitutional Court held that there can be no expropriation where deprivation does not result in 
property being acquired by the state. See the discussion of this decision in chapter 2. 
21
 See the discussion on forfeiture below. 
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farmers, who have to bear this harsh burden that results from the Act in the interest 
of and for the benefit of the public as a whole. It would be unfair to expect the 
affected owners to endure the disproportionate regulatory burden without 
compensation. Therefore, the compensation provided for in the legislation is aimed at 
reducing the burden imposed on the affected property owners and thereby 
preventing the statute or action from being declared arbitrary and thus invalid in 
terms of section 25(1).22 
 
2 2 National Water Act 36 of 1998 
The purpose of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 is to “ensure that the nation’s 
water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and 
controlled”.23 Furthermore, the promulgation of the Act forms part of the state’s 
compliance with its constitutional obligations to reform and bring about equitable 
access to all South Africa’s natural resources.24 The Act abolished the traditional 
system of water rights, previously regulated by common law together with the Water 
Act 54 of 1956, and replaced it with a new regulatory framework.25 Therefore, it is no 
longer possible to have private ownership of water.26 In terms of the Act, one can 
                                                   
22
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 282. 
23
 Section 2. 
24
 See section 25(4) and 25(8) of the Constitution. Section 27 of the Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to have access to sufficient water and furthermore mandates that the state take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right. See also the discussion of the Act in relation to transformative regime changes 
in AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 394-450. 
25
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 398-399. Prior to the commencement of 
the Act it was possible to acquire and hold private property rights in water. However, the new Act 
abolished private ownership of water. 
26
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 401 states that the Act abolished the 
traditional distinction between public and private water and, together with it, the notion of private 
ownership in water. The Act establishes a uniform system of regulated use rights with regard to all 
water, which is regarded and treated as public water. 
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only have use rights, which are acquired, allocated and enjoyed and subject to the 
regulatory control of the state.27 Although there are policy arguments that justify this 
comprehensive regime change in respect to the regulation of water use,28 the 
manner in which the change is implemented may offend against section 25 of the 
Constitution. In terms of the FNB methodology or logic, unless there is a formal 
expropriation present, the effects of the legislation on individuals should be assessed 
in terms of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1).29 In terms of the Agri 
SA decision, state acquisition is a pre-requisite for expropriation to be present.30 The 
Act does not transfer rights in water from previous holders to the state or others and 
its implementation can therefore not be regarded as expropriation of previously 
existing water rights.31 Extrapolating from the Agri SA decision, the effect of the Act 
on previously held water rights is that of a deprivation of property. The impact of the 
new regulatory regime on individual property owners may arguably constitute 
arbitrary deprivation of property under section 25(1) since it abolished private 
ownership in water and replaced it with use rights that may be weaker and less 
valuable than those held in the previous dispensation.32 It is therefore necessary to 
analyse the relevant provisions of the Act to establish whether it strikes an 
appropriate balance between the public interest served by the Act and the private 
interests of holders whose pre-existing water rights have been terminated or 
detrimentally affected by the commencement of the Act. 
                                                   
27
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 401. 
28
 According to AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 413, policy arguments that 
support the idea of a comprehensive regime change in respect of water resources include that water is 
a vital and scare resource; there is a constitutionally recognised need for equal access to natural 
resources that were withheld or unequally distributed in the apartheid era; and the fact that 
conservation and equitable and sustainable use of this scarce resource is only possible in a system of 
comprehensive and strict state regulation. 
29
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 421. 
30
 Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. 
31
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 422. See also H Thompson Water Law: A 
practical approach to resource management and the provision of services (2006) 390. 
32
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 411. 
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 The National Government, acting through the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (Minister), is the public trustee of the nation’s water resources.33 The 
Minister has the power to regulate the use, flow and control of all water in the 
Republic.34 Furthermore, the Minister must ensure that water is allocated equitably 
and used beneficially in the public interest.35 Section 4 regulates entitlements to use 
water and states that a person may “use water in or from a water resource for 
purposes such as reasonable domestic use, domestic gardening, animal watering, 
fire fighting and recreational use, as set out in Schedule 1”;36 “continue with an 
existing lawful water use in accordance with section 34”;37 and “use water in terms of 
a general authorisation or licence under this Act”.38 More importantly, section 4(4) 
states that “[a]ny entitlement granted to a person by or under this act replaces any 
right to water which that person might otherwise have been able to enjoy or enforce 
under any other law”.  
 Chapter 4 of the Act sets out general principles for regulating water use. Water 
use is broadly defined in section 21.39 In terms of section 22 a person may only use 
water (a) without a licence if the water use is permissible under Schedule 1 if that 
water use is permissible as a continuation of an existing lawful use; or if that water is 
permissible in terms of a general authorisation issued under section 39; (b) if the 
water use is authorised by a licence under this Act; or (c) if the responsible authority 
                                                   
33
 Section 3(1). 
34
 Section 3(3). 
35
 Section 3(2). 
36
 Section 4(1). Section 1 defines water resource as “a watercourse, surface water, estuary, or 
aquifer”. 
37
 Section 4(2). 
38
 Section 4(3). 
39
 In terms of section 21, water use includes “taking and storing water, activities which reduce stream 
flow, waste discharges and disposals, controlled activities (activities which impact detrimentally on a 
water resource), altering a watercourse, removing water found underground for certain purposes, and 
recreation”. 
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has dispensed with a licence requirement. Furthermore, authorised water use under 
section 22(1) is subject to the conditions and restrictions set out in section 22(2). 
Sections 32-35 regulate the continuation under certain conditions of an existing water 
use under the previous dispensation.40 Although the Act recognises an existing lawful 
water use, it may only continue to the extent that it is not limited, prohibited or 
terminated by the Act.41 Furthermore, no licence is required to continue with an 
existing lawful water use until a responsible authority requires a person claiming such 
an entitlement to apply for a licence, in which case, if granted, such licence becomes 
the source of authority for the water use. However, if a licence is not granted the use 
is no longer permissible. 
 Sections 40-42 regulate the application procedure for licences to use water in 
terms of the Act.42 Section 43 sets out the procedure to apply for a compulsory 
licence.43 Furthermore, section 48 states that any licence issued pursuant to an 
application contemplated in section 43(1) replaces any existing lawful water use 
entitlement of that person in respect of the water in question. Sections 49-52 set out 
the procedures for review, amendment and renewal of licences and the substitution 
of their conditions. Section 49(4) provides that if an amendment of a licence condition 
                                                   
40
 Section 32 defines an existing lawful water use as “a water use which has taken place at any time 
during a period of two years immediately before the date of commencement of this Act … or … which 
has been declared an existing lawful water use under section 33”. Section 33 sets out the instances 
when a responsible authority may declare a water use to be an existing lawful water use. 
41
 Section 34 provides that a person, or that person’s successor-in-title, may continue with an existing 
lawful water use, subject to any existing conditions or obligations attached to that use; its replacement 
by a licence in terms of the Act; or any other limitation or prohibition by or under this Act. 
42
 Water users who are not required to licence their use, but who wish to convert the use to licensed 
use may apply for a licence under section 40. However, section 40(4) provides that a responsible 
authority may decline to grant a licence when the applicant is entitled to the use of water under an 
existing lawful water use or by a general authorisation. 
43
 In terms of section 43(1) the responsible authority may issue a notice requiring persons to apply for 
licences for one or more types of water uses contemplated in section 21. The procedure in section 43 
is intended to be used in situations where areas are, or are soon to be, under “water stress”, or where 
it is necessary to review prevailing water use to achieve equity of access to water. Examples of “water 
stress” are when the demands for water are approaching or exceed the available supply; when water 
quality problems are imminent or already exist; or when the water resource quality is under threat. 
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on review severely prejudices the economic viability of any undertaking in respect of 
which the licence was issued, the claimant may lodge a claim for compensation 
under section 22(6).44  
 Section 22(6) states that  
“[a]ny person who has applied for a licence in terms of section 43 in respect of an 
existing lawful water use as contemplated by section 32, and whose application 
has been refused or who has been granted a licence for a lesser use that the 
existing lawful water use, resulting in severe prejudice to the economic viability 
for an undertaking in respect of which the water was beneficially used, may, 
subject to subsections (7) and (8), claim compensation for any financial loss 
suffered in consequence”.45 
Section 22(7) requires that the amount of compensation should be determined in 
accordance with section 25(3) of the Constitution, which prescribes how 
compensation for expropriation should be determined. According to section 22(10) of 
the Act, the responsible authority may enter into negotiations with the claimant and 
offer an allocation of water instead of compensation within 30 days after the decision 
of the Water Tribunal.46 
                                                   
44
 The circumstances under which the relevant authority may amend existing licences in terms of 
section 49(2) are the following: (a) If it is necessary or desirable to prevent deterioration or further 
deterioration of the quality of the water resource; (b) if there is insufficient water in the water resource 
to accommodate all authorised water uses after allowing for the Reserve and international obligations; 
or (c) if it is necessary or desirable to accommodate demands brought about by changes in socio-
economic circumstances, and it is in the public interest to meet those demands. However, section 
49(3) limits the responsible authority’s power in terms of section 49(2) by stating that such amendment 
may only be amended “if the conditions of other licences for similar water use from the same resource 
in the same vicinity” have also been amended in an equitable manner through a general review 
process. Section 49(5) requires that the responsible authority must afford the licensee an opportunity 
to be heard before amending any licence condition on review. It is interesting that the compensation 
measure provided for in section 22(6) is also applicable in section 49 amendments. A burden imposed 
by a regulatory scheme is generally disproportionate when it singles out an individual property holder 
to carry a burden which should generally be borne by the public as a whole. However, section 49(3) 
precludes this possibility by stating that an amendment must be applied in an equitable manner. 
Secondly, section 49 only applies in limited situations and only when there is a strong public interest in 
amending licence conditions. 
45
 The procedure for claiming compensation and the determination of the amount of compensation 
payable are set out in section 22(7)-(10). See also the appeal to a High Court procedure set out in 
article 149.  
46
 Section 146 establishes the Water Tribunal, which is an independent body that has jurisdiction to 
hear appeals against certain decisions made by a responsible authority or other authorised organs 
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 The Act thus provides for compensation in certain instances in which the burden 
that results from the commencement of the Act may possibly be disproportionate. 
Although the Act applies to all holders of pre-existing rights, the burden that results 
from application of the Act may be more extensive for some individuals than for 
others, thereby rendering the burden disproportionate and excessive. The 
compensation provided for is not compensation for expropriation since the Act does 
not and is not intended to expropriate property.47 The compensation provision in 
section 22(6) is focused on the financial loss an individual may suffer in terms of an 
unsuccessful application for a licence or amendment of a licence condition on review 
and not the loss of rights under the new regime.48 This type of compensation is 
aimed at softening the excessive and inevitable loss that may result from the 
otherwise legitimate, necessary and lawful regulatory interference with property rights 
in terms of the Act. The compensation is therefore aimed at saving the legislative 
scheme from invalidity by ameliorating the burden that results from the Act, which 
might in the absence of compensation be found to constitute arbitrary deprivation of 
property in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
 Such a change of the regulatory regime whereby a specific category of property 
is removed from the sphere of private ownership has also been upheld in foreign law. 
In the Naβauskiesung decision the German Federal Constitutional Court held that the 
newly introduced regulatory water regime change did not abolish the core of property 
rights (the institution of property in terms of the institutional guarantee in article 14.1.1 
of the Basic Law);49 the right to use and dispose of property was not lost because it 
                                                                                                                                                               
under the Act. Section 22(9) explicitly authorises the Water Tribunal to determine liability for 
compensation and the amount of compensation payable in terms of this section. 
47
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 431. 
48
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 430. 
49
 See chapter 3 for a discussion on the institutional and the individual property guarantee in article 14 
of the Basic Law. 
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was made subject to state approval.50 The Federal Constitutional Court held that the 
institutional guarantee was not infringed when the state interfered with private 
property for the purpose of protecting and promoting the public interest.51 
Furthermore, the Court held that the constitutional guarantee of property does not 
guarantee the most beneficial and economically viable use of property or that the 
existing use of the property has to endure in perpetuity without any interference from 
the state.52 However, although a regulatory interference may be in accordance to the 
institutional property guarantee, the impact that may result from the application of the 
Act may still be in conflict with the individual property guarantee, which protects 
individuals from disproportionate burdens. In Naβauskiesung the Court stated that a 
sudden regulatory regime change with regard to private ownership and existing 
entitlements to groundwater under the previous regime would have infringed upon 
the individual property guarantee in the Basic Law.53 Therefore, the Court viewed the 
transitional arrangements provided for in the new Act necessary and important to 
equalise the burden, which would otherwise have been disproportionate. Transitional 
arrangements constitute one form of equalisation measures. Subsequently, in the 
Denkmalschutz decision the Federal Constitutional Court considered the various 
forms of equalisation measures and held that monetary compensation should only be 
used as a last resort.54 In the context of South African law, invalidation of the new 
Water Act would create a lacuna in the area of water conservation and management, 
which is necessary and important for the promotion and protection of the public 
interest in light of the scarcity of water as a natural resource. Therefore, the non-
                                                   
50
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung) 345. 
51
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung) 339. See also DP Kommers The constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 259. 
52
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung) 345, 350-351. See also DP Kommers The constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2
nd
 ed 1997) 261. 
53
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981) (Naβauskiesung) 349. 
54
 BVerfGE 100, 226 (1999) (Denkmalschutz) para 96 
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expropriatory compensation provision in the Act fulfils an extremely important 
function. 
 
2 3 Road planning, town-planning and land use planning ordinances 
The purpose of road planning legislation is to regulate the powers of the state with 
reference to the proclamation, establishment and definition of public roads over land 
within the jurisdiction of local authorities. Section 67 of the Local Government 
Ordinance 17 of 1939 regulates the instances when the local authority may 
permanently close or divert any street or portion of a street.55 Any person adversely 
affected by the proposed closing or diversion may lodge an objection with the local 
authority for any loss or damages that will be sustained by him if the proposed 
closing or diversion is carried out.56 The local authority may choose to proceed with 
its proposed plan and pay compensation for the damage or loss sustained by such 
person; or may resolve not to proceed if the local authority finds that the payment of 
compensation will be too costly. 
                                                   
55
 This Ordinance is applicable in Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. Section 67 of the Ordinance 
provides 
“(a) Any person who considers that his interests will be adversely affected by the 
proposed closing or diversion may at any time before the time for the lodging of 
objections and claims has expired, lodge with the council a claim, in writing, for any loss 
or damage which will be sustained by him if the proposed closing or diversion is carried 
out. If such closing or diversion is carried out the council shall pay compensation for the 
damage or loss sustained by such person, the amount of compensation in default of 
mutual agreement to be determined by arbitration. In assessing the amount of 
compensation the benefit or advantage derived or to be derived by the claimant by 
reason of the closing or diversion shall be taken into account. …  
(b) If the council finds that the payment of compensation will be too costly, it may resolve 
not to proceed with the proposed closing or diversion.” 
A similar provision is found in section 30 of the Local Government Roads Ordinance 44 of 1904. 
56
 Section 67(4)(a). 
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 In City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another,57 the first 
respondent (Engen) claimed compensation in terms of section 67 from the appellant 
(the City) for damages that resulted from a diversion of a busy thoroughfare that 
impeded access by vehicles to the filling station owned by the respondent. The public 
road concerned in this case (Grayston Drive in Sandton, Johannesburg) was a major 
thoroughfare that leads to and from on- and off-ramps of the highway, which 
connects Pretoria and Johannesburg. From 1992-1994 the City effected substantial 
changes to Grayston Drive, particularly at its intersection with Katherine street, which 
was also a major thoroughfare. The effect of the construction was to elevate four 
lanes of Grayston Drive above Katherine street in order to create a flyover above the 
latter. The remaining lanes remained on the same plane as previously. The second 
respondent (Sandton Gate Service Station CC, hereafter Sandton Gate) owned a 
petrol filling station and a public garage where Grayston Drive intersected with 
Katherine street. Engen supplied petrol and other products to Sandton Gate. The 
respondents alleged that the diversion or closure of the lanes in Grayston Drive 
impeded access of vehicles to the filling station and thereby led to a decrease in the 
respondents’ respective incomes. As a result they claimed compensation in terms of 
section 67(3) and (4) of the Ordinance.  
 The issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether the elevation of 
four lanes, which created a flyover, amounted to a permanent diversion or closure of 
Grayston Drive for purposes of section 67 of the Ordinance.58 The respondents 
would only fall within the ambit of section 67, and thereby be entitled to claim 
compensation, if the answer to this question was affirmative. The court a quo held 
                                                   
57
 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA). 
58
 The appellant in City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) 
para 8 relied on the judgment in Bellevue Motors CC v Johannesburg City Council 1994 (4) SA 339 
(W), in which it was held that changing the direction of the flow of traffic did not constitute a diversion 
for purposes of section 67 of the Ordinance. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
 
that prior to the construction of the flyover, the three lanes of Grayston Drive were on 
a level plane but after the construction two of the lanes were located on a different 
plane and diverted away from the intersection of Katherine Street.59 Therefore, the 
court a quo concluded that there was a permanent diversion for purposes of section 
67 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the court a quo’s 
decision and stated that the question whether there was a diversion or not was 
dependent on the facts and not determined by the Surveyor-General or any other 
functionary.60  
 According to the Court, the purpose of section 67 was to compensate for the 
pecuniary loss sustained as a result of a change to the road that caused an adverse 
financial impact upon owners, lessees or occupiers whose property abuts the road.61 
The Court had to determine whether the change to Grayston Drive had such an 
adverse financial effect on the respondents, in which case they would be entitled to 
compensation in terms of the Ordinance. The Court considered that the elevation of 
the lanes on Grayston Drive had an adverse impact on the ability of drivers to gain 
access to the filling station, regardless of the direction in which they were travelling.62 
Furthermore, the elevation of the lanes to a different plane also altered access to and 
from adjoining properties.63 According to the Court this was exactly the kind of road 
change that affects adjacent landowners, lessees and occupiers whom the provisions 
of the Ordinance are designed to compensate in the event of loss.64 Therefore, the 
                                                   
59
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 9. 
60
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 14. 
61
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 15. 
62
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 16. 
63
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 16. 
64
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 17. 
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Court concluded that the construction of the flyover did constitute a permanent 
diversion and that the respondents were therefore entitled to compensation.65 
 This compensation provided for in the Ordinance is not compensation for 
expropriation or compensation in terms of the law of delict. The Ordinance did not 
expropriate the respondents’ property (land or any entitlements connected to 
ownership of property). Furthermore, delictual damages is only applicable if the loss 
is the direct result of an unlawful action.66 In this case the state did not act unlawfully. 
The Ordinance authorises the state to permanently close or divert roads when 
commencing construction work to the relevant public road. Therefore the financial 
loss suffered by the respondents in this case was the result of a lawful state action. 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution authorises the state to limit property rights in the 
public interest. Compensation is not a requirement for a valid deprivation of property. 
However, a law may not authorise arbitrary deprivation of property.67 Although road 
planning is in the public interest, it is unfair to enact legislation that has the effect of 
expecting an individual property owner to bear an excessive burden for the benefit of 
the public as a whole without compensation. In this case, the compensation provided 
for in section 67 of the Ordinance is aimed at reducing the burden on the 
respondents to prevent the burden from being disproportionate and therefore 
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 67 of 
the Ordinance does not guarantee full compensation for the loss suffered by the 
respondents. The section specifically provides that any benefit or advantage derived 
or to be derived by a claimant will be taken into account when assessing the amount 
                                                   
65
 City of Johannesburg v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 412 (SCA) para 18. 
66
 J Neethling; JM Potgieter & JC Knobel Neethling-Potgieter-Visser Law of delict (6
th
 ed 2010) 4 state 
that a delict “is the act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another”. 
Furthermore, all five elements of delict must be present before the conduct complained of may be 
classified as a delict. These five elements include an act, wrongfulness, fault, causation and harm.  
67
 See chapter 1 for a discussion on arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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of compensation payable. The compensation in this case fulfils the same function as 
financial equalisation payments in German law and statutory non-expropriation 
compensation in terms of the égalité principle in French, Dutch and Belgian law. 
 
3 Legislation that specifically excludes the possibility of 
compensation 
3 1 Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 
The Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 provides for compensation under some 
circumstances but specifically excludes the possibility of compensation in other 
specific instances. However, the classification of the kind of compensation provided 
for in the Act is problematic. It is not clear whether the compensation scheme 
provided for in the Act is intended to be a form of non-expropriatory equalisation 
compensation or whether it is intended to be compensation for expropriation. 
 The Firearms Control Act fulfils a public purpose that falls within the core of the 
police power, namely protecting and promoting public safety. The Act regulates the 
possession of firearms and prohibits the possession of a firearm without a licence or 
permit issued in terms of the Act.68 Furthermore, the Act aims to improve the control 
of legally possessed firearms. Sections 13-15 restrict the number of licences a 
person may hold in respect of certain types of firearms. 
 The current Act repealed and replaced the Arms and Ammunitions Act 75 of 
1969 (old Act). To accommodate those who held firearm licences under the old Act, a 
transitional scheme is included in the new Act. Schedule 1 of the new Act provides 
                                                   
68
 Section 3. 
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that a licence granted under the old Act is valid for five years from the date of the 
commencement of the new Act.69 During this five year period, a person holding a 
licence issued in terms of the old Act must apply for the corresponding licence or 
permit in terms of the new Act.70 If the application for the renewal of a licence is 
rejected or otherwise terminated, the former holder of the licence must, within 60 
days of receipt of notice, dispose of the firearm through a dealer or in such manner 
as the Registrar of Firearms (Registrar) may determine.71 If the firearm is not 
disposed of within this 60 day period, it is forfeited to the state and the former holder 
of the licence must surrender it immediately at such place and in such manner as the 
Registrar may determine.72 A person who fails to comply with the provisions of the 
Act is guilty of an offence.73 
 The commencement of the new Act created the situation that persons who 
lawfully possessed firearms under the old Act and who were unable to secure a 
licence in terms of the new Act, had to sell or donate the firearm to another qualified 
person; or deactivate the firearm; or destroy the firearm; or surrender the firearm to 
the state.74 The possibility of this regulatory burden having harsh effects in certain 
instances was foreseeable and therefore the legislature included a compensation 
scheme in the Act to reduce the possible burden on individual firearm owners. 
 Chapter 19 of the Act regulates the situations where compensation is payable. 
Section 137 provides for compensation to persons whose firearms have been 
                                                   
69
 Item 1(1) of Schedule 1. 
70
 Item 11(1)(a) of Schedule 1. 
71
 Section 28(4)(b). Section 1 read with section 123 states that the National Commissioner of the 
South African Police Service is the Registrar of firearms. 
72
 Section 28(5). 
73
 Section 120(1)(a). In terms of section 121 read with Schedule 4 to the new Act, the penalty for non-
compliance with section 28 is imprisonment for a maximum period of 10 years. 
74
 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
[2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012). 
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surrendered or forfeited to the state in circumstances other than those referred to in 
sections 134-136.75 For example, section 149(2) provides that firearms and 
ammunition forfeited to the state must be destroyed but in terms of section 149(3), 
the state may retain and become owner of any forfeited firearm or ammunition, which 
the Registrar deems to be of special value. The previous owner of the relevant 
firearm or ammunition may in this situation claim compensation in terms of the Act.76 
 The Minister must, in terms of section 137(5), establish guidelines for the 
payment of compensation. In terms of the guidelines enacted under the Act,77 an 
application for compensation will be considered by a panel of at least three 
independent valuators. The valuation determined by the panel is subject to the flat 
rate and maximum amount of compensation set out in the guidelines for the relevant 
category of firearm. Furthermore, the guidelines also set out the maximum amount of 
compensation payable for any firearm, irrespective of the evaluation by the panel. 
Section 137(7) states that an aggrieved person who is not satisfied with the amount 
of compensation may approach a court to determine the amount, the time and the 
manner of payment of the compensation. 
 It is not clear whether the compensation provided for by the Act is similar to the 
non-expropriatory compensation discussed above or whether the compensation is 
meant to be compensation for expropriation. On first glance the compensation seems 
to be compensation for expropriation, especially since the state acquires ownership 
of the forfeited firearm or ammunition in the instances when the Registrar deems 
such firearm or ammunition to be of special value. However, to view these situations 
as expropriation is problematic because the Act uses the term “forfeiture”.  
                                                   
75
 See a discussion of sections 134-136 below. 
76
 Section 149(3)(c). 
77
 See GN 1071, GG 32701, 10 November 2009 for the guidelines promulgated by the Minister in 
compliance with section 137(5). 
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 The exercise of the state power of forfeiture of property should be treated as 
deprivation of property that has to comply with the requirements in section 25(1) of 
the Constitution.78 Van der Walt points out that the effects of forfeiture may appear 
expropriatory in the sense that the state sometimes acquires the property and 
benefits from its acquisition financially.79 The Constitutional Court’s statement in the 
Agri SA decision that acquisition is a fixed requirement for expropriation may create 
further confusion and lead to the assumption that forfeiture amounts to 
expropriation.80 However, this assumption is problematic since one of the 
requirements for a valid expropriation is the payment of compensation and the public 
purpose sought to be achieved by forfeiture will be defeated if compensation were 
required for it. Van der Walt warns that state acquisition cannot be regarded as the 
single defining characteristic of expropriation, particularly for the confusion this may 
create in relation to forfeiture.81 Van der Walt argues that a more appropriate 
approach to distinguish between deprivation and expropriation is to determine the 
state’s intention with which the infringement was made.82 Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court has consistently treated forfeiture as deprivation and not 
expropriation of property.83 Van der Walt states that forfeiture is a regulatory action 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 311-312. 
79
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 320.  
80
 Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. See the 
discussion on the distinction between deprivation and expropriation in chapter 2. 
81
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 200; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 338; AJ van der Walt & H Botha “Coming to grips 
with the new constitutional order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO” (1998) 13 South African 
Public Law 17-41 at 21. See also H Mostert “The distinction between deprivations and expropriations 
and the future of the ‘doctrine’ of constructive expropriation in South Africa” (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 567-592 at 573, 577. Moreover, in Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 78, 102 Cameron J and Froneman J in separate minority judgments 
both disagreed with the majority judgment on the requirement of state acquisition as a pre-requisite for 
expropriation. 
82
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 200. 
83
 See Van der Burg and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 2012 (2) 
SACR 331 (CC) paras 25, 28; Mohunram and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Another (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC) paras 44, 56-102; Prophet v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 169 (CC) paras 58-69. 
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that involves deprivation of property, which is usually reasonably easy to justify in 
terms of the police power principle in so far as individual instances of forfeiture are 
aimed at and necessary for the protection of public health and safety.84 The reasons 
for the deprivation in terms of the new Firearms Control Act relate to the fact that 
possession of the property (firearm) is illegal or dangerous. Moreover, section 149(2) 
expressly states that a firearm that has been forfeited in terms of the Act remains the 
property of the owner thereof until its destruction; in that sense, the state does not 
acquire the property but regulates its destruction. Therefore, although the state 
apparently acquires possession of the firearm, it does not acquire title thereof. 
Forfeiture for purposes of this Act is clearly not expropriation of property. 
 The compensation scheme in sections 137 and 149 of the Act appears to 
authorise compensation for expropriation rather than the regulatory type of 
compensation referred to above. A firearm only becomes the property of the state 
once it elects to retain the firearms in terms of section 149(3). In all other instances, 
the firearm, although it is in the possession of the state, remains the property of the 
owner thereof until its destruction.85 Section 149(3) authorises the acquisition of title 
of the firearm by the state. However, as was argued above, acquisition should not be 
regarded as the sole determining factor to distinguish between deprivation and 
expropriation of property; one should also have regard to the intention with which the 
infringement was made. The state’s decision to retain or to destroy a firearm is 
qualified. Only firearms that are deemed to be of special value may be retained by 
the state. This qualification in section 149(3) indicates that the purpose of the 
infringement is no longer purely to promote and protect the public’s safety but rather 
to preserve a firearm, which may for instance be of historical significance or a 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
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 ed 2011) 312. 
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 Section 149(2). 
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technologically advanced object. Depending on the reason why special value is 
attached to a particular firearm, the retention rather than destruction thereof may be 
for a public purpose or in the public interest. The purpose of the infringement 
therefore seems to move away from a regulatory limitation imposed on the use and 
enjoyment of property in terms of the police power to that of eminent domain. If this is 
the case, it would be unfair not to compensate an owner who sacrifices his property 
for the benefit of the public as a whole. If this argument is correct, the exclusion of 
compensation for a firearm retained by the state in terms of section 149(3) that has 
been surrendered rather than forfeited would amount to expropriation without 
compensation, which may be in conflict with section 25(2). 
 Although the Firearms Control Act allows for compensation in some instances, it 
is not clear what type of compensation the Act envisages. The Firearms Control Act 
is one example of legislation that specifically excludes the possibility of compensation 
in specified circumstances. In terms of the Act, compensation is not due in situations 
where firearms or ammunition are forfeited to the state in terms of section 134. 
Firearms or ammunition can be forfeited to the state in terms of the Act for various 
reasons, including if the holder of the firearm had contravened or not complied with a 
provision of the Act or a condition specified in that licence; or if the holder of the 
licence was or became unfit to possess a firearm in terms of the Act.86 Other 
instances in terms of the Act where the duty to compensate does not arise are when 
firearms and ammunition are seized by the state;87 or where firearms and 
ammunition are destroyed by the state.88 Similar to the forfeiture example discussed 
above, the state’s power to search and seize illegally possessed, dangerous property 
should be treated as deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) and not as 
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 Section 134(a)-(b). 
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expropriation of property.89 Section 136 of the Act provides that the Registrar may 
issue a notice in the Gazette stating that any firearm or ammunition seized, 
surrendered or forfeited to the state shall be destroyed.90 Any person who has a valid 
claim to the relevant firearm or ammunition may make representations to the 
Registrar as to why the particular property should not be destroyed.91 If the Registrar, 
after considering the representations in terms of section 136(2), is not satisfied that a 
valid claim has been proven, the firearm or ammunition may be destroyed and no 
compensation will be payable.92  
 In Justice Alliance of South African and Another v National Minister of Safety 
and Security and Others93 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider whether 
persons who voluntarily surrendered their firearms in terms of section 136 were 
entitled to compensation if the firearms were destroyed by the state. The Court drew 
a distinction between compulsory surrender and voluntary surrender of firearms.94 In 
terms of the new Act, a former holder of a firearm would have to surrender his firearm 
to the state in the following situations: The cancellation of accreditation;95 the 
termination of a firearm licence;96 the cancellation of a dealer’s licence;97 the 
cancellation of a manufacturer’s licence;98 or when a person is declared unfit to 
                                                   
89
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 311-312. 
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 Section 136(1).  
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 Section 136(2). 
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 Section 136(3). 
93
 [2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012). This was an appeal from an unreported judgement of the 
Western Cape High Court cited as Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of 
Safety and Security and Others Case No 11206/2008.  
94
 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
[2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012) para 14. 
95
 Section 8(5). 
96
 Section 28(5). 
97
 Section 42(5). 
98
 Section 56(5). 
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possess a firearm.99 According to the Court, these situations constituted compulsory 
surrender of firearms. The Court held that section 136 of the Act clearly and 
expressly excluded the possibility of compensation for firearms destroyed by the 
state, irrespective whether it was compulsorily or voluntarily surrendered.100 
Moreover, section 149(3) recognises that when the state retains a firearm, which is 
deemed to be of special value, that firearm becomes the property of the state and the 
former owner should be compensated.101 Section 149(2) provides that firearms or 
ammunition forfeited to the state remains the property of the owner thereof until its 
destruction. The Court concluded that to read compensation into section 136 would 
unduly strain the language of the legislation and would be a deliberate disregard of 
the explicit provisions of the Act.102  
 The forfeiture, seizure or surrender of firearms and ammunition in instances 
other than those specified in sections 137 and 149 should be construed as 
deprivation of property. The Act applies to all holders of firearms equally, therefore in 
this regard cannot constitute a disproportionate burden because it affects everyone in 
the same way. However, in the alternative, the legislature’s explicit exclusion of 
compensation in these circumstances does not in itself bar a claimant from 
challenging the constitutionality of an infringement of his property. If the court finds 
that a provision in the Act authorises arbitrary deprivation of property, the court will 
most probably declare the relevant provision invalid. In Justice Alliance of South 
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 Section 104(2). 
100
 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
[2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012) paras 15-16. 
101
 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
[2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012) para 17. 
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African and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others103 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that it cannot award compensation since the 
legislature has explicitly excluded the possibility of compensation. An express 
statutory exclusion of compensation indicates to the court that the legislature had 
foreseen the possible deprivation that might result in the exercise of the Act and still 
deemed that compensation should not be applicable. Whether this will have any 
impact on the Court’s power to award constitutional damages in terms of sections 38 
and 172 of the Constitution is unclear.104 
 
4 Legislation that might require but does not provide for 
equalisation-type measures  
4 1 Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 
The Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 is aimed at regulating electronic 
communications in the Republic in the public interest.105 Chapter 4 of the Act is only 
applicable to electronic communications network service licensees (licensee) and 
relates to the establishment and maintenance of electronic communications networks 
and electronic communications facilities. Licensees are not limited to state organs but 
include private parties that mainly have profit as a motive.106 Section 21 mandates 
the Minister to provide guidelines, which must provide processes and procedures for, 
amongst others, resolving disputes that may arise between a licensee and any land 
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 [2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012). This was an appeal from an unreported judgement of the 
Western Cape High Court cited as Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of 
Safety and Security and Others Case No 11206/2008.  
104
 See the discussion of constitutional damages below. 
105
 Section 2 sets out various public purposes that the Act aims to achieve. 
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 SMI Trading CC v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (2) SA 642 (GSJ) para 
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owner. However, no such guidelines have yet been enacted. Furthermore, section 
22(1) allows a licensee to enter upon any land to construct, maintain or remove an 
electronic communications network or facilities and may for that purpose attach wires 
or any other support to any building or other structures. Furthermore, section 22(2) 
provides that any actions authorised in terms of section 22(1) are subject to 
compliance with applicable law and the environmental policy of the Republic. 
 In Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading107 (SMI Trading) the 
Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether section 22 of the Act was in conflict 
with section 25 of the Constitution. The court a quo ordered the appellant (MTN) to 
remove its base station from the private property of the respondent (SMI). MTN had 
concluded a lease agreement for a period of approximately ten years with the 
previous owner of the property in question. In terms of the agreement, MTN was 
entitled to construct and maintain a base station on the property and was obliged to 
pay the lessor a fixed monthly rental with provision for escalation. The lease 
agreement expressly stated that the base station was “movable”, implying that it 
would be removed on termination of the lease. When the lease agreement expired 
MTN took no steps to renew it. Two months after the lease agreement had expired 
SMI became the registered owner of the property. Subsequent to the transfer, MTN 
proposed a new lease agreement with SMI. However, the parties could not reach an 
agreement on the terms of the new lease, which led to SMI requesting the removal of 
the base station.  
 MTN argued that section 22 created a statutory servitude in favour of electronic 
communications network licensees that did not have to be registered and that lasted 
in perpetuity. The parties agreed that MTN’s actions in terms of its interpretation of 
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the Act did not amount to expropriation but constituted deprivation of property.108 
However, the regulation of property to protect the common good must not amount to 
arbitrary deprivation as meant by section 25(1) of the Constitution.109 SMI did not 
challenge the constitutionality of section 22 of the Act but argued that MTN’s reliance 
on section 22 was misconceived because the manner in which it invoked section 22 
amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of section 25 of the 
Constitution.110 
 The Court held that after the expiry of the lease MTN had unilaterally held over 
and remained in occupation of SMI’s property.111 The Court held that although 
section 22 is concerned with the exercise of public power, it does not authorise the 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the object of 
the Act cannot be achieved without depriving the respondent of its property in that 
way.112 In the end the Court concluded that section 22 does not confer upon a 
licensee the power to unilaterally occupy private property for purposes of the 
section.113  
 The Court emphasised another ground why the appeal could not succeed. The 
Court held that any decision by MTN in terms of section 22 of the Act is 
administrative action, which is reviewable under PAJA.114 Furthermore, any 
administrative action which adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectation of 
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any person must be procedurally fair.115 Therefore, the taking of the decision must be 
procedurally fair.116 However, the Court pointed out that MTN’s original entry upon 
the site, its construction and maintenance of the basis station took place pursuant to 
a commercial lease and did not amount to administrative action, since section 22 
only came into operation thereafter.117 Judicial review under PAJA is only possible if 
a “decision” constitutes administrative action in terms of section 1 of PAJA. 
Therefore, in the absence of a “decision” taken in a lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair manner, the Court concluded that MTN had no right to occupy SMI’s 
property.118 However, administrative action in terms of PAJA can sometimes also 
constitute procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property under section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance119 (FNB) the Constitutional Court distinguished between two forms of 
arbitrary deprivation of property, namely substantive and procedural arbitrariness. 
Van der Walt points out that the SMI Trading decision is a good illustration of a 
deprivation that might have been procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1).120 
Uncertainty exists with regard to the interplay between procedurally arbitrary 
deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) and procedurally unfair 
administrative action in terms of PAJA. Van der Walt argues that to give proper effect 
to PAJA, decisions based on section 25(1) should be reserved for deprivations that 
are either substantively arbitrary (irrespective whether they constitute administrative 
action) or that are procedurally arbitrary but not brought about by administrative 
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action.121 Therefore, procedurally arbitrary deprivations of property in terms of section 
25(1) that are also procedurally unfair administrative actions in terms of PAJA should 
be dealt with under PAJA and not under section 25(1). It is not clear from the 
decision whether the Court considered MTN’s actions as effecting a substantive or 
procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property.122 However, Van der Walt points out 
that this distinction could have been avoided altogether:123 The basis for the decision 
could simply have been that section 22 does not authorise the unilateral occupation 
of private property without an underlying legal right (such as a lease or servitude) for 
purposes of the Act because the section is capable of a construction that does not 
require such arbitrary powers for licensees.124 
 The Act furthermore provides in section 28 that the licensee may take such 
steps as he deems necessary to give relief to an owner of private land who can 
satisfactorily prove that he is obstructed in the free use of his land because of the 
insufficient height or depth of any electronic communications network or facility.125 
The section does not provide a review procedure for an aggrieved property owner, it 
merely states that the licensee, in taking any action in terms of this section, must 
have due regard for the environmental laws of the Republic. The decision taken by 
the licensee will probably constitute administrative action and can therefore be 
reviewed under PAJA. The outcome of such a review will most probably be either a 
finding that the licensee’s action was procedurally unfair and therefore invalid, in 
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which case a remedy in terms of PAJA will be awarded, or a finding that its actions 
were procedurally fair and therefore valid. 
 The Act does not intend to expropriate private property but merely regulates the 
use and enjoyment of property in the public interest. The burden that results from the 
exercise of powers granted under the Act may in some situations be unfair and 
disproportionate. The Act singles out individual property owners and requires of them 
to tolerate a licensee entering the owner’s private property to build and maintain 
electronic communications networks or facilities, which in effect deprives such an 
owner of the use and enjoyment of a sometimes sizable portion of his land for the 
benefit of the public as a whole. Furthermore, although the communications network 
or facilities hinder the landowner’s free use of his land, it may sometimes render a 
portion of the landowner’s land useless, for example if the height or depth of a 
particular communications network or facility is too close to the surface that the 
landowner cannot make economical use of the affected land and it would be 
unreasonable or too costly for the licensee to move the particular communications 
network or facility. Although the Act grants a broad discretion to the licensee 
regarding appropriate relief, the Act does not provide guidelines in the Act itself or its 
Regulations regarding what the relief should entail. If a property owner can 
successfully prove that he was arbitrarily deprived of his property in terms of the Act, 
the relevant provision will be declared invalid. Invalidity can in suitable cases be 
avoided by providing a compensation scheme in the Act, stipulating the 
circumstances in which compensation should be paid and how the amount of 
compensation should be calculated. This would soften the burden on property 
owners and prevent the regulatory limitation from constituting arbitrary deprivation of 
property. 
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4 2 National Heritage Act 25 of 1999 
The overarching objectives of the National Heritage Act 25 of 1999 include the 
identification, protection, preservation and management of heritage resources for 
purposes of public prosperity, spiritual well-being and cultural identity.126 The Act 
contains various provisions that seek to achieve these objectives. One such provision 
is section 34, which limits an owner’s right to demolish any structure or part of a 
structure which is older than 60 years without a permit. Strydom argues that although 
section 34 has not been challenged on constitutional grounds, it is likely that there 
may be circumstances where the preservation of a historic building may impose a 
disproportionate burden upon the landowner.127 According to Strydom, a similar 
situation may arise as in the German Monument Protection Act of the Rhineland-
Palatinate that was considered in the Denkmalschutz decision128 where the heritage 
authority refused to issue a demolition permit for a decaying historical building, 
thereby making it impossible for the owner to use what has become an expensive 
building to maintain.129 With regard to the German example, Strydom argues that the 
Heritage Resources Act could result in a similar situation, for example if the 
authorities should refuse to grand the landowner a demolition order for a historical 
building that has no economically viable use to the owner and is too costly to restore 
and maintain.130 Furthermore, this could result in a situation where the owner finds it 
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increasingly difficult to sell or lease the building in its dilapidated state.131 Strydom 
convincingly argues that equalisation measures should be provided for in the Act to 
prevent it from being declared invalid for arbitrarily depriving owners of their 
property.132 She argues that the equalisation measures need not be monetary but 
can include tax breaks or subsidies; providing legislative authorisation to charge 
members of the public entry fees; or creating exemptions from applicable zoning 
regulations.133 
 
4 3 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
19 of 1998 (PIE) 
One aim of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 is to regulate the eviction of unlawful occupiers. PIE is enacted to give 
effect to a direct constitutional obligation in section 26(3) of the Constitution.134 The 
preamble states that “no one may be deprived of their property except in terms of law 
of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
Furthermore, “no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
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circumstances”. It is evident in the preamble that PIE aims to balance the tension 
between the interests of property owners and the interests of unlawful occupiers.135 
 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers136 (PE Municipality) the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that the Constitution recognises that land rights, the 
right of access to adequate housing and the right not to be arbitrarily evicted are 
closely entwined. Furthermore, the Court held that the Constitution imposes new 
obligations on the courts regarding the tension between property rights (section 25) 
and housing rights (section 26).137 The Court stated that the judicial function in this 
respect is not to establish a hierarchy between these two conflicting fundamental 
rights but rather to “balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner 
as possible, taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors 
relevant in each particular case”.138 
 PIE provides some guidelines to courts in determining the approach to eviction 
required under the Constitution. Section 4 of PIE applies to the application by an 
owner or person in charge of land for the eviction of unlawful occupiers from private 
property. Section 4(2)-(5) contains the procedural requirements that must be met 
before a court may grant an eviction order. Section 4(6) concerns unlawful occupiers 
that have occupied the land in question for less than six months and section 4(7) 
concerns unlawful occupiers that have occupied the land in question for more than 
six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated. Both sections 4(6) and 
4(7) set out factors that the court needs to consider when granting an eviction order. 
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The main difference between the two subsections is that only section 4(7) requires 
the court to consider whether there is alternative land available or can reasonably be 
made available by a municipality or other organ of state for the relocation of the 
unlawful occupier(s). The factors set out in sections 4(6) and 4(7) of PIE give effect to 
section 26(3) of the Constitution, which emphasises the need to seek concrete and 
case-specific solutions to the difficult problems that may arise in eviction 
proceedings.139 In terms of section 4(8) the court must grant an eviction order if it is 
satisfied that all the requirements of section 4 has been met and that no valid 
defence has been raised by the unlawful occupier(s). When a court grants an eviction 
order under section 4(8) of PIE, it has to determine (a) a just and equitable date upon 
which the unlawful occupier(s) must vacate the land in question and (b) the date 
upon which the eviction order may be enforced if the unlawful occupier(s) failed to 
vacate the land on the date specified in (a). In terms of section 4(9), the court’s 
determination of a just and equitable date upon which the unlawful occupier(s) must 
vacate the land in question under section 4(8) must be determined with regard to all 
the relevant factors, including the period of unlawful occupation. 
 The availability of alternative land plays a crucial role in eviction proceedings, 
especially with regard to the date upon which an eviction order may be enforced. 
According to Van der Walt, a landowner is entitled to the enforcement of his eviction 
order but before such eviction order may be enforced provision has to be made for 
the future accommodation of the unlawful occupiers once they have been removed 
from the land in question.140 In this respect, PIE recognises and protects the property 
interests of the affected landowner but requires a certain measure of patience and 
empathy towards the unlawful occupiers who stand to become homeless once the 
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eviction order is carried out.141 Although PIE authorises deprivation of property in the 
sense of suspending the enforcement of the eviction order granted by the court, the 
deprivation may become arbitrary if the period of suspension endures for an 
unreasonable period of time rendering the portion of land unlawfully occupied 
useless for the duration of the unlawful occupation.  
 In President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae)142 (Modderklip) the large number of 
unlawful occupiers and the state’s refusal to assist made it impossible for the affected 
landowner to enforce his eviction order.143 The portion of land unlawfully occupied in 
this case was once part of a fully operational farm but the landowner has since the 
unlawful occupation had no use of the affected land. Both the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court agreed that it is unreasonable and it cannot be 
expected of a private property owner to provide accommodation for the occupiers. 
Therefore, the state was ordered to pay compensation to the affected landowner. 
The compensation was not compensation for expropriation since there was no 
expropriation of the property in question. Rather, the compensation was a kind of 
non-expropriatory equalisation as discussed above, aimed at evening out the harsh 
and disproportionate burden that resulted from the application of PIE, which required 
the owner to wait for an excessively long time before he could obtain the eviction, 
while the state was attempting to find alternative accommodation. Although PIE does 
not authorise the courts to award compensation, the court derived its authority 
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directly from the Constitution and the compensation was therefore in the form of 
constitutional damages.144  
 The Modderklip decision serves as an example that the regulatory burden 
imposed by PIE may in some instances be deemed substantively arbitrary. However, 
PIE fulfils an important public purpose, especially in ensuring that evictions takes 
place in a humane and constitutional manner. It would have disastrous 
consequences for the public interest if PIE were to be declared invalid for authorising 
arbitrary deprivation of property. The possibility of invalidation of PIE can be avoided 
if the legislature made provision for compensation in instances where the period of 
suspension may extend beyond that which can reasonably be expected of 
landowners to endure without the payment of compensation. In Modderklip the court 
awarded compensation on the basis of constitutional damages, but in view of the 
argument in this chapter it might be more appropriate if the authorising legislation 
itself included such a provision. 
 
5 Constitutional damages 
5 1 Introduction 
When a court considers the validity of a specific piece of legislation, it should try to 
interpret the legislation in a manner that would bring it in line with the Constitution in 
terms of section 39(2).145 If this is not possible the legislation is invalid.146 However, it 
is argued in chapter 1 that the invalidation of legislation that serves a necessary and 
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important public purpose is not always appropriate. The invalidation of such 
legislation will sometimes create a vacuum in a specific area that requires and 
depends on state regulation, for example eviction. It would create public upheaval 
and result in injustice if landowners could evict unlawful occupiers at whim. 
Furthermore, in some instances declaring the legislation that brought about the 
infringement invalid will not provide appropriate relief that just and equitably 
vindicates the claimant’s fundamental right. For example, invalidating social welfare 
legislation that grants the administrator an overly wide discretion to decide whether to 
award social welfare benefits to an applicant would not vindicate the right of a 
claimant whose rights were unjustly and unconstitutionally infringed by the 
administrator’s decision not to grant the social welfare benefits. In these instances, 
where legislation, common law or customary law do not and cannot be interpreted or 
developed to bring it in line with the Constitution but where the invalidation thereof 
would not be in line with section 39(2) of the Constitution either, it becomes 
necessary for courts to step in and award constitutional remedies. 
 Constitutional damages constitutes one remedy to provide appropriate relief 
that is just and equitable to vindicate the violation of a fundamental right in the Bill of 
Rights. Constitutional damages is awarded directly from a provision in the 
Constitution rather than from the common law or legislation.147 Damages awards that 
flow from the common law or legislation provide indirect relief.148 The Consitutional 
Court considered and confirmed the availability of the remedy of constitutional 
damages in the constitutional regime for the first time in Fose v Minister of Safety and 
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Security (Fose).149 Fose also provides the framework for the interpretation and 
application of the term “appropriate relief” in terms of section 38 of the Constitution. 
Subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s recognition of constitutional damages as 
appropriate relief in the Fose decision, this remedy has only been successful in a 
handful of cases. The remedy of constitutional damages is analysed below in relation 
to case law in which this remedy was considered, to evaluate the circumstances and 
factors that courts consider to determine when constitutional damages will be 
appropriate relief. 
 In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security150 (Fose) the Constitutional Court 
delivered a ground-breaking decision on the availability of constitutional damages as 
a remedy for infringements of constitutional rights in South African law. The Court 
had to consider whether constitutional damages constituted “appropriate relief” for 
purposes of section 7(4)(a) of the Interim Constitution, which is the predecessor of 
section 38 of the 1996 Constitution.151 More specifically, the Court had to determine 
whether it was competent in law to award damages, over and above common law 
damages to which the plaintiff was entitled, for a flagrant infringement of one or more 
of the fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. In this case, the plaintiff 
(Fose) sued the defendant (Minister of Safety and Security) for damages arising out 
of a series of assaults perpetrated by members of the police force acting within the 
course and scope of their employment. In addition to common law delictual damages 
the plaintiff also claimed constitutional damages, which included an element of 
punitive damages. It was alleged that assault and torture were part of a widespread 
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pattern of abuses at the particular police station. The plaintiff argued that the 
common law does not provide a remedy sufficient to accentuate the importance of 
human rights violations.152  
 The Court held that “appropriate relief” is “relief that is required to protect and 
enforce the Constitution”.153 What is appropriate will depend on the circumstances of 
each particular case. In light of the egregious human rights violations that preceded 
the constitutional dispensation, the Court held that  
“this Court has a particular duty to ensure that, within the bounds of the 
Constitution, effective relief be granted for the infringement of any of the rights 
entrenched in it. In our [historical] context an appropriate remedy must mean an 
effective remedy, for without effective remedies for breach, the values underlying 
and the rights entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or 
enhanced. … The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are 
obliged to ‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to 
achieve this goal”.154 
The Court held that there is no reason in principle why “appropriate relief” should not 
include an award of damages, especially where such an award is necessary to 
protect and enforce the rights in the Bill of Rights.155 However, whether such a 
remedy would be appropriate will depend on the circumstances of each case and the 
particular right that has been infringed.156 The Court considered the availability of 
delictual damages in this case and stated that the common law of delict is flexible 
and should, in terms of section 39(2), be developed by the courts to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.157 Furthermore, the Court held that the 
common law will in most cases be broad enough to provide appropriate relief for a 
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breach of constitutional rights, but it will always depend on the circumstances of each 
particular case.158 
 In a separate but concurring judgment Kriegler J accepted the plaintiff’s 
argument that the aim of remedies under section 38 differs from the aim of a 
common law remedy.159 One difference is that the relief provided by the common law 
is more specific and victim focussed, whereas the relief provided by the Constitution 
is more general in its application, so it may directly affect a wide range of people.160 
Furthermore, the harm that arises from a violation of the Constitution is a harm to 
society as a whole.161 The judiciary is tasked primarily, albeit not exclusively, to 
prevent and vindicate violations of the Constitution. Judges, in the exercise of their 
discretion, should choose between appropriate forms of relief by carefully analysing 
the constitutional infringement and striking effectively at its source.162 Furthermore, 
Kriegler J described appropriate relief as something that is “specially fitted or 
suited”.163 According to Kriegler J, suitability is measured by the “extent to which a 
particular form of relief vindicates the Constitution and acts as a deterrent against 
further [fundamental rights] violations”.164 In exercising judicial discretion, courts 
should consider the nature of the infringement and the probable impact of the 
particular remedy on the facts of the case before it.165 According to Kriegler J, there 
is no reason in principle why common law and statutory remedies cannot be 
appropriate relief in the sense that they vindicate the Constitution and deter further 
                                                   
158
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 58. 
159
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 95.  
160
 Kriegler J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 95, citing O’Regan J 
in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 
(CC) para 229. 
161
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 95. 
162
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 96. 
163
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 97 (footnotes omitted). 
164
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 97. 
165
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 97. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
255 
 
violations of it.166 Furthermore, there are powerful reasons for not excluding common 
law and statutory remedies from the ambit of section 38.167 On the facts of this case 
there was no place for additional constitutional damages because delictual damages 
constituted adequate vindication of the constitutional rights in question.168 
Furthermore, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to use the limited and 
scarce resources of the government to pay punitive constitutional damages to 
plaintiffs who are already fully compensated in common law.169  
 The Fose decision confirms that constitutional damages, as a constitutional 
remedy, is only applicable when indirect remedies (interpreting the legislation and 
developing the common law or customary law to be in line with the Constitution) are 
incapable of vindicating the infringed fundamental rights in a just and equitable 
manner. Moreover, the decision confirms that it is not possible to claim constitutional 
damages over and above the compensation provided for in common law if such 
compensation already vindicate the claimant’s infringed fundamental rights 
sufficiently. Although the Constitutional Court did not consider what the position 
would be in cases where the legislature explicitly provided for compensation in the 
relevant legislation, the Court’s approach in this regard might by comparison be 
similar to its approach towards the availability of delictual damages in common law. 
In light of the Court’s emphasis on the existence of a remedy in common law in Fose 
it seems unlikely that the Court will supplement the delictual damages with 
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constitutional damages if the delictual damages proves to be insufficient to 
adequately vindicate the fundamental right in question. The Court will rather try to 
develop the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution to ensure that 
the delictual damages that is available in terms of the common law provides a 
suitable remedy. Moreover, by comparison, it seems equally unlikely that the Court 
will supplement the insufficient compensation provided for by legislation with 
constitutional damages. The Court will generally try to interpret the legislation in a 
manner that will render it in accordance with the Constitution. This might mean that 
the Court will if necessary extend the scope of the statutory compensation to bring it 
in line with the Constitution. In this context it should be noted that the notion of 
developing delictual damages wherever possible before considering constitutional 
damages does not apply to the situations that form the focus of this dissertation, 
since the regulatory actions that are at stake are lawful; there is therefore no 
possibility of awarding or extending delictual damages. 
 The possibility of constitutional damages was also considered in President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae)170 (Modderklip). In this case a private landowner 
(Modderklip) approached the court for a declaratory order to the effect that the state 
was obliged to take immediate steps to remove the illegal occupiers who had settled 
on his property. At the time of illegal occupation Modderklip’s property was a fully 
operational farm. The initial number of occupiers was 400 but during the course of 
the court proceedings the number rapidly increased to approximately 40 000 illegal 
occupiers. Modderklip laid charges of trespassing against the occupiers at the local 
police station but due to the growing size of the group of illegal occupiers, the police 
could not detain all the arrestees. Modderklip applied for an eviction order in terms of 
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the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998 (PIE), which was granted in 2001. The illegal occupiers, in contempt of court, 
remained on Modderklip’s property. A writ of execution was issued but the Sheriff 
insisted that the eviction could only be executed with the help of private contractors 
at a cost of R2.2 million. The amount far exceeds the value of the piece of land that 
was illegally occupied. Modderklip was unwilling and unable to pay this amount.  
 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that Modderklip’s rights to property and the 
rights of the occupiers to have access to adequate housing has been infringed.171 It 
found that the state did not provide alternative accommodation for the occupiers. This 
would have enabled Modderklip to enforce the eviction order and it would also have 
enabled the occupiers to comply with the eviction order. Therefore, the state failed in 
its constitutional duty to protect the respective rights of Modderklip and that of the 
occupiers. The state’s inaction allowed the burden of the occupiers’ need for land to 
fall on an individual.172 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it cannot be 
expected of Modderklip to bear the constitutional duty of the state to provide land for 
approximately 40 000 people without any compensation. Furthermore, it held that the 
ideal solution would have been for the state to expropriate the affected property, but 
emphasised that it is questionable whether a court may order an organ of state to 
expropriate property.173 The Court stated that it has a duty “to mould an order that will 
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provide effective relief to those affected by a constitutional breach”; what effective 
relief entails should be determined on an ad hoc basis.174 The Court concluded that 
the only appropriate relief in the particular circumstances of the case was to grant 
constitutional damages.175 According to the Court no other remedy was apparent. 
The Court argued that the payment of damages to Modderklip would allow the 
occupiers to remain on the land and would recompense Modderklip for that which it 
had lost and the state had gained by not providing alternative land.176 
The Constitutional Court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order, albeit 
on different grounds. The Supreme Court of Appeal based its decision on violations 
of the rights to property (section 25) and housing (section 26), whereas the 
Constitutional Court based its decision on the state’s contempt for the rule of law and 
the right to have access to courts (section 34).177 The Constitutional Court analysed 
the ambit and scope of the state’s obligations. The Constitutional Court held that the 
rule of law principle, which underlies our constitutional order, places a duty on the 
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state to provide the necessary mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that may 
arise between them.178 Although PIE was enacted to fulfil this obligation, the Court 
held that the state’s obligation goes further than merely providing mechanisms and 
institutions for the resolutions of disputes.179 It held that the state is also obliged to 
take reasonable steps, when necessary, to prevent large-scale disruptions of the 
public peace in the execution of court orders, which will undermine the rule of law.180 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court stated that the nature of the state’s obligation 
in a particular case will depend on what is reasonable, having regard to the nature of 
the right at risk as well as the circumstances of each case.181 In this case, Modderklip 
followed the correct legal procedures and obtained a court order, which it could not 
enforce because the large number of unlawful occupiers would have nowhere to go 
and the state was either unwilling or unable to assist in enforcing it.182 The Court held 
that it was unreasonable for a private property owner like Modderklip to be forced to 
bear the burden to provide the occupiers with accommodation. It is a burden that 
should be borne by the state.183 Moreover, the mechanisms for executing court 
orders should be sufficient to deter self-help and allow the execution of court orders 
in a manner that prevents social upheaval.184  
                                                   
178
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 39. 
179
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 43. 
180
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 43. 
181
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 43. 
182
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 44. 
183
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 45. 
184
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 46. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
260 
 
The Constitutional Court emphasised that the circumstances of this case were 
extraordinary. It would not have been possible to rely on the traditional mechanisms 
normally used to execute eviction orders, nor would it have been consistent with the 
rule of law to evict the sheer number of people who had nowhere else to go.185 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court took into account that the progressive 
realisation of housing is not an easy task and that it requires careful planning and 
that orderly and predictable processes are vital but, at the same time, it stated that 
“[i]f reality fails to conform to the best laid plans, reasonable and appropriate 
responses may be necessary”.186 The Court concluded that the state had not 
proffered any acceptable reason for its failure to assist Modderklip and this failure 
had accordingly breached Modderklip’s constitutional rights to an effective remedy as 
is required by the rule of law and entrenched in section 34 of the Constitution.187 In its 
determination of what would be an appropriate remedy the Court held that 
“[a]ppropriate relief must necessarily be effective”.188 The Court concluded that in the 
circumstances of the case, the award of compensation made by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal was the most appropriate, effective and expeditious way of vindicating the 
rights of both Modderklip and the occupiers.189  
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd and Another190 (Blue Moonlight) the Constitutional Court was again 
confronted with a claim for constitutional damages in relation to the eviction of 
                                                   
185
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 47. 
186
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 49. 
187
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) paras 50-51. 
188
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 58. 
189
 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 65. 
190
 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
261 
 
unlawful occupiers from private property. The facts of this case appear similar to 
those in Modderklip but in fact are subtly but significantly different. In Blue Moonlight 
the owner of commercial property in the central business district of Johannesburg 
(Blue Moonlight) sought an eviction order against the unlawful occupiers residing on 
its property. Blue Moonlight acquired the property in 2004 for redevelopment 
purposes but could only start to demolish the existing building once the unlawful 
occupiers had been evicted. The property in question has been occupied, for a 
considerable period of time, by 86 people. The condition of the property deteriorated 
over the years to such an extent that it constituted a “dangerous building” under the 
City’s by-laws. All the occupiers have been occupying the property for more than six 
months and have been paying rent and even effected some repairs to the property at 
their own expense. In 2005 Blue Moonlight posted two notices to vacate the property 
and simultaneously purported to cancel any lease that may have existed. In 2006 
Blue Moonlight commenced eviction proceedings in terms of PIE. The unlawful 
occupiers opposed the eviction on the basis that they would be rendered homeless if 
the eviction order was granted. The High Court granted an eviction order as well as 
an order for compensation, in an amount equivalent to fair and reasonable monthly 
rental from a certain period until the eviction date. The court considered it bound by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s constitutional damages award in Modderklip and held 
that Blue Moonlight’s property rights have similarly been infringed.191  
 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the eviction order but set aside 
the order for compensation. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that this case was 
factually distinguishable from Modderklip, and emphasised that Modderklip is by no 
means authority for the proposition that constitutional damages will always be 
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available, or appropriate, as a remedy whenever a fundamental right has been 
breached.192 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the facts of 
Modderklip were exceptional and therefore justified the payment of compensation, 
which was the only remedy that was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal distinguished Modderklip from this case: In Modderklip 
the eviction order had already been granted but ignored by the unlawful occupiers; 
the private landowner was the innocent victim of land invasion and he took all 
reasonable steps within a reasonable time to safeguard his interests; and the large 
number of occupiers on the land, and the failure of the state to provide assistance to 
them, made it impossible for the landowner to enforce the eviction order. In Blue 
Moonlight, on the other hand, the compensation order was made ancillary to the 
eviction order; there was nothing to suggest that Blue Moonlight would not have been 
able to execute the eviction order if it had to; the occupation was once lawful; and 
Blue Moonlight bought the property with full knowledge that it was being occupied by 
a number of persons.193 In the light of these facts, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
concluded that compensation was not an appropriate remedy in this case.194 
 The Constitutional Court confirmed this decision, holding that the enforcement 
of an eviction order may be delayed on equitable grounds, although an indefinite 
delay would amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property as meant by section 25(1) 
of the Constitution.195 The Constitutional Court accepted that “[u]nlawful occupation 
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results in a deprivation of property under section 25(1)”.196 However, section 25(1) 
does not prohibit deprivation in general, only arbitrary deprivation of property. The 
Court stated that the provisions of PIE are not designed to allow for the expropriation 
of land.197 The purpose of PIE is to regulate the eviction process. Tension between 
the competing interests of the occupiers and the affected landowner is inevitable in 
eviction proceedings. PIE allows for eviction of unlawful occupiers only when it is just 
and equitable and provides a list of factors that courts need to consider in the 
determination of what is just and equitable.198 Although it cannot be expected of the 
property owner to provide free housing for the homeless indefinitely, an owner may, 
in certain circumstances, have to be patient and tolerate the temporary restriction on 
the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.199 The Court stated that the rights 
of a property owner must be interpreted within the context of the requirement that 
eviction must be just and equitable.200 All the relevant circumstances must be taken 
into account to determine whether, under what conditions and by which date eviction 
would be just and equitable. One factor that the court needs to consider is the 
availability of alternative accommodation for the occupiers.201 According to the 
Constitutional Court, the fact that Blue Moonlight was aware of the presence of the 
occupiers when it purchased the property must have connoted to it the possibility of 
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having to reasonably endure the occupation for some time.202 Blue Moonlight has to 
endure the reasonable and temporary limitation of its property, without 
compensation, to give the City a reasonable time to comply with its obligation of 
providing alternative accommodation to the occupiers who stand to be evicted.203 
However, the Court stressed that it cannot be expected of Blue Moonlight to bear the 
burden of providing accommodation to the occupiers indefinitely.  
 The Modderklip and Blue Moonlight decisions indicate that the Constitutional 
Court considers the actions and knowledge of the landowner, the fundamental rights 
affected, the actions of the state, and the duration of the unlawful occupation of the 
relevant property important in determining whether the regulatory burden imposed on 
the landowner is in fact disproportionate to the purpose of PIE and therefore 
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court considers whether the measures and institutional 
support provided for in PIE are sufficient to vindicate the infringement of the 
landowner’s property rights. In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local Government and 
Housing in the Province of Gauteng and Others204 (Mkontwana) the Constitutional 
Court held that ownership entails certain rights and responsibilities, which give 
owners some power to limit the potential deprivation of their property rights.205 In 
Mkontwana the Court held that owners have the responsibility to take steps to evict 
unlawful occupiers on their property. In Modderklip both the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court found that the landowner (Modderklip) took all 
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the necessary steps within a reasonable time to safeguard his interests. The 
mechanisms provided for in PIE did not provide any measures to alleviate the burden 
that resulted in the specific case. The deprivation did not result from the unlawful 
occupation of Modderklip’s property, since deprivation may only be legitimate if it is in 
accordance with law of general application. The occupiers were not authorised to 
occupy Modderklip’s property. The deprivation in Modderklip resulted from the 
inaction of the state in assisting Modderklip with the enforcement of the eviction 
order. According to the Constitutional Court the state’s failure to act infringed 
Modderklip’s right to have access to courts (section 34) and the rule of law principle 
that requires the state to provide mechanisms for citizens to resolve any dispute by 
the application of law. Modderklip had to endure the unlawful occupation of its 
property for a long period of time and had no use of his property during the period of 
unlawful occupation. Declaring PIE invalid would not have provided Modderklip with 
appropriate relief, nor would the constitutional remedy of a declaration of rights have 
done so. Therefore, in Modderklip no other remedy than a constitutional award of 
compensation was appropriate. 
 In Blue Moonlight, on the other hand, the Court found that there was nothing in 
the facts of the case to indicate that the landowner (Blue Moonlight) would not have 
been able to enforce his eviction order. Furthermore, the Court held that Blue 
Moonlight had full knowledge of the unlawful occupation before it purchased the 
property, therefore it should have known or should reasonably have been aware that 
its rights in relation to his property might be temporarily limited in the process of 
evicting the unlawful occupiers from the premises. In this regard Blue Moonlight’s 
right to property has been infringed. But section 25 does not prohibit deprivation of 
property in general, it only prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property. The Court held 
that the deprivation of property that resulted from the temporary suspension of the 
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enforcement of the eviction order did not impose an excessive or harsh burden on 
Blue Moonlight. The temporary suspension of the eviction order was necessary to 
give the state a reasonable opportunity to find alternative accommodation for the 
unlawful occupiers. The section 26 rights of the unlawful occupiers would have been 
infringed if the eviction order was made enforceable with immediate effect, since the 
unlawful occupiers would then have been rendered homeless. In light of the 
importance of the temporary suspension of the eviction order and on the facts of the 
case there was no arbitrary deprivation of Blue Moonlight’s property rights, therefore 
it was not necessary for the Court to consider the applicability of constitutional 
damages or any other remedy. However, in Blue Moonlight the Court emphasised 
that the temporary deprivation of a landowner’s property rights that results from the 
suspension of the enforcement of the eviction order may not endure for an indefinite 
period. If the suspension period of the eviction order is unreasonably long, the 
deprivation might become arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional. It is in this regard 
appropriate and necessary for the amendment of PIE to include a compensation 
provision (similar to equalisation payments in German law).206 The compensation 
provision may prevent certain deprivations caused by long delays in obtaining an 
eviction order from being arbitrary, even if the delay is extended for what seems like 
an unreasonably long time.207 
 The possibility of constitutional damages was also considered in the context of 
socio-economic rights. In MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate208 
(Kate), the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether the unexplained and 
unreasonable 40 month delay by the state in considering the claimant’s (Kate) 
application for a disability grant entitled her to constitutional damages. The Supreme 
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Court of Appeal held that the state’s conduct infringed Kate’s right to social 
assistance in terms of section 27 of the Constitution.209 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that what would constitute appropriate relief must be determined 
casuistically with due regard to, amongst other things, “the nature and relative 
importance of the rights that are in issue, the alternative remedies that might be 
available to assert and vindicate them, and the consequences of the breach for the 
claimant concerned”.  
Contrary to the Constitutional Court’s attitude towards constitutional damages, 
and to constitutional remedies in general, evident in Fose, Modderklip and Blue 
Moonlight, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that “the relief that is permitted by 
[section] 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only 
when there is no alternative – and indirect – means of asserting and vindicating 
constitutional rights”.210 Furthermore, the Court held that there will be cases that 
require a direct, rather than indirect, assertion and vindication of constitutional rights 
and where this is so, the next inquiry will relate to what form of remedy would be 
appropriate.211  
With regard to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded 
that Kate was entitled to a direct constitutional remedy and held that the only 
appropriate remedy in the circumstances was to award constitutional damages to 
recompense Kate for the infringement of her constitutional right.212 The Court found 
the state’s argument that the Court’s order will put an extra strain on an already 
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depleted public purse uncompelling. The Court held that it was the state’s unlawful 
conduct that was the very cause for these monetary claims.213 
 The outcome in Kate seems correct and the facts of the case also seem to 
justify the award of constitutional damages. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning regarding the relationship between constitutional remedies and indirect 
remedies is problematic and arguably incorrect. On the facts of the case, a claim for 
delictual damages was not possible. Furthermore, the Court held that the remedy of 
mandamus was available to the claimant and would probably have provided sufficient 
protection of her section 27 rights. However, on the facts of the case, the Court found 
that the remedy of mandamus would not have been effective in the hands of the 
specific claimant.214 The Court considered that the nature of the right at issue is 
directed towards the very poorest in our society, who have little or no knowledge of 
their rights or the resources to readily secure them. The Court also took into 
consideration the influx of similar cases indicating that the problem that was faced by 
the claimant is endemic in the particular province. These factors led to a conclusion 
that an award of constitutional damages was the only appropriate remedy in the 
circumstances that vindicates the claimant’s right and deters further violations. In this 
regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement in Kate regarding the question of 
appropriate relief and the relationship between constitutional remedies and indirect 
remedies seems to be unnecessary, apart from the fact that it also appears to be in 
conflict with the Constitutional Court’s approach to the applicability of constitutional 
remedies. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach seems to be in conflict 
with the one system of law principle set out in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
decision by the Constitutional Court. In terms of this principle and the courts’ duty in 
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terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, existing legislation should be interpreted 
and the common law developed to try to bring it in line with the Constitution. Only if 
this is impossible should courts consider constitutional remedies. Therefore, existing 
indirect remedies should first be considered and exhausted before resorting to 
constitutional remedies. 
In M and Another v Minister of Police215 the North Gauteng High Court had to 
consider a claim for constitutional damages in the context of an infringement of the 
constitutional right to parental care entrenched in section 28 of the Constitution.216 In 
this case the deceased, who was also the family breadwinner, died after sustaining 
serious injuries during his unlawful detention by the police. The deceased’s spouses 
instituted a common law claim for damages for loss of support. They also instituted a 
claim for constitutional damages on behalf of two minor children for the loss of 
parental care. It was argued that no claim for the loss of parental care is available in 
the common law of delict. Section 38 of the Constitution as well as section 15 of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 provide that a court may grant appropriate relief if a right in 
the Bill of Rights has been infringed. The court held that both the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal, in the decisions discussed above, recognise 
constitutional damages as part of our law.217  
Although section 28 of the Constitution does not define the right to family or 
parental care, section 1 of the Children’s Act provides an elaborate definition of 
“care”.218 The court held that a child’s claim for the loss of support or maintenance in 
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 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP). See also a brief discussion of this decision in D Matlala “The law reports” 
2013 De Rebus 35-40 at 35. 
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 Section 28(1)(b) provides that every child has the right to “family care or parental care, or to 
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 M and Another v Minister of Police 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP) para 17. 
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terms of the common law of delict is restricted to material or financial support.219 
However, the content of the right to parental care goes further than just the need for 
financial support.220 According to the court, loss of support does not include an award 
for loss of parental care.221 The court stated that a child cannot claim for both loss of 
support and deprivation of parental care separately as the former is part of the 
latter.222 According to the court, allowing both claims would amount to duplication and 
undue enrichment.223 The court referred to the Constitutional Court’s statement in 
Fose that the common law is flexible and should be developed in terms of section 39 
of the Constitution.224 However, it held that development of the common law in this 
case would not provide relief that is appropriate for the infringement of section 28 of 
the Constitution.225 The parent and child relationship is now governed by statute and 
no longer by the common law.226 Therefore, the development of the concept of loss 
of support had to be effected within the context of the relevant sections of the 
Children’s Act read with section 28 of the Constitution.227 The court held that the right 
to parental care deserves constitutional protection and enforcement.228 
Consequently, the court concluded that a claim for damages arising from a breach of 
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this right must be based on the relevant provision of the Children’s Act read with 
section 28 of the Constitution.229 
This decision provides a good illustration of the relationship between the 
different sources of law. The Constitutional Court, in terms of the single system of law 
principle,230 sets out certain principles (“subsidiarity principles”)231 that function as 
guidelines to help courts identify when to apply legislation, a constitutional provision 
or the common law.232 In terms of the subsidiarity principles, if legislation is enacted 
to give effect to a constitutional right, conflicts regarding that right should be 
adjudicated with reference to the legislation rather than the Constitution or the 
common law.233 Therefore, the correct approach for a claimant who argues that a 
right protected by the Constitution has been infringed is to rely on the legislation 
specifically enacted to give effect to that right. In these circumstances the claimant 
may not rely on the constitutional provision directly, unless he wants to challenge the 
legislation for constitutional invalidity.234 Moreover, a claimant may in these 
circumstances not rely on the common law directly either.235 According to Van der 
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 M and Another v Minister of Police 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP) para 53. 
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 In Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44 the Constitutional Court held that “[t]here is 
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determine the source of law applicable to a particular dispute. “Subsidiarity principles” is the term used 
by AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 37 to distinguish and explain the Constitutional 
Court’s approach with regard to this determination of the applicable source of law. 
232
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 35. 
233
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 36. 
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 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 36. See also Minister of Health and Another NO v 
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 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 36. See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 25; Minister of Health and Another NO v New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae) 
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Walt, these subsidiarity principles developed by the Constitutional Court define the 
space where interpretation of legislation in terms of section 39(2) and the 
development of the common law in terms of section 39(2) must take place.236 By 
implication, a conflict should only be decided directly on the basis of the relevant 
constitutional provision where no legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right 
protected by the Constitution and the right is not protected by the common law 
either.237  
Therefore, in light of the subsidiarity principles it is incorrect to view the 
compensation awarded in M and Another v Minister of Police238 as constitutional 
damages. Constitutional damages is damages that is awarded on the basis of a 
direct constitutional provision (section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution). However, in this case legislation had been enacted (Children’s Act 38 
of 2005) to give effect to a right in the Constitution, namely section 28 of the 
Constitution. Furthermore, section 15 of the Act authorises the court to award 
appropriate relief to a claimant whose rights in the Bill of Rights have been infringed. 
In this case, the court interpreted the legislation with reference to section 38 of the 
Constitution to determine what would constitute appropriate relief. The court’s choice 
to award compensation was based on a statutory provision, namely section 15 of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005) and not directly on the constitutional provision. Therefore, 
the compensation was not constitutional damages but statutory damages. 
The fact that the compensation was based on a judicial interpretation of 
legislation which did not specifically provide for compensation (as required in German 
law for a valid equalisation measure) but rather just for appropriate relief in general, 
                                                   
236
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 37. 
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 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP). See also a brief discussion of this decision in D Matlala “The law reports” 
2013 De Rebus 35-40 at 35. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
273 
 
makes it interesting. It may be an indication that it is possible to interpret legislation 
that would otherwise have been unconstitutional for not sufficiently protecting a 
constitutional right as giving rise to a duty to pay compensation, even though the 
legislation does not specifically authorise the court to provide compensation but does 
not explicitly preclude the possibility of compensation either. Furthermore, there was 
no indication that it was not the legislature’s intention that compensation may not be 
appropriate relief. If this interpretation of the decision is correct, it might be an 
indication that courts are willing to interpret legislation widely in terms of section 39 of 
the Constitution to include the payment of compensation in instances where the 
regulatory statute may be excessive and disproportionate and therefore arbitrary. 
However, this approach is subject to the condition that there is no contrary indication 
with regard to the legislature’s intention or express exclusion of compensation in the 
specific legislation. In this respect, the South African approach regarding the wide 
interpretation of legislation in terms of section 39 of the Constitution to extend the 
existing provision of compensation or read in a duty to pay compensation in the 
instances where the statute may otherwise be subject to invalidity for authorising the 
type of excessive regulatory burden discussed in chapter 1, corresponds to some 
degree with the French, Dutch and Belgian courts’ approach to award compensation 
in terms of the égalité principle, even in the absence of express statutory authority to 
do so. 
5 2 Constitutional damages as an appropriate constitutional remedy 
Constitutional damages is one of the constitutional remedies that a court may award 
when a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed.239 The courts’ primary, although 
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not exclusive, function is to protect and uphold the Constitution.240 Therefore, when 
the state deprives owners of their property rights in a manner that is arbitrary as 
meant in section 25(1) of the Constitution, the courts must give effect to the 
Constitution, which includes the vindication of the infringed fundamental right. This 
means that the courts must award a remedy which is appropriate, just and effective 
to vindicate the right infringed in the specific case.  
 The remedy is dependent on the source of law that regulates the specific 
dispute. Van der Walt points out that the simultaneous existence of various sources 
of law, namely the Constitution, legislation, common law and customary law, which 
are often diverging and occasionally conflicting, sometimes makes it difficult to 
identify the source of law applicable in a particular dispute.241 Furthermore, it cannot 
be assumed that the Constitution will always apply directly because it is the supreme 
law.242 The Constitution requires all law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.243  
 If a fundamental right has been infringed and the common law, customary law 
or relevant legislation does not provide a remedy or the remedy that is provided does 
not vindicate the infringement appropriately, the courts may have to apply a 
constitutional remedy. The Constitution entrusts courts with a wide discretion to 
fashion remedies that vindicate any violation of a right in the Bill of Rights. The 
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 K O’Regan “Text matters: Some reflections on the forging of a new constitutional jurisprudence in 
South Africa” (2012) 75 The Modern Law Review 1-32 at 2. See also C Okpaluba “Of ‘forging new 
tools’ and ‘shaping innovative remedies’: Unconstitutionality of legislation infringing fundamental rights 
arising from legislative omissions in the new South Africa” (2001) 12 Stellenbosch Law Review 462-
483 at 469. 
241
 AJ van der Walt Property and constitution (2012) 13. See the discussion on subsidiarity principles 
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Constitution provides remedial guidelines, albeit vaguely, in section 172(b)244 and 
section 38.245  
 The relationship between section 172(1)(a) and section 172(1)(b) is 
problematic, especially with regard to the award of constitutional damages as a 
constitutional remedy. Section 172(1)(a) provides that a court must declare any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid to the extent of its 
invalidity, whereas section 172(1)(b) states that a court may make any order that is 
just and equitable. In light of the mandatory wording of section 172(1)(a) it is unclear 
whether courts have the authority to award constitutional damages without declaring 
the legislation in question that authorises the infringement invalid. Section 2 of the 
Constitution (the supremacy clause) states that the Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic and law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. 
However, section 2 states further that the obligations imposed by the Constitution 
must be fulfilled. The latter part of section 2 arguably trumps section 172(1)(a) of the 
Constitution in the sense that if the invalidation of legislation would lead to the non-
fulfilment of a constitutional obligation necessary for the achievement of an important 
public purpose, the legislation should stand but the court should then look to section 
172(1)(b) read with section 38 to apply a just and effective and appropriate remedy, 
which includes constitutional damages, to vindicate the fundamental rights 
infringement in question. 
 Both section 38 and section 172(1)(b) are applicable in the determination of the 
appropriate constitutional remedy in a specific case. However, the precise 
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relationship between these two sections is unclear. Furthermore, these two sections 
use different terminology. Section 172(b) provides that a court may make any order 
that is “just and equitable”, whereas section 38 provides that the court may grant 
“appropriate relief”. Although section 38 and section 172(1)(b) use different 
terminology, courts generally read these sections together and use the terms of the 
provisions interchangeably; arguing that it is illogical to attach separate meanings to 
the terms “appropriate relief” and “just and equitable relief”.246 Courts have 
emphasised the fact that there is no uniform formula as to what would constitute 
appropriate relief; what would be appropriate has to be determined on the facts of 
each individual case.247 When courts exercise their remedial discretion, they should 
bear in mind their constitutional mandate and the purpose of constitutional remedies. 
O’Regan states that determining an appropriate constitutional remedy in a 
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 In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) the Constitutional Court considered 
Canadian case law that draws a distinction between “appropriate” and “just” relief. Section 24(1) of the 
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See also M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 
1 (2
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 ed OS 2008) chap 9 at 57-59. 
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constitutional case is often the most difficult aspect of the case.248 This task may 
sometimes require courts to engage with contentious issues.249  
 Judicial activism is the process whereby courts put into practice the 
Constitution’s avowed undertaking to “forge new tools and fashion innovative 
remedies” to ensure that effective relief is granted for the infringement of fundamental 
rights.250 The powerful statement by Kriegler J in Fose holds that when courts award 
a constitutional remedy in constitutional cases, they “attempt to synchronise the real 
world with the ideal construct of a constitutional world created in the image of [the 
supremacy clause contained in section 2 of the Constitution]”.251 In Fose the 
Constitutional Court stated that the harm that arises from a violation of the 
Constitution is a harm to society as a whole.252 Therefore, the importance of 
appropriate and effective relief for the infringement of fundamental rights is crucial. 
Ineffective remedies undermine respect for the courts, for the rule of law, and for the 
Constitution itself.253 In determining what would be appropriate relief, courts take into 
account the interests of the state, the public at large, the victims of the 
unconstitutionality and the complainant before the court.254 Roach and Budlender 
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emphasise that courts should, when determining an appropriate remedy, examine 
the underlying reasons why the state failed to respect constitutional rights.255 
 Although it is the duty of the courts to protect and uphold the Constitution, they 
should be conscious not to encroach upon the domain of the legislative and 
executive branches of government.256 However, virtually all disputes before the 
courts inevitably implicate the separation of powers doctrine.257 In Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996258 (First Certification Case) the Constitutional 
Court held that the separation of powers doctrine underlies the Constitution. The 
purpose of this doctrine is to diffuse and accordingly constrain the respective powers 
of the three arms of government, which in turn enhances democracy, increases 
accountability and eficiency, and protects fundamental rights from state tyranny.259 
O’Regan points out that, comparatively speaking, there is no uniform conception of 
the separation of powers.260 The separation of powers doctrine, in the South African 
context, is not a fixed or rigid constitutional doctrine.261 The Constitutional Court 
conceded that intrusions of one branch of government on the terrain of another are 
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unavoidable.262 The Constitutional Court in Minister of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2)263 held that the three branches of 
government should be sensitive to and respect this separation but this does not 
mean that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on policy.264 
The extent of judicial involvement in the policy issues will depend on the facts and 
context of every specific case.265 
 Bishop argues that courts are not exceeding their powers when the exercise of 
their judicial discretion is indeed appropriate or just and equitable.266 Roach and 
Budlender argue that some cases may require a higher level of judicial intervention, 
which indicates that there are escalating levels of remedies.267 Bishop separates 
remedies into three categories, namely remedies that follow the invalidation of law; 
individual remedies; and remedies for systemic violations.268 According to Bishop’s 
categorisation of remedies, damages falls into the category of individual remedies. 
However, Bishop stresses that individual remedies are not strictly separable from 
systemic remedies or remedies following findings of invalidity; all three remedies are 
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interrelated.269 Moreover, Swart argues that an award of a strong, affirmative remedy 
such as constitutional damages does not breach the separation of powers principle 
but rather enables courts to fulfil their constitutional mandate.270 Currie and De Waal 
offer two reasons why an award of damages is important and necessary in suitable 
cases.271 Firstly, there may be instances where an award of damages is the only 
effective remedy that will vindicate the fundamental right and deter future violations. 
These situations will include, for example, cases where an interdict or declaration of 
invalidity would make no sense and a declaration of rights or mandamus is too weak 
a remedy on the facts of the specific case. Secondly, an award of damages may 
encourage victims to come forward and litigate, which may in itself vindicate the 
Constitution and deter further violations. 
 In the discussion of the case law dealing with constitutional damages it is 
evident that the Constitutional Court is hesitant to award constitutional damages as a 
constitutional remedy. Constitutional remedies are generally forward-looking, 
community-orientated and structural rather than backward-looking, individualistic and 
corrective or retributive.272 Moreover, constitutional remedies have a wider field of 
application and concern a broader range of interests that have to be balanced than 
indirect remedies. Constitutional damages is an exception to the general 
characteristics of constitutional remedies, since constitutional damages is generally 
individualistic and corrective. Furthermore, constitutional damages have inevitable 
budgetary implications and may pose a threat to the separation of powers principle. 
Therefore, in sum, constitutional damages is not a constitutional remedy that can 
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generally be applied to vindicate all fundamental rights violations. Constitutional 
damages is specific and relief of the last resort that will only be considered 
appropriate when there is no other appropriate remedy (indirect or constitutional) 
available to vindicate the fundamental rights infringement in a just and equitable 
manner. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Regulatory state action that is otherwise lawful and legitimate but results in an 
unforeseen and unintended burden being imposed on one or a small number of 
property owners would normally be treated as an arbitrary and therefore 
unconstitutional deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1). In light of the courts’ 
reluctance and the arguable improbability of recognising the notion of constructive 
expropriation the default remedy for arbitrary deprivations is generally a declaration 
of invalidity.273 However, the particular arbitrary regulatory measure may in some 
instances serve a necessary and important public purpose that cannot be reasonably 
attained otherwise. In this regard, it would have an adverse impact on the public 
interest to invalidate the excessive regulatory measure but, at the same time, it would 
be unfair to force disproportionately affected property owners to tolerate excessively 
harsh burdens without receiving compensation for the benefit of society at large.  
In chapter 3 an alternative to constructive expropriation is discussed. German, 
French, Dutch and Belgian law recognise the possibility of including a non-
expropriatory equalisation compensation provision in the specific excessive 
regulatory statute. This non-expropriatory compensation would soften the 
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excessiveness of the regulatory burden and prevent the burden from being 
disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional. The German approach in this regard 
is strict, the excessive regulatory legislation has to specifically provide for non-
expropriatory compensation and the statute must set out clearly and in detail when 
an individual property owner is entitled to such non-expropriatory compensation and 
how the amount of compensation should be calculated. The courts in French, Dutch 
and Belgian law, on the other hand, are allowed to award non-expropriatory 
compensation even in the absence of specific statutory authority. 
 In South African law there is legislation that does provide for non-expropriatory 
compensation, for example the Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984, the National Water 
Act 36 of 1998 and the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939. The compensation 
in these statutes looks similar to the explicit compensation provisions in excessive 
regulatory statutes in German, French, Dutch and Belgian law. This type of non-
expropriatory compensation provisions in these South African statutes fulfil a similar 
function as that in German, French, Dutch and Belgian law in the sense that they 
serve to equalise the harsh and excessive burden that may result from an excessive 
non-expropriatory regulatory measure and thereby prevent the burden from being 
disproportionate and unconstitutional and thereby subject to invalidity.  
 There are also statutes in South African law that explicitly exclude the possibility 
of compensation in specific instances, for example the Firearms Control Act 60 of 
2000. In Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety 
and Security and Others274 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it would be a 
deliberate disregard of the explicit provisions of the Act if the Court was to read 
compensation into the Act, which explicitly excludes the possibility of compensation. 
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In this regard, it seems impossible for courts to interpret legislation that explicitly 
exclude compensation in line with section 39(2) of the Constitution by means of 
reading a compensation provision into the Act. Therefore, an approach similar to the 
French, Dutch and Belgian solution when the legislation does not provide for non-
expropriatory compensation seems impossible in South African law. It seems that 
invalidity is inevitable in these circumstances. It is not clear whether the courts will be 
willing to resort to the constitutional remedy of constitutional damages in cases where 
the legislation explicitly excludes the possibility of compensation but the legislation 
imposes a disproportionate regulatory burden. The Constitutional Court is hesitant to 
award the remedy of constitutional damages and it has repeatedly held that it will 
only be willing to do so in exceptional cases where the facts of the case are 
extraordinary and there are no other remedies available, including invalidity, that will 
vindicate the fundamental right infringement in a just and effective manner. 
 In addition to South African legislation that provides for non-expropriatory 
compensation and legislation that explicitly excludes the possibility of compensation, 
there is legislation that does not provide for non-expropriatory compensation and 
may have the potential of imposing an excessive regulatory burden that may be 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. Examples include the Electronic Communications Act 
36 of 2005, the National Heritage Act 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. In this regard, it is 
argued that the legislation should be amended to provide for non-expropriatory 
compensation that is aimed at reducing the regulatory burden and preventing the 
burden that results from the application of the statute from being disproportionate and 
arbitrary and therefore rendering the specific legislation subject to invalidity. In the 
absence of such compensatory provision, it is not clear whether the courts will 
interpret the legislation in line with the Constitution in terms of section 39(2) by 
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means of reading-in a compensation provision. The remedy of reading-in such 
compensation seems impossible if the statute explicitly excludes the possibility of 
compensation and is also unlikely if the intention of the legislature, although not 
expressly stated, seems to indicate that compensation should not be applicable.275 
However, the decision in M and Another v Minister of Police,276 although only a high 
court decision, might be an indication that the courts will read the legislation in a 
manner that allows compensation if the legislation may be in conflict with the 
Constitution for sufficiently protecting fundamental rights and there is nothing in the 
legislation to indicate that the legislature did not intend the payment of compensation.  
 The last possibility to save excessive regulatory measures from invalidity is by 
awarding constitutional damages. However, this does not seem to be a reliable and 
appropriate alternative remedy to invalidity since it is very specific and a claim for 
constitutional damages rarely succeeds. The Constitutional Court is reluctant to 
award constitutional damages as it will breach the separation of powers principle if i t 
was readily awarded as a cure-all solution. The cases in which constitutional 
damages were awarded concerned exceptional and extraordinary circumstances and 
there were no other alternative remedies available to cure the fundamental rights 
violation that had occurred.  
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 See for example City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 
(SCA) para 3. 
276
 2013 (5) SA 622 (GNP).  
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises the state to limit property 
rights by means of either deprivation or expropriation and simultaneously sets the 
limits to which the state may legitimately limit property rights. Section 25(1) requires 
that any regulatory deprivation of property rights must be authorised by law of 
general application and that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. In 
addition to the requirements in section 25(1), section 25(2) requires that expropriation 
of property must be for a public purpose or in the public interest and must be 
accompanied by just and equitable compensation.  
The focus of this study is the requirement in section 25(1) that no law may 
authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. In terms of the FNB arbitrariness test, a 
deprivation is arbitrary if there is no sufficient reason for the deprivation. The question 
whether there is sufficient reason for deprivation requires a consideration of a 
complexity of relationships.1 In the end, whether deprivation is substantively arbitrary 
or not is dependent on the level of scrutiny a court decides to apply to a particular 
case and may range from a lower rationality review to a stricter proportionality 
review. 
 Courts will generally find deprivations of property that impose a harsh and 
excessive burden on an individual or small group of property owners arbitrary and 
unconstitutional, for which the default remedy is usually invalidity. However, in 
chapter 1 it is stated that invalidity may not always be the appropriate remedy, 
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 See the discussion on the establishment of sufficient reason in chapter 1. 
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especially in cases where the regulatory deprivation complies with all the formal 
requirements of section 25(1) (the regulatory measure is therefore otherwise 
legitimate and lawful in the sense of being authorised by law of general application, 
complies with procedural requirements and serve a necessary and important public 
purpose) but results in an excessive and harsh regulatory burden for one or a small 
group of property owners. In these circumstances, although the disproportionality of 
the burden alone may not always justify the invalidity of the regulatory measure, it 
cannot be expected of the affected property owner to endure the excessive and 
harsh burden without compensation either. Furthermore, it may not be in the public 
interest to invalidate otherwise legitimate and lawful regulatory measures that fulfil an 
important and necessary public purpose merely because the burden that results from 
the application of the regulatory statute may sometimes be excessive and unfair for 
one or a small group of property owners. If legislation that is aimed at protecting the 
public from, for example, water damage that may result from a raise in the water 
levels of a specific dam, authorises the state to increase the height of the dam wall 
were invalidated because of the excessiveness of the burden on the small number of 
adjacent property owners (whose property value may decrease as a result of a loss 
of their property’s view over the dam, or loss of light on the property) might have 
disastrous consequences for public safety. The same is true for the invalidation of 
legislation that is enacted to give effect to specific fundamental rights in the Bill of 
Rights. An example is the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) that is enacted to give effect to property 
rights in section 25 and housing rights in section 26 of the Constitution. In some 
situations PIE may impose a burden that is excessive and disproportionate on an 
individual private property owner whose property is unlawfully occupied. If PIE were 
to be invalidated for authorising arbitrary deprivation of property, it would create a 
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void in eviction law and have dire consequences for the rights of unlawful occupiers. 
In addition, a declaration of invalidity may in some situations be meaningless and 
would not constitute appropriate relief as meant by section 38 of the Constitution.2 
Therefore, it is necessary to find alternative ways to save these otherwise lawful and 
legitimate regulatory measures from invalidity. 
 There are various alternative solutions to invalidity developed in foreign law that 
may serve as examples to overcome the problem in South African law. These 
alternative solutions allow courts to uphold excessive regulatory measures that are 
otherwise legitimate and lawful but impose a disproportionate burden on an individual 
or select group of property owners, by awarding compensation. Such a 
compensation award could be made on the basis of different strategies.  
The notion of constructive expropriation or regulatory taking discussed in 
chapter 2 is one strategy that would allow courts to uphold excessive regulatory 
measures by awarding compensation to the adversely affected property owner.3 In 
terms of the notion of constructive expropriation, courts judicially transform excessive 
regulatory measures that have the same effects as expropriation, although there is 
usually no state acquisition of the property, into expropriation and require the 
payment of compensation even though the state did not formally expropriate the 
affected property owner. The notion of constructive expropriation is influenced by the 
doctrine of regulatory takings that originated in the US Supreme Court. The Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution refers to “taking” of property. The term “taking” is 
wider than expropriation, as it also includes some regulatory state actions that are 
                                                   
2
 See for example President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). See also the discussion of PIE in chapter 
4. 
3
 The use of the terms “constructive expropriation” and “regulation taking” are dependent on whether 
one is dealing with a common law or civil law legal tradition. See the discussion on the difference in 
terminology in chapter 2. 
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tantamount to expropriation but do not constitute formal expropriation of property, 
called regulatory takings. Regulatory takings of property cannot be upheld without the 
payment of compensation. Similar to the US notion of regulatory takings, Irish law 
also recognises the validity of excessive regulatory measures provided that they are 
accompanied by compensation. The Irish Constitution does not distinguish between 
deprivation and expropriation of property and the duty to pay compensation is not 
limited to expropriation in the narrow sense of a formal compulsory acquisition of the 
affected property by the state. In the absence of state acquisition, it is a matter of 
degree whether compensation is required. If a regulatory interference with property 
imposes a harsh and excessive burden on one or a small group of property owners, 
the interference constitutes an unjust attack on property if such regulatory 
interference is not accompanied by the payment of compensation. Similar to the term 
“taking” in the US Constitution, the term “unjust attack” in the Irish Constitution 
extends beyond formal expropriation of property and includes otherwise lawful and 
legitimate but excessive regulatory interferences with property rights. Unlike the 
judicial transformation of excessive regulatory measures into expropriation that 
require compensation in US and Irish law, the Swiss Constitution explicitly 
recognises a third category of state interferences with property, namely material 
expropriation. The types of excessive regulatory interferences discussed in chapter 1 
are generally classified as material expropriation in Swiss law. Similar to regulatory 
takings, compensation is a validity requirement for material expropriation.  
The notion of constructive expropriation is one alternative solution to the 
invalidation of otherwise legitimate and lawful but excessive regulatory deprivations 
of property. However, chapter 2 concludes that the notion of constructive 
expropriation might be inappropriate, if not impossible, in South African law. Despite 
the criticism of the courts’ conflicting theories on how to determine whether a 
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regulatory interference with property rights constitutes a regulatory taking or an 
unjust attack in US and Irish law, which in itself illustrates that constructive 
expropriation creates legal uncertainty and might not be the best solution, the 
structure and terminology of the US, Irish and Swiss constitutions are unique and 
create the necessary context for the application of the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation. Section 25 of the South African Constitution, on the other hand, draws 
an explicit distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property. In terms of 
the FNB methodology, expropriation is a subset of deprivation. Roux argues that the 
FNB methodology negates the possibility of recognising the notion of constructive 
expropriation since excessive regulatory deprivations of property would have failed 
the arbitrariness test before they reach the expropriation stage of the analysis.4 
Furthermore, in Agri SA5 the Constitutional Court stated that state acquisition of the 
affected property is a necessary requirement for the establishment of expropriation. 
In addition to the conceptual hurdle created by the FNB methodology, the 
requirement of state acquisition as a fixed requirement for expropriation also negates 
the possibility of recognising the notion of constructive expropriation since the type of 
excessive regulatory deprivations of property that would generally fall within the 
category of constructive expropriation do not involve state acquisition of property at 
all. In addition to these difficulties, South African courts are generally reluctant to 
recognise constructive expropriation. However, there are alternative solutions to 
constructive expropriation that would allow courts to uphold excessive regulatory 
measures without transforming the deprivation into expropriation. Therefore, it is not 
                                                   
4
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman; T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 3 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2003) chap 46 at 3; T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law 
after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional conversations (2008) 265-281 at 270. See 
also the discussion in chapter 2. 
5
 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 59. 
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necessary for South African law to develop the notion of constructive expropriation of 
property. 
Chapter 3 reviews the German, French, Dutch and Belgian solution to save 
otherwise legitimate and lawful regulatory measures from invalidity because they 
authorise the state to impose a disproportionate burden on individual or small groups 
of property owners. These four jurisdictions recognise that the payment of non-
expropriatory compensation in instances where the regulatory statute authorises the 
state to impose harsh and excessive regulatory burdens on individual property 
owners could equalise the burden and prevent the statute from being 
disproportionate and consequently invalid.  
The possibility of recognising something similar to constructive expropriation 
was considered in German law by the civil, administrative and constitutional courts. 
However, in the Naβauskiesung decision the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly 
rejected the notion of constructive expropriation.6 The Federal Constitutional Court 
held that excessive regulatory measures are invalid and cannot be upheld by the 
judicial award of compensation. However, the Federal Constitutional Court 
mentioned that invalidity might not always be justified but it cannot be expected of 
property owners to bear the excessive and disproportionate burden without 
compensation either. Subsequently, in the Denkmalschutz decision the Federal 
Constitutional Court recognised that compensation may sometimes equalise the 
excessiveness of the burden and thereby prevent the statute from authorising a 
disproportionate regulatory interference with property rights in conflict with the Basic 
Law.7 However, the Federal Constitutional Court held that this equalisation solution is 
only allowed in exceptional circumstances. Non-monetary equalisation measures, 
                                                   
6
 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981). See the discussion of this decision in chapter 3. 
7
 BVerfGE 100, 226 (1999). See the discussion of this decision in chapter 3. 
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such as transitional measures, exceptions and exemptions, are preferable to 
monetary equalisation measures. Furthermore, there must be an explicit statutory 
basis for the payment of compensation and the statute must state clearly when a 
property owner will be entitled to claim compensation and how the amount of 
compensation should be calculated. A vague, catch-all compensation provision will 
not be sufficient. This form of compensation is non-expropriatory since no 
expropriation of property occurred. The German solution to excessive regulatory 
measures is therefore strict. If the regulatory statute does not provide for 
compensation, courts are not allowed to uphold the excessive regulatory measure on 
the condition that compensation should be paid. The only remedy in these 
circumstances is to declare the excessive regulatory statute invalid. 
French, Dutch and Belgian law also recognise the possibility of explicit statutory 
provision for non-expropriatory compensation in instances where the regulatory 
burden is otherwise lawful and legitimate but authorises the disproportionate 
limitation of property rights of an individual or a small group of property owners. 
However, unlike German law, an explicit statutory basis for this form of non-
expropriatory compensation is not a pre-requisite. Furthermore, the form of 
compensation is generally monetary. French, Dutch and Belgian courts may award 
non-expropriatory compensation even in the absence of explicit statutory 
authorisation on the basis of the égalité principle.8 The égalité principle developed in 
French law and was transferred to Dutch and Belgian law. In terms of the égalité 
principle, compensation is required when the burden that results from the excessive 
regulatory statute is both special and abnormal. A regulatory burden is special when 
it only affects an individual or a small group of property owners in comparison to 
similarly situated property owners. Furthermore, a burden is abnormal when the loss 
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 See the discussion of the égalité principle in French, Dutch and Belgian law in chapter 3. 
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that results from the regulatory measure is so excessive that it cannot be expected of 
the affected owner of the property to endure the burden without compensation.9 
Although both requirements must be met before a duty to pay compensation in terms 
of the égalité principle arises, the special burden requirement receives less attention 
in Dutch law than in its French counterpart. 
The role played by the égalité principle is not the same in French, Dutch and 
Belgian law. In French law, the égalité principle forms one of two bases for holding 
the state liable for lawful state action. The legal foundation for awarding non-
expropriatory compensation for lawful state action (also called nadeelcompensatie) is 
unclear in Dutch law. However, the general consensus in Dutch law is that the égalité 
principle forms the independent legal foundation for nadeelcompensatie. 
Furthermore, in Belgian law the égalité principle forms one basis of awarding non-
expropriatory compensation for otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive 
regulatory measures. There is no uniform treatment of excessive regulatory 
measures by the Belgian courts. The judicial award of non-expropriatory 
compensation (in the absence of explicit statutory authorisation) in terms of the 
égalité principle fulfils the same function as monetary equalisation measures in 
German law. The compensation is non-expropriatory in nature and is aimed at 
softening the excessive burden on the affected property owner. 
The German, French, Dutch and Belgian solution of including a non-
expropriatory compensation provision in specific legislation that foresees the 
possibility that the statute may impose a harsh and excessive burden on one or a 
small group of property owners in some situations is not foreign to South African law. 
An overview of statutory examples that make provision for this form of non-
expropriatory equalisation-type compensation is discussed in chapter 4. The 
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legislation discussed there is not a complete overview of South African legislation but 
selected on the basis of examples that were considered by the courts. Examples of 
legislation that do provide for non-expropriatory compensation include the Animal 
Diseases Act 35 of 1984, the National Water Act 36 of 1998 and the Local 
Government Ordinance 17 of 1939. The provision for compensation in these statutes 
fulfil a similar equalisation function as the non-expropriatory compensation provisions 
in German, French, Dutch and Belgian statutes. Therefore, the compensation 
provision is aimed at softening the regulatory burden that may arise from the 
application of excessive regulatory legislation and thereby prevent the burden from 
being disproportionate and unconstitutional and therefore subject to invalidity. As 
appears from the discussion, it is not customary for South African statutes of this kind 
to specify the basis on which compensation must be calculated in the same detail as 
is required in German law, although some provisions of this kind do appear. 
In chapter 4, South African legislation is identified that does not but should 
arguably be amended to provide for non-expropriatory compensation. Examples of 
such legislation include the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005, the National 
Heritage Act 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The application of these legislative examples 
may impose a burden that may in some situations be arbitrary and in conflict with 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. In these circumstances, they may be subject to 
invalidity. Furthermore, South African legislation that explicitly excludes the possibility 
of compensation is also identified in chapter 4. An example of such legislation is the 
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.  
Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution mandates the courts to interpret 
legislation in a manner that will bring the legislation in line with the Constitution. The 
question arises whether the courts may read in a compensation provision in the 
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otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory statute that does not provide 
for compensation or that explicitly excludes the possibility of compensation. In Justice 
Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others10 the Supreme Court of Appeal made it clear that it cannot read a provision 
into the statute that explicitly excludes compensation for specific instances in a 
manner that would allow the payment of compensation in those excluded instances. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that this would unduly strain the language of the 
legislation and be a deliberate disregard of the express wishes of the legislature.11 
Moreover, if the legislation does not explicitly exclude the possibility of compensation 
but the legislation somehow indicates that it is the intention of the legislature that 
compensation should not be payable, the courts will not read in a provision for 
compensation into the statute.12 Therefore, the remedy of reading-in a compensation 
provision seems impossible if the legislation explicitly excludes the possibility of 
compensation or if there is something in the legislation that indicates that it could not 
have been the intention of the legislature to allow the payment of compensation.  
In M and Another v Minister of Police13 the North Gauteng High Court 
interpreted the legislation to allow for the payment of compensation. The decision 
concerned the interpretation of section 15 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which 
merely authorised the court to award appropriate relief to a claimant whose rights in 
the Bill of Rights have been infringed. The legislature did not expressly exclude the 
possibility of compensation or indicate that compensation should not be allowed. 
Therefore, this decision might be an indication that the courts will interpret legislation 
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 [2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012). 
11
 Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others 
[2012] ZASCA 190 (30 November 2012) para 17. See also the discussion in chapter 4. 
12
 See for example City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 12 
(SCA) para 3. 
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in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution to allow for the payment of compensation 
if this remedy will promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and 
there is nothing in the legislation to explicitly or implicitly indicate that compensation 
should not be awarded. If this interpretation of the decision is correct, it may be an 
indication that the South African approach to non-expropriatory compensation 
measures is not as strict as the German approach. It seems that South African law 
will regard vague, catch-all provisions as sufficient. 
If an otherwise legitimate and lawful but excessive regulatory statute does not 
provide for non-expropriatory compensation and compensation cannot be read into 
the statute in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, or if compensation is 
explicitly excluded, the question arises whether the courts can award a constitutional 
remedy in the form of constitutional damages in terms of section 38 read with section 
172(1)(b) of the Constitution to reduce the regulatory burden and prevent the burden 
from being arbitrary and therefore subject to invalidity. The Constitutional Court has 
repeatedly held that constitutional damages is a specific remedy that is only 
applicable in exceptional circumstances.14 The Constitutional Court is generally 
hesitant to award constitutional damages because it may easily breach the delicate 
separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution. The rare cases in 
which constitutional damages were awarded was when the facts of the case were 
extraordinary and there was no other appropriate remedy available that would have 
vindicated the fundamental rights infringement in a just and effective manner.  
In conclusion, the remedy of constitutional damages does not seem to be a 
reliable or appropriate last-resort remedy to salvage excessive regulatory measures, 
because constitutional damages may only be considered in very strictly 
circumscribed and exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, a claim for constitutional 
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damages rarely succeeds. It seems unlikely, if not impossible, that the notion of 
constructive expropriation could be developed in South African law. The courts will 
not read-in a compensation provision if the statute explicitly excludes the possibility 
of compensation or if the legislation somehow indicates that compensation should 
not be awarded. The Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court has yet to 
decide whether courts may read-in a compensation provision into legislation where 
the legislature does not explicitly exclude compensation or indicate that 
compensation should not be awarded. Therefore, invalidity of the excessive 
regulatory statute is inevitable unless the legislature explicitly provides for non-
expropriatory compensation in the particular legislation or if such a provision can 
reasonably be read into the provision. 
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